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The aim of this dissertation is to address the intersection of two normative 
epistemologies, Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) and virtue epistemology 
(VE).  While both are successful in many respects, I argue that the constraints on 
rational degrees of belief provided by Bayesianism are not enough.  VE offers 
additional constraints on degrees of belief, and plays a salutary role for BCT in 
the form constraints from background knowledge on the more subjective aspects 
of Bayesianism.  Chapter 1 is an introduction to my project.  Chapter 2 presents a 
brief review of the logic and epistemology of science, Bayesian Confirmation 
Theory.  Chapter 3 presents a recent development in cognitive science, rational 
analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning 
and bases everyday rationality in formal rationality.  Chapter 4 presents historical 
motivations for turning to virtue epistemology.  I argue that given historical 
considerations virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by shifting the 
focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of agents.  Chapter 
5 presents a development of a particular, reliabilist view in virtue epistemology.  
Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation.  In this chapter I argue that Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory, as an epistemology of science, should be embedded within 
virtue epistemology and that at least one familiar problem, the problem of the 





The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between two 
diverse and distinct epistemologies—virtue epistemology and Bayesian 
epistemology.  At first glance, it may seem as there is no relationship between the 
two.  Virtue epistemology is concerned with the attributes of agents that turn 
justified true belief into knowledge.  Bayesian epistemology is concerned with 
how an idealized agent should reason under uncertainty.  What could these two 
diverse projects possibly have in common? 
Most importantly both are agent centered in a way that other theories of 
justification and knowledge are not.  Virtue epistemology focuses on the 
intellectual character of agents in order to account for how true belief becomes 
knowledge.  Bayesian epistemology focuses on the conditions under which 
theories are confirmed for idealized agents.  Both are, to varying extents, 
idealizations.  With its normative character virtue epistemology is an idealization 
of real agents, though the intuitions to which the virtue epistemologist appeals are 
often based on actual human performance.  The idealization involved in Bayesian 
epistemology is also due to its normative character, though the idealization is 
much more straightforward.  The main goal of Bayesian epistemology is to show 
how we arrive at strongly confirmed theories that are true.   
My view of what an epistemology ought to do is similar to what Feldman 
(2001) calls cooperative naturalism, the view that empirical results from 





  Evaluative questions are questions in general like, “What is the 
nature/structure of justification/knowledge?” where the answer given is evaluative 
and normative.  The idea behind cooperative naturalism is that epistemology 
needs to “cooperate” with science by taking into consideration empirical results in 
order to move forward in answering these kinds of questions and in putting forth 
normative theories.  Epistemology as traditionally construed is “armchair 
epistemology” and is concerned with analyzing epistemological concepts and 
formulating epistemic principles without regard for empirical findings.
2
  These 
concepts and principles are subjected to evaluation by entertaining thought 
experiments.  Epistemologists attempt to locate good ways of reasoning by using 
every day examples and focusing on methods of reasoning that withstand scrutiny 
(e.g. withstand skeptical attacks) epistemologists are able to contribute to the 
improvement of our understanding of the concepts of knowledge and 
justification.
3
  The “armchair epistemologist” is not concerned with how a human 
agent actually reasons, but only with whether or not the proposed concept 
withstands the possible counterexample.  An epistemological naturalist, on the 
other hand, thinks that cognitive science has something to say about what our 
epistemic concepts and principles ought to be because this is how actual human 
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  A cooperative naturalist, then, is someone who thinks that the 
data from empirical science plays a role in evaluating epistemic principles and 
concepts, and epistemology should draw from cognitive science. 
It has long been an intuition of mine that certain areas of philosophy 
should look to the sciences for evaluating concepts and even the conceptual 
analysis itself.  For example, it seems to me that metaphysics should look to 
physics for aid in the conceptual analysis of things like time and causality, 
philosophy of mind should look to biology and cognitive science for aid in 
conceptual analysis of mind and consciousness, and epistemology should look to 
cognitive science and computer science for aid in analysis of concepts like 
knowledge and justification.  That being said, I previously said that my view of 
the role of epistemology is similar to the cooperative naturalist, but it seems to me 
that this view is one sided.  While epistemology can learn from the empirical 
results in cognitive science, cognitive science can also draw from epistemology, 
and indeed recent research in cognitive science has done this.  Chater and 
Oaksford (2007) have put forth a program of rational analysis, “a methodology 
for the rational explanation of empirical data,”
5
 employing Bayesian epistemology 
and logic in order to “rationalize”—give an explanatory account of the reasoning 
behavior of actual agents which conforms to the laws of probability—reasoning 
behavior.   
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One reason given for their appeal to a probability model (and, Bayesian 
epistemology) in their program is that Bayesian epistemology is normative.   
“…if we want to explain how it is that people…are able to cope so 
successfully with their highly uncertain world, the norms of probability 
provide the beginnings of an answer—to the extent that the mind reasons 
probabilistically, the normative justifications that imply that this is the 
‘right’ way to reason about uncertainty, and go some way to explaining 





In other words, Bayesian epistemology does two things for the explanation of the 
uncertain reasoning and decision making of actual agents:  1) in so far as human 
agents reason probabilistically, the norms of probability serve as a starting point 
for explaining the reasoning and decision making behavior of actual agents by 
giving justifications that imply the correct way to reason and make decisions 
under uncertainty (e.g. Dutch book arguments) and 2) the norms of probability 
explain how it is that actual human agents are able to successfully reason and 
make decisions under uncertain conditions and with limited information. 
 One problem relevant to epistemological naturalism in general is 
epistemic normativity, and this problem is a relevant problem for the project of 
rational analysis.  The general problem is this:  there is no clear link between the 
naturalistic criteria that may be set forth for epistemic concepts and normative 
concepts in epistemology.  Or, as Kim (2009) puts it, “If we take the discovery 
and systematization of such criteria to be the central task of normative 
epistemology, is there any reason to think that…normative epistemology is a 
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possible field of inquiry?”
7
  The specific problem for rational analysis is:  if 
human agents reason probabilistically, to any extent, and rational analysis can 
explain how this is, then is there any reason to think that the normative concepts 
of the “armchair epistemologist” still apply?  In other words, if rational analysis 
can explain human reasoning, mistakes and all, then there doesn’t seem to be 
room left for normative concepts such as justifiedness or knowledge. 
 One possible response that I offer is Kim’s own supervenience response.  
Just like moral (or, valuational) properties supervene on naturalistic conditions, 
epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemic, naturalistic conditions.
8
  So, if 
rational analysis can explain reasoning behavior employing Bayesian 
epistemology, then the normative properties of probability can supervene on the 
reasoning behavior.   
 Another possible objection to naturalism in general, and specifically my 
version of naturalism espoused in this dissertation is from Bealer (cited in 
Kornblith, 2008).  The objection goes that naturalism opposes any kind of 
inferential rule following because inferential rule following requires 
acknowledging the force of a priori intuition.  Kornblith’s response is to say that 
while a priori considerations are irrelevant to the naturalist, what is relevant to the 
naturalist is reliability.  “…reliable inferential practices are epistemically 
legitimate; those which are unreliable are not….Rules of inference that tend to 
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produce true beliefs in the kinds of environments that human being occupy may 
fail to live up to a priori standards of cogency, but they are none the worse for 
that.  By the same token, rules of inference that do meet a priori standards may be 
unworkable in practice or hopelessly mired in problems of computational 
complexity.  These kinds of problems are not in any way ameliorated if the rules 
do meet a priori standards of cogency.  A priori standards thus drop out of the 
picture entirely as simply irrelevant to proper epistemic practice.  They fail to bear 
on the conduct of inquiry.”
9
   While I am sympathetic to the first part of 
Kornblith’s response, the program of rational analysis seems to contradict the 
second part.   
 It may be the case that what makes rules of inference epistemically 
legitimate is the reliability of the inferential practice.  For example, if you start 
with true premises while employing modus ponens, you will reliably end up with 
a true conclusion.  Or, if a prior probability is a statistical hypothesis and the 
likelihood is also statistical, then if you use Bayes theorem, you will reliably end 
with an accurate posterior probability.  Or, if we take recent research into 
consideration, if the probabilities do not matter in terms of extracting information 
from an environment
10
, epistemic or inferential practices that reliably get 
information may be considered invalid under a priori considerations.  But, 
reliability may not be the only standard for evaluating the legitimacy of epistemic 
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or inferential practices.  Part of both epistemic and inferential practice for human 
agents involves many other things, such as motivation or cognitive character in 
general. 
11
 Reliability alone does not take these other considerations into account.  




 It is with these considerations in mind that in this dissertation I argue for 
the following.  First, in Chapter 2 I investigate Bayesian Confirmation Theory, the 
logic and epistemology of science.  In this chapter, I review and prove several 
versions of Bayes’ theorem, discuss the problem with prior probabilities, and 
suggest that supplementation from resources outside of the Bayesian purview.  
Second, in Chapter 3 I discuss a recent development in cognitive science, Rational 
Analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning.  
In this chapter, I argue that given the success of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
and the unique methodology of rational analysis that bases everyday rationality in 
formal rationality, contemporary analytic epistemology must go beyond 
conceptual analysis in order to advance the program of Bayesian Confirmation 
Theory and epistemology in general.  Third, in Chapter 4 I discuss three problems 
in epistemology—the debate over the structure of justification, the debate over the 
nature of justification, and the problem of defining knowledge—that go 
unresolved in the history of epistemology.  I argue that given these historical 
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considerations (i.e. the inability of other, more longstanding theories of 
knowledge which employ the notion of justified true belief to deal with Gettier 
problems and skepticism) virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by 
shifting the focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of 
agents.  Fourth, in Chapter 5 I develop and discuss a reliabilist version of virtue 
epistemology.  Finally, in Chapter 6 I argue for some connections between 




BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY 
Introduction 
Confirmation theory is the study of the logic and epistemology by which 
scientific theories may be confirmed, disconfirmed, or refuted by evidence.  It is a 
normative enterprise.  Thus, the primary issue treated by confirmation theory is 
not how scientists actually reason, but what kinds of inferences based on 
evidence should count as correct reasoning.  By analogy, the primary issue 
treated by deductive logic and the associated epistemology is not how people 
(including mathematicians) actually reason.  One of the primary motivations for 
the development of rigorous systems of deductive logic was to put the kind of 
mathematical reasoning used to justify mathematical theorems on a firm footing.  
If some common bit of mathematical reasoning turns out to be invalid according 
to the well-founded rules of deductive logic, so much the worse for that kind of 
reasoning.  And so it should go for a well-founded theory of confirmation.  If a 
specific theory of confirmation really can be established as well-founded, and if it 
then turns out that some bit of common scientific confirmational reasoning is 
invalid according to that theory of confirmation, then that bit of scientific 
reasoning is ill-conceived, regardless of how well regarded it may have become 
among members of a scientific community.  Thus, the goal of confirmation theory 
is to establish normative standards for the kind of scientific reasoning involved in 
the evidential evaluation of scientific theories.  The primary focus of confirmation 
10 
 
theory is to investigate how the evaluation of scientific hypotheses and theories 
should proceed if knowledge (or at least true belief) is to be reliably acquired. 
 A particular theory of confirmation is a proposal for a logic and 
epistemology that may, arguably, succeed in the establishment of scientific 
knowledge.  The most prominent theory of confirmation among contemporary 
philosophers of science is Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT).  The logical 
foundation for BCT consists of a few axioms of the mathematical theory of 
probability together with a definition of the notion of conditional probability.  
From these we can deduce Bayes’ theorem, which in its various forms, does the 
main work of explicating how, according to BCT, evidence bears on epistemic 
evaluation of empirical hypotheses and theories. 
 In this chapter we will take a look at the most telling versions of Bayes’ 
theorem.  I will describe how Bayes’ theorem is supposed to codify the evaluation 
of scientific hypotheses and theories.  We will find that the Bayesian approach has 
certain specific weakness.  However, these soft spots are not fatal flaws.  Rather, I 
will suggest, they call for some kind of supplementation from resources outside 
the usual Bayesian purview.  In later chapters I will make specific suggestion 
about the kinds of supplementation needed in order for the Bayesian account to do 
the job of supplying a well-founded logic for the evaluation of scientific 
hypotheses.  This will require showing how the Bayesian logic may be fitted into 
a larger epistemic context suitable to the goals of scientific enquiry. 
Section 1—Theory and Evidence 
11 
 
 In the broadest sense, hypotheses and theories are collections of 
propositions expressed as statements.  Propositions represent ways the world 
might be, and statements are bits of language that express propositions.  The 
things that propositions represent may be described in various ways — e.g., as 
possible states of affairs, or as possible events.  To say that some bit of evidence 
confirms (or disconfirms) a hypothesis or theory means it raises (or lowers) the 
probability that the hypothesis or theory is true.  Confirmation theory, then, is a 
theory about the relation between evidence and the collection of propositions that 
constitute a hypothesis or a theory.  For evidence to be one of the relata in this 
relation, it must be expressible in statements as well.  Confirmation theory is not 
necessarily committed to a realist position regarding propositions, but it does at 
least require that statements are meaningful sentences of a language that represent 
ways the world might be.  A logic uses statements (declarative sentences of a 
language) as its basic elements.  The relevant logic here is an inductive logic. 
 When we say that a theory is confirmed by evidence, we simply mean that 
the evidence supports it – the theory is true in a greater proportion of the possible 
states of affairs where the evidence statement is true than in the class of possible 
states of affairs overall (including those possible states of affairs where the 
evidence statement is true taken together with those where it is false).  When an 
evidence statement is true, the evidence itself is some actual state of affairs, some 
way the world actually is.  Evidence supports a theory via statements that describe 
the relevant evidential state of affairs.  The logic represents how evidential 
statements may come to support bodies of theoretical statements. 
12 
 
 The strongest possible case of theory confirmation is when the relation of 
confirmational support is a logical entailment.  However, in a logical entailment 
the information contained in the conclusion cannot exceed the information 
contained in the premises.  Thus, confirmation via logical entailment is not 
particularly useful.  Almost all interesting hypotheses go well beyond the 
available evidence.  Furthermore, we often want to draw on scientific hypotheses 
and theories to make predictions about future events.  But for a hypothesis to 
speak about a future event it must necessarily go beyond the evidence for it, 
which can only come from events that have already occurred.  Thus, the only way 
to confirm most scientific hypotheses is to step beyond deductive logic.  The logic 
of evidential support for scientific hypotheses and theories must of necessity be 
some sort of inductive logic, which supports conclusions that have content that 
goes beyond the content of evidence statements.  A Bayesian approach to 
confirmation provides a probabilistic version of an inductive logic. 
Section 2—The Probabilistic Logic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
 Let Pr be a probability function defined over a finite collection of 
sentences (e.g. in a language for predicate logic with identity) that satisfies the 
following axioms: 
1. 0 < Pr(A) < 1 
2. Pr(A) = 1, if A is a tautology 
3. Pr(A  B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A and B are mutually exclusive (i.e. if ~(A 
& B) is a tautology).
13
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In addition, conditional probability is defined
14
 as follows: 
 Pr(A  B) = Pr(A & B) / Pr(B) when Pr(B) > 0.  
When Pr(B) = 0 we may either leave the conditional probability undefined or we 
may define it as automatically equal to 1. 
 Axiom 1 just says that all probabilities are measures between 0 and 1.  
Axiom 2 says that if A is logically certain, then its probability is one.  Axiom 3 
says that when it is logically impossible for the sentences A and B to both be true, 
the probability of the truth of their disjunction equals the sum of the probabilities 
of the truths of the individual sentences. The definition of conditional probability 
just says that the probability of the truth of A given the truth of B is equal to the 
probability of the truth of the conjunction divided by the probability of the truth of 
just B.  Think of the conditional probability as representing the proportion of 
cases where A and B are true together among all those cases where B is true.  
From these three axioms and the definition of conditional probability various 
versions of Bayes’ theorem are immediate consequences.  Here is a common 
version (aka The Simple Form of Bayes’ Theorem: 
Suppose that Pr(E&B) > 0.  Then 
 
    Pr(E  H&B) x Pr(H  B)  
 Pr(H  E&B)     = ------------------------------------ 
       Pr(E   B)    
 
The proof from the axioms is: 
                                                                                                                                     
 
14
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1. Pr(H  E&B) =  Pr(H&(E&B)) / Pr(E&B)    DCP15 
2.  =  Pr(E&(H&B)) / Pr(E&B)     LE16 
3.  =  Pr(H&B) x Pr(E  H&B) / Pr(E&B)   DCP 
4.  =  Pr(H | B) x Pr(B) x Pr(E  H&B) / [Pr(E | B) x Pr(B)] DCP 
5.  =  Pr(H | B) x Pr(E  H&B) / Pr(E | B) 
Here H, B, and E may be any sentence at all.  To see how BCT employs 
Bayes’ Theorem to explicate the evidential support for scientific hypotheses, let H 
represent a hypothesis or a theory
17
, let E represent an evidence statement, let C 
represent a statement about experimental conditions, and let K represent a 
statement of the relevant background knowledge.  Then substituting C&K for B 
into the theorem just derived, we get a version of Bayes’ theorem that expresses 
how evidence obtained under conditions C may support a hypothesis H relative to 
background knowledge and auxiliary hypotheses contained in K:  
    Pr(E  H&C&K) x Pr(H  C&K) 
 Pr(H  E&C&K)   =    -------------------------------------- 
         Pr(E  C & K)   . 
 
What this “simple” formulation expresses is this:  given evidence E obtained 
under experimental conditions C, and relative to background information K, the 
probability of a hypothesis that accounts for that evidence (at least 
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probabilistically accounts for it) is a function of its prior probability (prior to 
taking the evidence into account), Pr(H  C&K), and the likelihood of the evidence 
according to the hypothesis, Pr(E  H&C&K), and the simple probability that the 
evidence would have occurred anyway, regardless of whether H is true, Pr(E  C 
& K).  
 In most scientific contexts the likelihood of the evidence on a given 
hypothesis, Pr(E  H&C&K), is fairly easy to evaluate. The whole point of 
constructing scientific hypotheses is to account for observable features of the 
world.  And the point of doing experiments is to find cases where the hypothesis 
H (in conjunction with experimental conditions C and background knowledge K) 
makes explicit claims about how likely it is that various kinds of evidential events 
E will result.  So, in using Bayes’ Theorem to evaluate how strongly the evidence 
supports H—i.e. to evaluate the posterior probability of H, Pr(H  E&C&K), 
finding the value of the likelihood factor  Pr(E  H&C&K) is generally 
unproblematic.  However, the same cannot be said of the other two factors, the 
simple probability of the evidence, Pr(E  C&K), and the prior probability of the 
hypothesis, Pr(H  C&K). 
 On the face of it the evidence, Pr(E  C&K), is particularly hard to assess.  
How probable would the evidence E be regardless of what hypothesis is true?  
One way to try to get around this problem is by decomposing this probability into 
components via the following theorem of probability theory. 
Theorem of Simple Evidential Probability Decomposition 
If Pr(C&K) > 0, then Pr(E  C&K)  =   
16 
 
Pr(E | H&C&K) x Pr(H | C&K)  +   
Pr(E | ~H&C&K) x Pr(~H | C&H) 
 
The proof for this theorem is: 
 Pr(E  C&K)   =  Pr(E&C&K) / Pr(C&K)    DCP 
   =  Pr(E&C&K&(H ~H)) / Pr(C&K)   LE 
   =  Pr((E&C&K&H) (E&C&K&~H)) / Pr(C&K) LE 
   =  Pr(E&C&K&H) + Pr(E&C&K&~H) / Pr(C&K) Ax 3 
Pr(E | C&K&H) x Pr(C&K&H)  +   
Pr(E | C&K&~H) x Pr(E&C&K&H) 
   = --------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Pr(C&K) 
 
   = Pr(E | H&C&K) x Pr(H | C&K)  +   
Pr(E | ~H&C&K) x Pr(~H | C&H)  
by DCP and LE. 
 
Putting this result together with the Simple Form of Bayes’ Theorem yields the 
following version of Bayes’ Theorem. 
Bayes’ Theorem for Hypotheses and their Negations: 
           
Pr(H  E&C&K)   =  
 
   Pr(E  H&C&K) x Pr(H  C&K) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pr(E | H&C&K) x Pr(H | C&K)  +  Pr(E | ~H&C&K) x Pr(~H | C&H) 
 
 This form of Bayes’ theorem eliminates the difficulty of evaluating the 
simple probability of the evidence, Pr(E | C&K), but replaces that difficulty with 
the need to evaluate the likelihood of the evidence on the negation of hypothesis 
H, Pr(E | ~H&C&K).  In some cases this likelihood is also easy to evaluate.  For 
example, if the hypothesis H says that a particular patient has some specific 
disease D, then ~H says that disease D is not present. In such cases we may have 
17 
 
a blood test with specific likelihoods of turning out “positive for D” (asserted by 
‘E’), when H is true (when D is present) and when the test is performed and 
evaluated in the usual prescribed way (as stated by ‘C’), say, Pr(E | H&C&K) = 
.99.  This is the “true positive rate” for the blood test.  The test will also have a 
specific “false positive rate”—i.e. a specific probability of turning our “positive 
for D” when ~H is true (when disease D is absent), say, Pr(E | ~H&C&K) = .05 (a 
5% false positive rate).  (In this kind of case C says that the blood test was 
administered and evaluated in the standard way, and K contains background 
knowledge about the accuracy and error rates of this kind of test). 
 However, in many scientific contexts the value of Pr(E | ~H&C&K) is as 
difficult to determine as the value of the simple probability of the evidence Pr(E | 
C&K).  For example, how likely is it that the path of a light ray will bend in the 
presence of a strong gravitational fields, E, if the General Theory of Relativity is 
false, ~H?  How are we to figure that out?  Each specific alternative theory of 
gravitation may make a different prediction, but ‘~H’ seems to make no specific 
prediction, and so furnishes no specific likelihood value, Pr(E | ~H&C&K), at all. 
 A way to try to resolve this problem, which is still effectively the problem 
of evaluating the simple probability of the evidence, is to expand the simple 
probability, Pr(E | C&K), further.  Let {H1, H2, ..., Hn} be any finite collection of 
alternative hypotheses that are mutually exclusive in the sense that for each pair 
of them, ~(Hi & Hj), is a tautology. Then an extended version of the 
Decomposition theorem yields the following result: 
Theorem of Simple Evidential Probability Decomposition—continued:   
18 
 
Suppose Pr(C&K) > 0 and that for each pair of hypotheses Hi and Hj under 
consideration K |= ~(Hi&Hj) (i.e. K logically entail that Hi and Hj are not both 
true).  Then 
 
Pr(E  C&K)  =  ∑j=1
n
  Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K)  +   
Pr(E | (~H1&...&~Hn)&C&K) x  
Pr(~H1&...&~Hn | C&H); 
 
     Pr(E  C&K)  =  ∑j=1
n
  Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K)   
if Pr(H1 ... Hn | C&H) = 1 (i.e. if {H1, H2, ..., Hn} 
is an exhaustive set of alternative hypotheses);   
 
     Pr(E  C&K)  =  ∑j=1   Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K)   
if limn→  Pr(H1 ... Hn | C&H) = 1 (i.e. if {H1, H2, 
..., Hn, ...} is an exhaustive set of alternative hypotheses).   
 
From the above three cases we get the following extended forms of Bayes’ 
Theorem. 
Bayes’ Theorem for sets of Alternative Hypotheses 
 
Suppose Pr(C&K) > 0 and that for each pair of hypotheses Hi and Hj under 
consideration K |= ~(Hi&Hj)  (i.e. K logically entail that Hi and Hj are not both 
true).  Then 
 
Pr(Hi  E&C&K)  = 
 




Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K) +  
Pr(E | (~H1&...&~Hn)&C&K) x Pr(~H1&...&~Hn |C&H) 
 
 
Pr(Hi  E&C&K)  =  
 




Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K)  
if Pr(H1 ... Hn | C&H) = 1; 
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Pr(Hi  E&C&K)   =  
 




Pr(E | Hj&C&K) x Pr(Hj | C&K) 
if limn→  Pr(H1 ... Hn | C&H) = 1. 
    
The first of these three versions of Bayes’ theorem is still troubled by requiring 
the evaluation of a likelihood of form Pr(E | (~H1&...&~Hn)&C&K), the 
likelihood of the evidence if none of the explicitly stated hypotheses are true. 
Such a likelihood will often be as difficult to evaluate as the simple probability of 
the evidence. That problem may be mitigated if the prior probability that none of 
the explicitly stated hypotheses are true, Pr(~H1&...&~Hn | C&H), is very close to 
0. Then the whole term Pr(E | (~H1&...&~Hn)&C&K) x Pr(~H1&...&~Hn |C&H) 
will be close to 0, and so the posterior probability of hypothesis Hi will 
approximately be given by the second of these three versions of Bayes’ Theorem.   
 The second of the three versions is unproblematic with regard to the 
values of likelihoods specified by hypotheses.  Its only difficulty is in dealing 
with values of the prior probabilities, a problem to which we will return below.  
The third form of Bayes’ Theorem above applies when version two fails because 
only some infinite collection of alternative hypotheses captures all of the 
theoretical possibilities.  The difficulty here is not with the likelihoods, but with 
actually specifying all of these alternative hypotheses—i.e. the problem is 
specifying all possible hypotheses that may account for a given domain of 
phenomena (e.g. all possible theories of gravitation).  Still, formally the version of 
Bayes' theorem is correct.  It represents a logical idealization that may only be 
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approximated in real cases (e.g. approximated by the second version when the 
prior probabilities of hypotheses far out in the sequence are extremely low).  
 In real cases the best we can often do is to compare the evidential support 
for those alternative hypotheses we can think of.  This pairwise comparison of 
hypotheses is represented by the Ratio Form of Bayes’ Theorem. 
Ratio Form of Bayes’ Theorem 
Suppose Pr(C&K) > 0. Then (taking the ratio of the simple forms of Bayes’ 
theorem applied to two hypotheses, Hi and Hj. we have, 
 Pr(Hj  E&C&K) Pr(E  Hj&C&K)      Pr(Hj  C&K)  
 --------------------     = --------------------  x  ---------------- 
 Pr(Hi  E&C&K) Pr(E  Hi&C&K)      Pr(Hi  C&K). 
 
In practice scientists usually compare hypotheses pairwise on the evidence.  If 
hypothesis Hi makes the evidence E much more likely than alternative Hj, then the 
ratio of likelihoods Pr(E  Hj&C&K) / Pr(E  Hi&C&K) becomes extremely small; 
then provided that Hi isn’t too extremely implausible as compared to Hj before the 
evidence C&E is taken in to account—i.e. provided that Pr(Hj  C&K) / Pr(Hi  
C&K) isn’t extremely small—the posterior probability of Hj becomes extremely 
small. This follows from the fact that 
   Pr(Hj  E&C&K) Pr(E  Hj&C&K)      Pr(Hj  C&K)  
Pr(Hj  E&C&K)  <   --------------------     = --------------------  x  ---------------- 
   Pr(Hi  E&C&K) Pr(E  Hi&C&K)      Pr(Hi  C&K). 
 
Thus, evidence C&E will effectively refute alternative Hj provided that the 
likelihood ratio Pr(E  Hj&C&K) / Pr(E  Hi&C&K) approaches 0 and the prior 
plausibility ratio for the two hypotheses Pr(Hi  C&K) / Pr(Hj  C&K) makes Hi 
not too implausible as compared to Hj. We will delve deeper in to prior 
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plausibilities a bit later.  (Here, and in what follows below, we may take the 
evidence statement ‘C&E’ to represent a large body of accumulated evidence.) 
 If one particular hypothesis Hi makes the evidence much more likely than 
every alternative that is at all plausible prior to taking the evidence into account—
i.e. if Pr(E  Hj&C&K) / Pr(E  Hi&C&K) is extremely small for all alternatives to 
Hi for which Pr(Hi  C&K) / Pr(Hj  C&K) is not extremely small, then we get the 
following result. 
Pr(~Hi | E&C&K)  =  ∑j  i Pr(Hj | E&C&K),  so 
 
Pr(~Hi | E&C&K)  Pr(Hj | E&C&K)     
----------------------  =     ∑j  i   ---------------------   
Pr(Hi | E&C&K)  Pr(Hi | E&C&K) 
       
Pr(E  Hj&C&K) Pr(Hj | C&K) 
              =     ∑j  i  -----------------------  x   ------------------- 
   Pr(E  Hi&C&K) Pr(Hi | C&K) 
 
is extremely small—approaching 0.  But notice that 
Pr(Hi | E&C&K)  =  Pr(Hi | E&C&K) / [Pr(Hi | E&C&K) + Pr(~Hi | E&C&K)] 
       =   1 / [1  +  Pr(~Hi | E&C&K) / Pr(Hi | E&C&K)]. 
So as the ratio Pr(~Hi | E&C&K) / Pr(Hi | E&C&K) approaches 0, the posterior 
probability Pr(Hi | E&C&K) must approach 1, and Hi becomes strongly confirmed 
by the evidence. Thus, when Hi beats each of its competitors Hj in a contest of 
likelihood ratios, making each likelihood ratio Pr(E  Hj&C&K) / Pr(E  Hi&C&K) 
approach 0, if Hi is itself not too implausible (prior to the evidence) as compared 
to those competitors—i.e. if none of the prior probability ratios  
Pr(Hi  C&K) / Pr(Hj  C&K) are extremely small—then the posterior probability 
of Hi approaches 1, and Hi becomes strongly confirmed by the evidence C&E.  
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 There is a kind of Bayesian convergence theorem that shows the 
following.  If Hi is in fact true and is evidentially distinct from alternative Hj on 
each of a sequence of experiments C1, C2, ..., Cn (i.e. for each of them Ck, there 
are possible outcomes Ok for which Hi and Hj differ on the values of 
likelihoods—i.e., Pr(Ok | Hj&Ck&K)  Pr(Ok | Hi&Ck&K) for some possible 
outcomes Ok), then it is very likely (approaching 1 for large numbers of 
experiments n) that the actual outcomes E1, E2, ..., En of the series of experiments 
will be such as to produce likelihood ratios  
Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K) 
-----------------------------------------------------  that approach 0 as n increases.
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Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hi&C1&C2&...&Cn&K) 
 
 This Likelihood Ratio Convergence Theorem shows that if we ever 
discover the true alternative hypothesis (but without knowing it to be true), and if 
we continually test alternative hypotheses against one another on additional 
evidence, then eventually the true hypothesis will win the contest of likelihood 
ratios over all the empirically distinct competitors we ever come to consider.  As a 
practical matter this means that continually testing hypotheses against one another 
will drive the likelihood ratios for each evidentially distinct alternative, Hj, of the 
true hypothesis, Hi, towards 0, since: 
             Pr(Hj  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K)  
Pr(Hj  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K)     <    ------------------------------------------     = 





                                                 
18
 For details and a proof of this theorem see Hawthorne, James, "Inductive Logic", The Stanford 




 Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)      Pr(Hj  K)  
----------------------------------------------------  x  ------------ 
 Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)      Pr(Hi  K) 
 
provided that the conditions under which the experiments are set up are not biased 
in favor of either hypothesis over the other—i.e. provided that 
  Pr(Hj | C1&C2&...&Cn&K)  Pr(Hj | K) 
  --------------------------------  = ------------ 
  Pr(Hi | C1&C2&...&Cn&K)  Pr(Hi | K)  . 
 
As this happens, the posterior probabilities of each of Hi’s competitors goes to 0.  
 This still leaves an important role for the prior probabilities to play.  For, 
the above evidential refutation of competitors only applies to those competitors 
that are evidentially distinguishable from the true hypothesis.  The posterior 
probability of Hi can itself approach 1 only if those alternative hypotheses that are 
not empirically distinct from the true hypothesis can be laid low by incisive 
comparative plausibility considerations.  That is, when Hj fails to be empirically 
distinct from Hi, the likelihoods of all evidential outcomes is the same for each of 
them.  Then  
 Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)      
 ----------------------------------------------------  =  1  so 
 Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)       
  
 Pr(Hj  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K)  Pr(Hj  K) 
 -------------------------------------------     =   ------------ 
 Pr(Hi  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K)  Pr(Hi  K)  . 
 
The comparative values of the posterior probabilities depend entirely on whatever 
plausibility considerations may reasonably be brought to bear in establishing their 
comparative prior plausibilities. 
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 Even when two hypotheses are empirically distinct, there remains an 
important role for prior plausibility considerations to play.  For, notice that if we 
consider the true hypothesis Hi to be too extremely implausible as compared to 
some particular alternative Hj, then it may require a huge amount of evidence to 
overcome that deficit—to make the product of the comparative plausibilities with 
the ratio of likelihoods come to favor Hi over Hj by making 
Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)      Pr(Hj  K)    
----------------------------------------------------  x  ------------  =   
Pr(E1&E2&...&En  Hj&C1&C2&...&Cn&K)      Pr(Hi  K)    
  
Pr(Hj  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K) 
    ------------------------------------------- 
Pr(Hi  (E1&C1)&...&(E1&C1)&K) 
 
approach 0.  So prior plausibilities, presumably based on incisive plausibility 
arguments, will play an important role even when the alternative hypothesis is 
empirically distinct from the true hypothesis. 
 The logic does show that in practice one need not become aware of every 
possible alternative hypothesis for this Bayesian approach to be effective.  Rather, 
these considerations show that if pairs of hypotheses are continually tested against 
one another and if among them the true hypothesis Hi eventually comes to be 
considered and tested, then the true hypothesis Hi will become overwhelmingly 
more strongly confirmed than all of the available alternative empirically distinct 
alternative hypotheses.  As a result, the disjunction of the true hypothesis with its 
empirically equivalent rivals becomes very strongly supported by the evidence.  If 
in addition we can bring probative and incisive plausibility considerations to bear 
in a way that tends to make empirically equivalent rivals of the true hypothesis 
25 
 
comparatively much less plausible, then the true hypothesis will become much 
more strongly confirmed than each of its rivals. 
 The Bayesian logic of evidential support suggests at least several 
conditions that need to be satisfied in order to have a reasonable chance of coming 
to strongly confirm a true hypothesis. 
1.   We must continually try to come up with new alternative 
hypotheses—for, the true hypothesis may not be among those we are 
presently considering. 
2. We must try to bring well conceived plausibility consideration to 
bear in comparing the relative plausibilities of hypotheses against one 
another, and we must be willing to continually consider new plausibility 
considerations. That is, the so-called prior probabilities should not be fixed 
once and for all. As new considerations and new arguments are developed, 
the “background knowledge” K may evolve and change, and even the 
weight of the same background K may be reconsidered and reevaluated. 
Thus, the values of the ratios of prior plausibilities Pr(Hj | K) / Pr(Hi | K) 
should be open to reevaluation, based on the most telling considerations 
we can muster. 
3. We should continually try to find evidential considerations and 
experimental arrangements C on which pairs of hypotheses differ with 
regard to objective likelihoods of possible outcomes.  We should then 
conduct as many of these observations and experiments as we practically 
can, so that we may bring the resulting likelihood ratios to bear on the 
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evidential comparison of one hypothesis to another.  These observations 
and experiments should be conducted in a way that precludes bias in the 
experimental conditions C that may themselves favor one hypothesis over 
another—i.e., the conditions C for experiments or observations should be 
such that Pr(Hj | C&K) / Pr(Hi | C&K)  =  Pr(Hj | K) / Pr(Hi | K). 
Condition 1 is a kind of “open-mindedness” condition.  Indeed, it goes beyond 
mere open-mindedness in that it tells us to actively challenge the current best 
hypotheses with new alternatives.  Condition 2 suggests that those new 
alternatives, as well as the old ones, should be rigorously assessed on the most 
telling plausibility arguments and considerations we can muster.  Suppose that in 
pursuit of conditions 1 and 2 we in fact succeed finding a true hypothesis and find 
it to be not hugely implausible as compared to other alternatives.  Then, if we 
avidly pursue fulfillment of condition 3, the Likelihood Ratio Convergence 
Theorem tells us that enough empirically distinguishing experiments and 
observations will be very likely (approaching a likelihood 1) to produce evidential 
outcomes that strongly support the true hypothesis over its empirically distinct 
rivals.  Then, provided that our most probative plausibility considerations also 
succeed at making the true hypothesis more plausible than its empirically 
equivalent rivals, the true hypothesis will indeed become highly confirmed.  
However, this approach to obtaining scientific knowledge via confirmations will 
never place us in a position to be certain that our best current hypothesis is indeed 
the true one.  This approach may succeed in eventually giving us a highly 
confirmed hypothesis that is also true, but is likely to do so only if we continually 
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attempt to challenge our current best support hypothesis with new alternatives and 
with new evidence and with new plausibility considerations.  Eventually the best 
confirmed hypothesis will be the true one (and it will remain well confirmed on 
future testing), but only if we continue the process of challenging and testing our 
best current alternative hypotheses and theories.  I hope this strikes you as a kind 
of common-sense scientific epistemology.  It is just a rigorously articulated 
version of how the sciences actually proceed in pursuit of theoretical knowledge.  
The recommended approach is just a rigorously justified version of scientific 
epistemological common sense. 
Section3—The Epistemic Context of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
 It takes a community to make a science.  If Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
is to be an effective account of how theories may legitimately be evaluated, then it 
should play a normative role in influencing the beliefs and actions of the members 
of a scientific community.  Within the community there will be a range of norms 
guiding things like how experiments are conducted and recorded, how researchers 
are trained and vetted, and ethical practices regarding how research is conducted.  
There are also specific epistemic norms, which often go unarticulated, perhaps 
because we take them for granted.  For example, although it’s assumed that a 
well-trained researcher will not falsify experimental data, and the community has 
ways of guarding against those researchers who might be tempted to publish false 
data.  Among the kinds of epistemic norms for the community are such things as 
honesty and accuracy in reporting data, and the practice of reporting on 
experimental procedures in enough detail to make it possible for experiments to 
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be replicated.  Thus, among the things that make good science epistemically 
reliable are epistemic norms, many of which are instilled in one’s training and 
then become taken for granted. 
 The logic of BCT, like deductive logic, brings its own norms of internal 
consistency, independent of any specific beliefs of agents.  BCT constrains the 
beliefs that agents may legitimately hold as a result of the logical impact of 
evidence claims accepted by the community (subject to community accepted 
norms for legitimate evidence gathering and reporting – both explicit and 
implicit), and as a result of publically shared plausibility arguments and 
assessments. 
 The most prevalent version of BCT among philosophers takes Bayesian 
probabilities to represent a measure of ideally coherent belief-strengths of agents.  
These belief-strength probabilities are usually called subjective probabilities; they 
represent an agent’s subjective degrees of belief in the truth of various statements.  
On this account the posterior probability of a hypothesis is supposed to represent 
how strongly an agent who is certain of the evidence and background knowledge 
K should believe the hypothesis H.  The idea of taking probabilities to represent 
degrees of belief comes from Bayesian decision theory, where probabilistic 
belief-strengths are combined with quantitative desirability strengths, called 
utilities, to generate net expected utilities; those actions having the highest 
expected utility are then regarded as the most desirable actions to take. 
 To see how the subjective degree of belief idea works as an interpretation 
of probability, consider how it applies to the standard probabilistic axioms stated 
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earlier.  First, by convention we may measure belief strength on a scale from 0 to 
1.  Second, if we know a statement is a tautology, we assign it the highest degree 
of belief 1.  (If a sentence is a tautology but we are unaware of it, then we are less 
than ideal agents, and so our belief strengths may fail to meet the axioms).  
Finally, if we are certain that A and B cannot both be true, then our belief strength 
in their disjunction is supposed to be the sum of our belief strengths in them 
individually.  
 How is this probabilistic measure supposed to apply to my individual 
belief strengths?  My degree of belief that my cat, who is now scratching at the 
door and mewing, wants to go outside and roll around in the dirt is very high, but 
I am not certain of this, only very confident that it is true.  Indeed, although my 
confidence is very high, I do not know exactly what probability value to assign it.  
However, as long as I also assign a low enough probability to the negation of the 
belief (i.e. that it is not the case that my cat wants to go outside and roll around in 
the dirt), I will remain in conformance with the norms of the probability rules.  
My belief strengths will be probabilistically coherent. 
 How can the axioms of probability theory be justified as constraints on 
ideally rational belief strength?  One standard answer comes from Dutch-book 
arguments.  Dutch-book arguments assume that degrees of belief are the fair 
betting quotients for agents.
19
  The Dutch-book theorems show that if your 
degrees of belief do not conformance to the probability axioms, then you should 
be willing to enter into a package of bets that guarantees a sure loss. Furthermore, 
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 John Earman, Bayes or Bust?  A Critical Examination of Confirmation Theory.  MIT Press:  
Cambridge, MA (1992), p. 38. 
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if your degrees of belief remain in conformance with the probability axioms, then 
you should be unwilling to enter into a package of sure-loss bets. 
 Although this degree of belief interpretation of the notion of probability is 
widely accepted among Bayesians, it turns out to be highly problematic as an 
interpretation of probabilistic confirmation functions.  The most salient problem is 
the so-called problem of old evidence.  Suppose that the agent already knows that 
the coin just tossed tuned up heads.  On the hypothesis H that the coin is fair (that 
its chances of coming up heads is 1/2) and under conditions C, that it is tossed in 
the normal way, what is the agent’s proper degree of belief that E, the toss 
resulted in heads?  Presumably it is 1, since the agent is already certain that E.  
But the appropriate Bayesian likelihood for testing H should be Pr(E | H&C) = 
1/2, not 1.  Bayesian confirmational likelihoods are not about what an agent 
believes.  They represent what the hypothesis says or implies about evidential 
outcomes.  Belief does enter in, of course.  When the agent believes E, and when 
E is the totality of the agent’s evidence regarding H, then (other things equal) the 
agent should align her belief-strength with the appropriate confirmational 
posterior probability, Pr(H | E&C&B), to the extent she can determine its value 
(or the range within which its value lies).  The reason she should do so is that in 
doing so, given enough evidence, her belief-strength is likely to go towards 0 for 
false hypotheses and towards 1 for true hypotheses.  However, Bayesian 
confirmation values shouldn’t themselves be construed as belief strengths.  
Rather, they are part of a logical apparatus that may guide belief strengths, much 
as deductive entailment may help guide the beliefs of agents—i.e. in the deductive 
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case, when premises logically entail a conclusion, if you believe the premises to 
be true, then you should believe the conclusion to be true, because the truth of the 
conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premises. In the confirmational case, 
aligning belief strengths with confirmation values has the advantage of (very 
probably, under appropriate conditions) eventually leading the agent to strongly 
believe that false hypotheses are false and that the true hypothesis is true. 
Section 4—Bayesian Epistemology Meets Traditional Epistemology 
 So far, I have discussed various aspects of Bayesianism logic and 
epistemology.  Now I want to turn to what I will call traditional epistemology and 
articulate possible relationships between Bayesian epistemology and traditional 
epistemology.  First, I need to make clear what I mean by traditional 
epistemology.  Following Hajek and Hartmann (2010), by traditional 
epistemology I mean a broad class of theories that takes belief to be a primitive 
notion (rather than a notion that is reducible to something else, like credence), 
takes both knowledge and belief to be central, binary epistemic concepts, and 
analyzes these concepts in terms of their properties, grounds, and limits.
20
  This is 
a broad generalization meant to capture a wide variety of views in contemporary 
epistemology.  I will focus on one of these traditional views, virtue epistemology, 
in Chapter 4, where I will motive the main idea and refine it.  Then, in Chapter 5 I 
will show how virtue epistemology may serve to enhance the Bayesian project. 
Given the description of traditional epistemology in the previous paragraph, one 
might think that that Bayesian epistemology and traditional epistemology are at 
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odds.  In some sense they are.  First, binary belief is not a primitive notion for 
Bayesians.  Most Bayesians take belief to be analyzable in terms of the notion of 
degrees of belief, or degrees of confidence, or credences.  Binary belief may be 
explicated as degree-of-belief above some threshold considered suitable or useful 
for some epistemic context. Consequently, the binary conception of knowledge 
that is taken to be standard in a wide variety of theories under the banner of 
traditional epistemology is may not be so central a concept of Bayesian 
epistemology either.  Given these differences, how can Bayesian epistemology 
have any important links with traditional epistemology, and how can traditional 
epistemology make any use of insights from Bayesian epistemology? 
Although on the surface it may seem that there is little in common between the 
two approaches to epistemology, Hajek and Hartmann (2010) convincingly argue 
that Bayesian epistemology and traditional epistemology complement each 
other.
21
  One suggestion for complimentarity is that while the Bayesian apparatus 
provides sound normative constraints on rational belief, these constraints are not 
exhaustive, and there is much room for supplementation.  For example, on the 
most wide-spread version of Bayesianism, the probability axioms listed earlier 
provide normative constraints on how degrees of belief should work, and Bayes’ 
theorem gives us further normative constraints on how evidence bears on 
hypotheses.  However, these constraints are not the only constraints needed for 
belief-strengths to be rational.   
                                                 
21




The main goal of BCT is to provide a logic and epistemology for how we arrive at 
strongly confirmed theories that are true.  As a logic, and to some extent as an 
epistemology, it is an idealization.  Additional normative constraints are surely 
relevant, not only to belief in general, but also to beliefs that arise in scientific 
contexts.  Traditional epistemology mainly endorses these additional normative 
constraints via analyses of the concepts of justification and knowledge. 
 For some kinds of objectivist Bayesians, Bayesian probabilities are 
determined by compatibility with empirical evidence in terms of chance and 
frequencies.
22
  When degrees of belief cannot be determined by empirical chances 
or frequencies, degrees of belief are to be determined by some form of a principle 
of indifference.
23
  Subjectivist Bayesians, on the other hand, allow for other 
factors to influence an agent’s assessment of Bayesian probabilities.
24
  Sometimes 
there is agreement among various kinds of Bayesians, sometimes there is not.  
This is especially crucial in the assessment of prior probabilities for hypotheses.  
But it seems to me that any serious version of Bayesianism that pretends to be a 
basis for an epistemology has to only permit rational factors to figure into an 
agent’s assessment of prior probabilities, especially in scientific settings. 
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 To illustrate an example of how Bayesians of different kinds assign 
probabilities, consider an example.  Suppose that prior to the toss of a coin (not 
already known to be fair or not) you are asked what the probability of getting 
heads on the toss is.  An objectivist Bayesian may advise that the probability that 
you should assign to each possible outcome (i.e. heads or tails) be ½.  This is 
because there are two possible outcomes and there will be only one result, and 
you do not already have any reason to think that one outcome is more likely than 
the other.  A subjectivist may agree with this recommendation, but for a different 
reason.  A subjectivist like de Finetti (1937, 1980) would advise that any 
assignment of probability between 0 and 1 to the outcome is permissible, 
provided that the probability of the opposite outcome is one minus that value. For 
assigning and any combination of probabilities to the possible outcomes that do 
not add up to one would lead to a sure-loss betting contract, were such a contract 
offered.
25
  In particular, the agent is certainly permitted to assign a degree-of-
belief probability of ½ to heads if the agent is equally confident in heads and in 
tails.  So, although both the subjectivist and the objectivist may agree on the 
probability assignment in this example, the reasons why the assignment may be ½ 
are different. 
 Consider another example.  Suppose that you are presented with an urn 
containing some number of equally sized and weighted marbles, and suppose you 
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are given only the information that some are solid yellow and some are cat’s eyes.  
You have no other information about how many marbles are in the urn or on how 
many of each kind of marble is in the urn.  Suppose you are asked the probability 
of drawing a cat’s eye from the urn.  An objectivist Bayesian would usually 
advise you to assign a prior probability of ½ for the same reasons as in the coin 
toss example.  The only information that you have is that there are two kinds of 
marbles, and given that you have no other information, this is the rational 
probability assignment according to the Principle of Indifference.  A subjectivist 
may or may not agree with this.  A subjectivist may only require probabilistic 
coherence for degrees of belief, and may allow other factors to influence your 
degree-of-belief probability assessment.  So, subjective and objective Bayesians 
may well disagree on probability assignments to outcomes.   
 However, this divide between Bayesians on the rational constraints for 
assignments of prior probabilities (i.e. probabilities that are not hypothesis based 
likelihoods) goes even further.  Even within the subjective and objective camps 
there is lack of widespread agreement on the kinds of rational constraints that 
prior probabilities should satisfy.  For example, the simple Principle of 
Indifference described above has been modernized by Williamson (2005) as a 
kind of maximum entropy principle.
26
  Williamson’s principle has become 
popular among objectivists, but is not accepted by all.  Subjectivists face the same 
problem of no general consensus on rational constraints for prior probabilities.   
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 I have presented the issue among Bayesians thus far as a debate between 
subjectivist and objectivist Bayesians.  But I there is a more general problem for 
BCT having to do with prior probabilities for hypotheses.
27
  The problem of the 
priors is most basically a problem of establishing normative standards for 
assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses.  Restricting the problem to the 
subjectivist/objectivist debate shows that there is not an agreed upon normative 
standard for assigning prior probabilities among various Bayesian schools, though 
there are normative standards in play within each school.  The objectivist would 
say that the normative standard is set in terms of fitting to chances or frequencies.  
The subjectivist Bayesian would say that the normative standard is coherence 
with the probabilistic axioms (at least), or avoiding possible Dutch book 
scenarios.  So, although objectivists and subjectivists may agree on a prior 
probability assignment in certain cases, there are numerous cases where they may 
not agree. 
 I suggest that Bayesians have much to gain from engaging with the 
normative constraints developed by traditional epistemologies.  These normative 
constraints may or may not be explicitly representable by the formal apparatus, 
though I suspect that many could find formal expression, or at least have an 
impact on the formalism.
28
  The next section is devoted to suggesting the kinds of 
                                                 
27
 I am not alone, cf. Elliot Sober (2002) and John Earman (1996) for two very nice discussions of 
the problem.   
 
28
 At this point, I am not concerned with representing normative constraints formally.  However, at 
least one excellent attempt at doing so has been developed.  See Bovens and Hartmann (2003) 
where they define reliability as an endogenous variable (see especially pp. 57-60 for a treatment of 
eye witness reports). 
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epistemic norms and constraints that a Bayesian epistemology may find 
particularly helpful. 
Section 5—How May Traditional Epistemic Norms Provide Useful 
Constraints for a Bayesian Epistemology? 
So, what are the epistemic norms from traditional epistemology that 
provide useful constraints on belief for Bayesian confirmation theorists?  In this 
section I will discuss three—reliability, creditability, and motivation. I think these 
are crucial, though not an exhaustive list.  I choose these three because they are 
important components of a virtue account of knowledge that I will develop in 
Chapter 4.  For now, I count them as normative standards because we take these 
to be standards that have to be met in successful accounts of knowledge. 
First, I need to make clear what I mean by the terms ‘norm’ or ‘normative’ and 
‘constraint’.  I understand a norm to be a standard of evaluation rather than simply 
a rule to be followed.  As a positive standard of evaluation, an epistemic norm is 
something to which we ought to aspire in an epistemic context.  For example, one 
straightforward example of an epistemic norm is that a method should be reliable 
at getting to the truth if it is to warrant justified belief.  The central epistemic aim 
of belief is truth.  To the extent that belief is within our control, we aim believing 
only what is true.  This is especially crucial to scientific inquiry.   
In this sense, attention to reliability is normative.  It is a standard of 
positive evaluation.   We might call a belief forming process reliable if it usually 
gets us to the truth, or perhaps if it will eventually get us to the truth.  A constraint 
on rationality or on the rational formation of belief is a restriction on what is an 
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acceptable, permissible, or correct approach to achieving belief.  So, for example, 
if something is a normative constraint on belief formation, then it is a restriction 
on methods of belief formation that upholds (or requires) a positive standard for 
belief acquisition.  It may rule some ways of forming beliefs “acceptable”, and 
may rule others preferable, and may even rule some as obligatory. 
I take reliability to be a normative constraint on a method for acquiring 
rational belief.  By this I mean, that if a belief forming process is reliable, then we 
have a standard of evaluation that constrains what methods are permissible, 
acceptable, or preferable belief forming methods, given the epistemic goal of 
arriving at truth.  To illustrate, consider a specific reliable belief forming process 
(that in this case happens to be strongly rule-governed) – the process of forming 
beliefs via valid deductive reasoning.  The reasoning process is reliable because 
deductive logic is truth preserving.  Supposing that we start with true beliefs, a 
deductively arrived at belief is permissible, and perhaps even obligatory, and its 
negation is forbidden.  By contrast, consider an instance of an unreliable method, 
a belief forming process that does not reliably get to the truth, like wishful 
thinking.  Even when wishful thinking does produce a true belief, it is only an 
accident that the agent who formed the belief hit upon the truth.  A belief arrived 
at in this way is not epistemically acceptable or permissible to hold, because it 
results from an unreliable process. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I will pursue the idea of epistemic norms in greater 
detail.  My main point will be to show how norms from traditional epistemology, 
especially virtue epistemology, bolster Bayesian epistemology.  But before taking 
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that on I want to investigate how the Bayesian approach fits with standards of 
human cognitive functioning with regard to reason and inference.  I turn to these 




RATIONAL ANALYSIS: BAYESIAN LOGIC AND THE HUMAN AGENT 
Introduction  
The Bayesian approach to uncertain inference (and so decision theory as 
well) provides a model of ideal reasoning in the sense that it can be shown to 
exhibit important benefits to agents who employ it.  I discussed some of these 
benefits in the previous chapter—e.g., avoiding sure loss situations (so-called 
“Dutch Books”) and evidentially converging on true hypotheses.  As is well-
known, common reasoning behavior does not always produce valid, or even 
inductively strong, arguments.  Humans are not natural Bayesian reasoners, in that 
we do not literally begin with specific prior probabilities and then determine 
likelihoods and expectedness in order to ultimately calculate posterior 
probabilities.  We are, however, the kinds of creatures who can (and do) learn 
how to use the Bayesian logic in various ways.
29
  Further, because much human 
reasoning behavior can be (abstractly and partially) modeled in terms of Bayesian 
logic, human agents may be characterized as approximately Bayesian agents.  
That is to say that although human agents often do not naturally apply Bayes’ 
Rule (and perhaps they cannot do so) in many circumstances, they may 
unconsciously implement it by way of their cognitive systems, and may on 
occasion even consciously choose to employ it.  In this chapter I will explore the 
idea that human agents are often approximately Bayesian by looking into an area 
                                                 
29
 I also think it is questionable that human beings are naturally equipped with full-on deductive 
logic skills.  It may be the case that the rules of inference come more easily to some of us, but as 
the results of the Wason task noted below show, the logic does not always make itself apparent to 
most of us. 
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of psychological research that investigates the connection between human 
cognition and ideal models of cognitive performance, a research program called 
rational analysis.  The main thrust of this chapter is to present the some of the 
ideas underlying rational analysis and to use the findings from an updated version 
of rational analysis to argue for a kind of “soft” naturalist approach to 
epistemology that employs Bayesian and similar formal models as norms.  This 
chapter proceeds as follows:  Section 1 presents a brief sketch of John R. 
Anderson’s original rational analysis program, Section 2 presents some problems 
for this position, Section 3 presents Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford’s update to 
Anderson’s original program, and finally Section 4 presents my discussion and 
assessment of this approach, and its implications for the epistemology of human 
agents. 
Section 1—A Brief Sketch of Anderson’s Original Program of Rational 
Analysis 
Rational analysis is a relatively recent development in cognitive science.  
Its proponents attempt to use Bayesian inference to model a variety of cognitive 
systems and to use experiments to determine how well actual human performance 
fits the models.  For example, Anderson developed a model to predict memory 
performance where the goal of memory is assumed to be to provide access to 
needed information acquired in the past.
30
  It is an idealization that represents  
what memory items are made readily available, given a model of the environment 
in which the memory is to be retrieved, the value of retrieving the memory, and 
                                                 
30
 John R. Anderson, “Is Human Cognition Adaptive?” in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 14, 
(1991), p. 474.  I will discuss the nature of goals below, but since I am only giving a preliminary 
example of an application of rational analysis, I will leave the notion vague, as Anderson does. 
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the cost of retrieving the memory.
31
  On this idealization, a rationally designed 
information-retrieval system stops retrieving when the probability that the 
memory is relevant to the current context is low enough that the expected gain 
(measured in some appropriate way relative to the agent’s goals) of retrieving the 
target memory is less than the cost of retrieving the memory.
32
 
Generally a rational analysis (an RA) is “an explanation of an aspect of 
human behavior based on the assumption that it is optimized somehow to the 
structure of the environment.”
33
  As applied to human reasoning, the model for 
this approach is very much like the ‘rational man’ of economics.  As in 
economics, there is no supposition that the agent consciously chooses its 
behavior.  The only supposition is that the behavior of the agent is due to 
cognitive processes that solve problems in an optimal way (given resource 
limitations and costs).
34
  This is to say that the processes in the cognitive system 
are such that, given costs and resource limitations, the behavior of the cognitive 
system will be optimal (at least in some sense).  RA does not assume that humans 
always use optimizing techniques, although they might at times.  Rather, RA 
assumes that humans implement optimizing techniques, in the sense that our 
natural reasoning behavior at least roughly follows the patterns of rational models.  
                                                 
31
 Ibid.  Anderson begins with what he calls a “rationally designed information retrieval system.”  
He does not assume that human memory is rationally designed, but the idealized model is 












The main idea is to explain behavior as well-suited to the goals of a cognitive 
system of an agent in a given environment.
35
   
Before I continue with a sketch of Anderson’s program below, I want to 
discuss both the distinction between using an optimization technique and 
implementing an optimization model, and also the issue of what is meant by goals 
in the RA framework.  When an agent uses an optimizing technique, e.g., when 
she tries to maximize her subjective expected utility, she will be aware of the 
components of the technique, e.g., the subjective probability functions that 
represent beliefs about available actions and about the agent’s environment, a 
preference ranking that represents an agent’s desires, attractions, aversions, etc., 
and the utility functions that numerically represent such a preference ranking.  
The choice of an action is a matter of discerning which action has the highest 
expected utility.
36
  However, this is not what real agents do in most decision 
situations.  Rather, in many cases people make decisions that more or less follow 
the recommendations of the model, without having any specific awareness of the 
model itself.  Rather, they roughly track the model by considering things that the 
model treats as relevant – their situations, what they value, and how to make the 
most of the former given the latter.  This should not be surprising.  The Bayesian 
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 This kind of explanation is not necessarily understood evolutionarily, but might be in some 
cases.  The view may be accompanied by the idea that the mind/brain is composed of cognitive 
modules for solving specific kinds of problems (survival problems posed in an ancestral 
environment) for which those modules were selected as ‘best available’ solutions.  But regardless 
of whether some evolutionary origin may explain how some behavior came to be, the immediate 
goal of a rational analysis is to identify and explain specific kinds of behaviors in terms of optimal 
problem solving solutions by cognitive systems in a given environment. 
  
36
 Grant Hayden and Stephen Ellis, “Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics”, Kansas 
Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 634. 
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decision model wasn’t fully developed until the 20
th
 century, and it was developed 
as an idealization of good human decision making.  What would have been quite 
surprising is if it had captured all real decision making precisely. 
Real agents are usually incapable of using the formal Bayesian model 
precisely: they are unable to assign probability functions to their systems of 
belief, assign complete and transitive preference rankings that represent all of 
their desires, and precisely define their utility functions.  Rather, real decision 
makers try to consider their values and beliefs, and try to best satisfy those values 
given the constraints they think they face.  This sort of rough-and-ready thinking 
about how to proceed can be characterized by, or at least be refined into, a 
mathematical model, so it seems fair to say that real agents implement such a 
model, rather than consciously apply it.  Implementation means that they track the 
main features of the model, not that they consciously try to follow the model.  To 
say that an agent implements a Bayesian decision model means that her natural 
processes of belief formation, preference ordering, etc., can be captured by the 
Bayesian machinery.  The agent need not appeal to the Bayesian norms in any 
direct way.  Rather, the agent’s natural processes may follow Bayesian principles, 
even if the agent has never been exposed to them (much like a person’s eyes 
implement the laws of optics without being aware of those laws).  Furthermore, a 
real agent’s implementation of the Bayesian model (and the attendant norms) will, 
in practice, be only approximate.  For one thing, real agents are unlikely to have 
the computational power needed to fully implement Bayesian Decision theory.  
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Rather, real agents may be natural systems that approximate a Bayesian decision 
model. 
The fact that real agents approximate the Bayesian Decision model should 
not be at all surprising.  For, decision theorists developed that model as an 
idealization of actual kinds of human reasoning that are generally recognized as 
good.  Thus, it is no surprise that we are often decent reasoners according to 
Bayesian norms, since those norms reflect an idealization of best human practice.  
Likewise, it is no surprise that we follow the norms only approximately – they’re 
an idealization. 
Can the usual Bayesian models of belief and decision be extended and 
improved to more accurately capture the decision behavior of real agents?  I think 
so, but some caution is needed when attempting to extend and improve models of 
decision and reasoning.  To the extent that a model becomes more descriptively 
accurate, it tends to lose at least some of its normative force.  One charge against 
RA, discussed further below, is that it attempts to maintain the normativity of the 
model while at the same time making it more descriptively accurate.  This runs 
the risk of “rationalizing” cases where reasoning behavior is poor.
37
  A truly 
accurate psychological model of cognitive decision processes should capture all 
facets of the workings of cognitive systems, including the kinds of cases where 
they tend to go wrong or break down, much as an accurate account of the 
physiology of the visual system should model how visual systems can go wrong 
or break down, and thus provide defective visual representations of the world.  So, 
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 C.f. Branden Fitelson and James Hawthorne, “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of 
Confirmation” in Philosophical Perspectives, No. 24, (2010), 207-241. 
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a psychological model that more accurately captures actual behavior will also 
capture less than fully rational behavior (perhaps even capturing cases of neurotic 
behavior).  Such a descriptively accurate model must lose some of its normative 
status, at least in some kinds of cases. 
Just as we do not want a descriptive psychological model to treat every 
instance of human reasoning as fully rational, we must also be careful about 
selecting appropriate normative models against which to judge human 
performance.  By judging human performances against inappropriate normative 
models it becomes far too easy to label those performances as irrational.  In a 
specific situation the behavior of real people may not descriptively fit one 
normative model at all well, but may fit an alternative normative model quite 
closely.  In such cases what counts as rational for RA should be behavior that 
closely fits the latter model.  Thus, although a model that counts as rational in the 
everyday sense discussed below (such as a bias toward confirmation rather than 
falsification) may fail to model optimal reasoning behavior for the confirmation 
of scientific hypotheses, it may in fact both be descriptively accurate for the 
behavior of real agents, and may be quite rational for the kinds of non-scientific 
day-to-day situations in which people make most of their judgments.  That is, the 
norm of effectively finding the truth is only one possible desiderata of choice.  In 
many everyday situations we care more about advancing other ends (rather than 
getting to the truth solely for truth’s sake). Thus, in such situations, behavior that 
fits an alternative normative model more geared towards achieving the desired 
ends will count as rational according to the model, and that model will be more 
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suited as a normative standard by which to measure behavior to achieve real 
human ends. 
On the issue of goals, Anderson does not make clear whether the goals of 
an agent are explicit, representing actual desires, or implicit, representing what an 
agent should desire given the kind of creature it is and other beliefs and desires it 
may have.  One reason for this, I think, is that Anderson is mostly concerned with 
refining a model that fits actual behavior.  Real agents have both kinds of goals—
explicit and implicit.  However, Anderson also ascribes goals to subsystems, e.g. 
to the memory system, in a way that seems independent of the explicit goals of 
the agent of which the system is part.  But can a cognitive system of an agent have 
its own, independent goals?  I think that cognitive systems have their own goals 
only in a metaphorical sense.  That is, when developing a model of an agent with 
cognitive capacities, goals can be attributed to a cognitive sub-system, but the 
sub-system has no goals apart from the agent – goal talk for such systems should 
reduce to talk about the proper functioning of the subsystem in contributing to the 
agent’s abilities.  Real agents have their own independent goals; cognitive 
subsystems (as functionally identified systems) do not. 
Above I said that the main idea behind RA is to attempt to explain 
behavior as well suited to the goals of an agent’s cognitive system in a given 
environment.  There are at least two motivations for this type of approach within 
cognitive science.  One is to alleviate what Anderson calls the “induction 
problem” and the other is to aid with what Anderson calls the “identifiability 
problem.”  The induction problem is the problem of inferring the cognitive 
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structure of the mind from the structure of behavior.  The identifiability problem 
is the problem of identifying the true mental structure among multiple, competing 
proposals which produce the same behavioral consequences.
38
  Behavior is 
observed, but identifying and articulating the underlying mental mechanisms that 
explain the behavior is difficult at best.  Rational analysis attempts to alleviate the 
induction problem by assuming that behavior is optimized to the structure of the 
environment.  The idea is this: if we assume (provisionally) that behavior is 
optimized in this way and we know the optimal behavior given the environment, 
then this suggests a cognitive mechanism behind the behavior.
39
  To be sure, 
Anderson’s induction problem is a general problem for cognitive psychology—
inferring the structure of the ‘black box’ of the mind from the structure of the 
behavior.  However, if this approach is correct, then a mechanism (for the ‘black 
box’) can be suggested given the constraint that we try to optimize our behaviors 
relative to our environment to achieve our goals.  This is not so much a solution to 
the induction problem, but rather a starting point.  The idea is that our behavior is 
fairly well-matched to our goals.  We aren’t just following a script or blundering 
about blindly – rather, we tailor our behavior to our goals.  That, at least, is how it 
seems, so is arguably an appropriate starting place for the explanation of behavior.   
Rational analysis attempts to alleviate the so-called identifiability problem 
by giving an abstract explanation of behavior in an environment that bypasses the 
problem of providing a detailed description of cognitive architecture.  The 
identifiability problem is the problem of identifying the true mental structure 
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among multiple, competing proposals which produce the same behavioral 
consequences.  Thus, every proposal that accounts for behavior has to deal with 
the internal structure of human cognition to some extent.  The main issue 
addressed by RA is whether the cognitive mechanisms are rational decision-
theoretic-like structures, or something else—e.g., a set of fast and frugal heuristics 
(a la’ Gerd Gigerenzer
40
) that succeeds for evolutionarily important goals like 
survival and reproductive success in the ancestral environment, but often gets less 
fundamental things wrong.  However, one need not have a detailed account of 
specific cognitive functions in order to address this issue. That is, if RA is right, 
then we should be able to get a pretty good first approximation of cognitive 
structure (as psychological regularity) by assuming that in broad outline it 
captures (i.e. approximately implements) Bayesian decision theoretic principles.  
Thus, to the extent that people do what normative Bayesian Decision Theory 
suggests, it makes sense, as a starting point, to suppose that their mental 
architecture is roughly isomorphic to that model.  After all, normative models of 
reasoning are ‘best practice’ idealizations of what we take our reasoning to 
actually be like. 
Anderson offers three reasons for thinking that RA will be more 
successful than alternative approaches here.  First, behavior and the structure of 
the environment are easier to discern than the details of cognitive architecture.  
Second, rational analysis offers a level of explanation for behavioral data that is 
more appropriate than behavioral explanations in terms of specific brain 
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 Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty, Oxford 
University Press:  New York, NY (2008). 
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structures, because the implementing mechanism (the specific ‘hardware’) is not 
as crucial to the explanation of behavior as the ‘program’ being implemented by 
the cognitive system.  Third, whatever the correct explanation for behavioral data 
at the level of the implementing mechanism, rational analysis (or some 
alternative at the same level of explanation) is still required to provide an 
adequate characterization and justification of behavior.
41
  I will address each 
reason in turn. 
Anderson’s first reason for the appropriateness of the RA approach seems 
right, as far as it goes – it really is easier to discern behavior and environment 
than it is to discern precise mechanisms in the brain.  In a clinical setting, for 
example, behavioral data can be recorded and the environment can be controlled 
precisely.  Although specific cognitive mechanisms can be precisely described, 
they cannot be observed directly in the way that behavior and environment are 
observed.  However, ease of discernment of behavior and environment does not 
imply anything about the shape of those implementing mental mechanisms.  If 
RA is correct, then some systems in the brain must implement the behaviors in 
accord with whatever norms are appropriate according to RA. 
Anderson’s second reason for the appropriateness of the RA approach is 
that rational explanation is a more appropriate explanation of behavior than lower 
level mechanisms.  This reflects Anderson’s view that appealing to the ‘gory 
details’ about behavioral mechanisms is unnecessary: “A rational theory … 
provides an explanation at a level of abstraction above specific mechanistic 
proposals.  All mechanistic proposals which implement the same rational 
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prescription are equivalent….  [A] rational theory provides a precise 
characterization and justification of the behavior the mechanistic theory should 
achieve.”
42
  Anderson arguably (and admittedly) goes further than he ought at 
times, eschewing all interest in the structure of the mind:  
The structure driving explanation in a rational theory is that of the 
environment, which is much easier to observe than the structure of the 
mind.  One might take the view (and I have so argued in overenthusiastic 
moments, Anderson, in press) that we do not need a mechanistic theory, 
that a rational theory offers a more appropriate explanatory level for 
behavioral data.  This creates an unnecessary dichotomy between 
alternative levels of explanation however.  It is more reasonable to adopt 
Marr’s (1982) view that a rational theory (which he called the 
‘computational level’) helps define the issues in developing a mechanistic 
theory (which he called the level of ‘algorithm and representation’).  In 
particular, a rational theory provides a precise characterization and 




I agree with Marr and the non-over-enthusiastic version of Anderson here.  
Rational explanation specifies the psychological-level mechanisms of the mind 
while allowing that those psychological processes can be implemented (with more 
or less precision) by a number of possible lower level mechanisms.  Still, the 
psychological-level of explanation tells us something important about the 
underlying causal mechanisms—they are constrained by the need to implement 
the psychological pattern. 
Because RA and mechanistic theories are compatible, the third reason is 
the most compelling reason Anderson gives.  If there is a correct mechanistic 
theory of cognition that describes what Marr (1982, as cited by Anderson) calls 





 Ibid.  The article Anderson cites as “in press” in this passage is the following: Anderson, J. R. 
“The Place of Cognitive Architectures in a Rational Analysis” in K. Van Len (ed.), Architectures 
for Intelligence, Erlbaum:  Hillsdale, NJ (1991). 
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“the level of algorithm and representation,”
44
 then it seems right that, to the extent 
that the program succeeds, RA will provide a characterization of behavior that 
will closely fit the correct mechanistic explanation, whatever it is.  That is, 
success at the psychological/computational level provides a constraint on 
mechanistic theories of cognition.  The initial hypothesis, at least, should be that 
the mechanisms of the mind implement the psychological account, so that the 
processes and categories of that account will be explained (rather than explained 
away). 
Anderson describes what he calls a program of providing a rational 
analysis of behavior via an inferred cognitive system as a six step process.  Here 
is the program as Anderson describes it: 
1. Precisely specify the goals of the cognitive system.   
2. Develop a formal model of the environment to which the 
cognitive system is adapted.   
3. Make minimal assumptions about the computational limitations 
of the cognitive system. 
4. Derive optimal behavior functions given 1-3.   
5. Check the empirical evidence to see if the predictions of the 
behavior are confirmed. 
6. Repeat to refine the theory.
45
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I will briefly explicate each step, and address attendant problems.  First, Anderson 
describes step one so as “to specify the goals being optimized by the cognitive 
system.  Any behavior can be seen as optimizing some imaginable goal.  Thus, 
the mere fact that one can predict a behavior under the assumption of optimality is 
no evidence for rational analysis.  One must motivate the goals to be 
optimized.”
46
  Step one involves identifying a cognitive system in terms of its 
goals.  One must hypothesize the existence of a cognitive system (as a component 
of an agent) whose function is to accomplish specific kinds of tasks in an 
environment which will further the goals of an agent.  The agent’s attempt to 
accomplish those goals, and the systems that contribute to it, is ultimately 
supposed to explain various behaviors of the agent.  Since many different goals 
can be suggested as the reason for a given behavior, reasons must be given for 
taking the system to have the goals that are proposed by the analysis.  In other 
words, the first step in RA is to specify goals for a cognitive system to achieve, 
and to argue that the attempt by a cognitive system to accomplish these goals is 
the reason for the specific kinds of behavior to be explained.   
Figuring out what goals an agent’s behaviors are trying to accomplish can 
be difficult.  Later I will provide an example where the goal of the cognitive 
system in question is to help the agent gain information about the world.  No 
doubt it is often beneficial for an agent to accomplish this kind of information-
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 Ibid, p. 472.  Anderson suggests that “there is the strong constraint that these goals must be 
relevant to adaptation” (p. 472).  He recognizes, however, that "[a] rational theory should stand on 
its own in accounting for data; it need not be derived from evolutionary considerations” (p. 472)  
While it is almost certainly true that human cognition has been importantly influenced by natural 
selection, the ways in which that might happen are complex and take us beyond the scope of this 
work.   
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obtaining goal.  But the hypothesis that a specific kind of behavior results from a 
cognitive system’s attempts to accomplish a specific goal will often be 
controversial.
47
  Ultimately any such hypotheses are subject to evaluation via the 
usual standards of the scientific enterprise – e.g., to ask the question, does this 
hypothesis provide the best (most plausible) explanation of the behavior, given the 
totality of the available evidence? 
Step two involves developing a formal model of the environment.  There 
may be numerous ways to specify an environment, and the environmental model 
being used may tend to favor one optimality hypothesis over another.
48
  Thus, a 
body of evidence may be needed to support the hypotheses about the formal 
model of the environment that captures important features of the environment in 
which real cognitive systems operate.
49
   
Step three involves identifying and specifying constraints on the cognitive 
system.  Such constraints may prevent it from obtaining globally optimal 
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 What I mean here is that it is controversial to posit a specific goal in order to explain a specific 
behavior.  For example, consider the following.  Two speakers are engaging in a conversation.  
Speaker 1 abruptly turns away from Speaker 2 mid-sentence.  There are multiple possible goals 
that could be posited to explain the observed behavior of Speaker 1.  Speaker 1 could have turned 
away in order to show rudeness to Speaker 2, in order to direct attention to an unexpected, loud 
noise, in order to direct attention to the unusual behavior of a colleague flailing his arms in the 
background, and so on.  Step two allows us to narrow the scope of possible goals, but even then 
the hypothesis that a specific kind of behavior results from a specific kind of goal is controversial 




 For one example, consider the possible specifications of environment in footnote 19 (above).  
The specifications could be very narrowly prescribed (with small scope) eliminating macro-
physical descriptions (e.g. the conversation takes place in the Milky Way Galaxy) in favor of 
micro-physical descriptions (e.g. Speaker 1 is in brain state α) or very broadly prescribed (with 
wide scope) excluding micro-physical descriptions in favor of macro-physical descriptions (e.g. 
Speaker 1 is in the second floor office of Speaker 2 on Earth).  So, the way in which one 
optimality model may favor one hypothesis over another could depend on the level of description 






solutions.  The point of a rational analysis is to model behaviors as resulting from 
a cognitive system that responds appropriately to the structure of the environment 
in which it must work.  RA models need not make strong assumptions about the 
particular nature of the cognitive system itself.  Only minimal constraints on the 
cognitive system and its resources are identified up front.
50
  Indeed, Anderson 
initially called for only two: the cost on the cognitive system in considering 
alternatives of action, and the limitations of memory.  The cost on a cognitive 
system can be either physical (e.g. a limit in capacity) or computational (e.g. 
requires more computational resources than the agent has available, or can make 
available before action must be taken); these need not be mutually exclusive.  
Furthermore, the model builds in memory limitations because of the empirical 
evidence that memory really is limited. 
The fourth step involves a normative model of ideal performance.  
Normative models tell us what cognitive systems should be like.  Starting from 
the assumption that people do pretty much what they ought to be doing, RA 
proposes that normative models do double duty as (abstract, psychological-level) 
descriptive models.  In cases of reasoning and decision the proponents of rational 
analysis often employ the normative aspects of probability theory and Bayesian 
decision theory in their accounts of how human beings actually behave.  The idea 
is that this step is supposed to answer the question: what behaviors maximize 
utility as defined by the goals set forth in step one.
51
   








Step five involves checking to see if the behavior of cognitive systems can be 
predicted from the optimal behavior predicted by the model.  In other words, the 
question to be answered is, do the predictions of the model match the empirical 
evidence?  This step leads to step six which is reiterating the process to develop a 
more adequate theory, especially in cases where the predictive model of behavior 
is wide of the mark. 
Section 2—Some Problems for Rational Analysis 
Rational analysis seems like a promising approach to identifying 
important features of human cognitive systems, especially those involved in 
reasoning and decision.  From a purely philosophical perspective, if the program 
succeeds, even in a limited way, we may find that human agents are natural 
Bayesian reasoners, to at least some degree and in some contexts.  If the program 
fails –we discover that human agents are naturally not very good at Bayesian 
reasoning – then, to the extent that Bayesian reasoning and decision can be shown 
to be normatively appealing, so much the worse for natural human inclinations.  
Courses of study in critical reasoning may become that much more important.  
From a cognitive science standpoint, the issue is to what extent we naturally 
follow Bayesian norms in our everyday cognitive processing.  We at least seem to 
have beliefs and other doxastic states, as well as desires, hopes, and other 
evaluative states.  We at least seem to make comparative preference judgments.  
If the RA program succeeds, we will find that our mental states are governed by 
something like Bayesian norms.  If the program fails then perhaps the best bet is 
that human psychology is shot through with biases and heuristics that may often 
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go wrong, but were selected for evolutionarily important goals (like survival and 
reproductive success) in the ancestral environment.
52
  Or, perhaps there is no good 
explanation of behavior at the higher, psychological/computational level of 
abstraction and all behavior is to be explained at the level of specific lower level 
cognitive mechanisms. 
For most of this section I will look more closely at the specific steps, 
proposed by Anderson, in the development of a rational analysis.  I will do so 
with an eye towards identifying potential problems for rational analysis as an 
approach to the study of cognitive components of human reasoning and decision.  
If this program is to succeed, these problems must be dealt with.  Indeed, I think 
they can be addressed adequately, to the extent that similar kinds of issue may be 
addressed in other areas of the epistemology of the sciences.  In the last part of 
this section I will address the assumption of rationality behind rational analysis. 
The first step suggested by Anderson is to specify the goals to be achieved 
by a cognitive system.  Clearly this brings teleology directly into the research 
program.  The usual philosophical/scientific approach to dealing with the 
teleology of a natural system (a system not created by an intelligent agent) is to 
provide a functional analysis of that system (and, the system in this case is the 
agent as a whole, not some isolated part of the agent).  This is what Anderson has 
in mind with step one.  While attributing goals to agents in this way is common, 
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goal attribution to agents is not uncontroversial.
53
  Thus, in the specification of 
goals of a cognitive system, the idea is presumably that human agents need certain 
capacities to pursue human ends, and the goal of the cognitive systems is to 
provide for those capacities.  Still, to attempt to specify specific goals is often a 
somewhat speculative enterprise.  Recall that the goals of cognitive systems are 
not to be merely identified with our conscious goals and desires.  So, in 
attempting to satisfy step one of Anderson’s program, there may be some degree 
of speculation with regard to goals of a cognitive system.    
In actual cases of rational analyses the goals attributed to a cognitive 
system tend to be pretty uncontroversial, so often the attribution of goals doesn’t 
require an extensive justification.  For example, Anderson posits that the goal (i.e. 
function) of a memory system in a human is to store information in such a way as 
to enable the possessor of that memory system to retrieve the most useful items in 
a fast and efficient way (just as the goal or function of the heart is to pump blood 
throughout the organism).
54
  The implicit goal of information storage with the 
means of fast and efficient retrieval is plausible enough because such a system 
would be generally useful for achieving any number of ends.  Similar to this is the 
idea that there are cognitive systems for which the goal (or function) is to gather 
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 For example, consider apparent acts of altruism and associated questions surrounding goal 
attributions.  What is the goal of an apparently altruistic act?  Is the goal to bring about a good 
state of affairs?  Is bringing about a good state of affairs good because it brings about pleasant 
sensations in the agent, or is it good for some other reason?  Is there another goal?  This set of 
questions in not exhaustive.  There are undoubtedly more possible questions that could arise when 




 Speed and efficiency are goals in their own right, but are implicit goals and are often 
subordinated to the explicit goals of an agent.  For example, if an agent has the explicit goal of 
learning a proof, speed and efficiency of retrieval might be subordinated to accuracy. 
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information about the world, and other systems whose function is to extract 
additional hypothetical information via inference.  The controversy will not 
usually be about there being cognitive systems that perform these tasks (i.e. that 
have this goal), but rather about the way in which these goals/functions are 
accomplished by the relevant systems.  For example, connectionism is a popular 
mechanistic theory that attempts to explain behavior and intellect in terms of 
artificial neural nets.  Information is stored in the connection strengths between 
the units that make up the network.
55
  Though this is a popular view, it stands in 
contrast to another popular view, computationalism.  Computationalism is the 
view that cognition resembles digital processing, and that strings of information 
are produced sequentially according to the instructions of symbolic program.
56
  
Whether cognition and information storage is a result of the connection strengths 
between the nodes of the network or is a result of symbol processing is a 
controversial issue.  However, controversial issues such as these are not part of 
step one of Anderson’s process for constructing rational analyses.  Recall that 
Anderson thinks that ‘nuts and bolts’ mechanistic theories in cognitive science are 
unnecessary. 
Step 2 is to develop a formal model of the environment(s) to which the 
system is adapted.  In the case of the memory retrieval system, the model will 
specify that within a specific kind of environment some sorts of memory items are 
needed very often, others less often, some very quickly, others not so quickly, 
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some very frequently, etc.  The model will place some specific (numerical) 
constraints on these factors (e.g. some items are needed in fractions of a second, 
others in a few seconds, and others may not be so time-sensitive). Of course, 
which sorts of items from memory are needed quickly and frequently will usually 
differ across environments. These features of the model come from studies of real 
human performance in common situations.  So the model is not simply some a 
priori speculation.  In cases of information gathering and reasoning, the models 
are of typical situations in which human agents perform these tasks, but where it 
is comparatively easy to figure out best outcomes for human agents in the specific 
environment, and to figure out what various kinds of information gathering and 
reasoning systems would do in that situation (i.e. in that environment). 
One thing that remains unclear is whether, and when, the various sorts of 
situations (i.e. environments) in which reasoning tasks occur are to be handled by 
the same cognitive system or by different cognitive systems.  If a proposed system 
for solving a problem (fulfilling a goal) seems to work well at modeling human 
performance in some kinds of situations, but fails to accurately model 
performance in other situations, that may suggest that different systems handle 
these different kinds of situations.  Thus, in the iteration stage (step 6) one may 
have to subdivide environment models, and distinguish types of situations as 
importantly different environments that trigger different cognitive systems that 
have somewhat different goals (e.g. with regard to speed vs. reliability). 
In step 3 Anderson suggests that minimal (but reasonable) assumptions be 
made about the computational limitations of the cognitive system.  Anderson 
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suggests that these assumptions be limited those about computational ‘costs’ (in 
time and energy) and limitation in available memory.  However, human agents are 
not supercomputers (we often have a hard time doing simple computations in our 
heads, such as those involved in balancing a checkbook).  And some kinds of 
problems in reasoning are known to be computationally intractable even for 
supercomputers (the so-called NP-hard problems).
57
  So, without drawing on 
assumptions that are too limiting, what is already known about human 
performance from empirical research, and also what is known about 




Step 4 is the heart of the approach.  Here a specific normative model is 
employed to derive optimal behaviors for the system in bringing about the 
identified goals identified in step 1 under the environmental conditions modeled 
in step 2 subject to the computational constraints identified in step 3.  The 
normative model itself may be subject to controversy—does the model employed 
as a norm have features that make it truly optimal?  Here one must look to the 
literature on such models (logic, decision theory, artificial intelligence) to find the 
features of suggested models that are supposed to make them superior ways to 
accomplish cognitive goals.  Given a normative model, one must then apply it to 
the environment model under the identified computational constraints to derive 
predicted problem solving behaviors.  Actually doing this may not be as 
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straightforward as it sounds, and it may bring in various kinds of background 
assumptions.  For example, one background assumption discussed below is the 
rarity assumption.  The rarity assumption is a principle that is based on the idea 
that finding out that something is true is more informative than finding something 
that is not true.  The rarity assumption says that the probability of something 
being the case is rather lower than the probability of that something not being the 
case.
59
  So, looking for confirming instances tends to be more helpfully 
informative (i.e. more useful in general for the purpose of gaining information) 
than searching for falsifying instances.  However, the rarity assumption is just 
that—an explicit assumption made by proponents of rational analysis.  The rarity 
assumption is controversial because it is not clear that this is really what is going 
on when confirmation bias (the tendency to search only for confirming instances 
and to not look for refuting instances) is observed.  Furthermore, there are always 
implicit assumptions in an experimental setup (e.g. that the equipment is 
functioning properly).  So care is especially needed here, and controversy may be 
unavoidable at this point. 
At step 5 one does empirical studies to see whether human subjects behave 
as predicted by the derived problem solving behaviors in step 4.  Here the issue 
arises as to whether the proposed experiments really get at the cognitive tasks one 
has attempted to model.  For example, if the model predicts a specific optimal 
behavior, but subjects do not exhibit this behavior, then the model is thought to be 
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faulty.  This is a common problem faced by experimental psychological studies, 
and is no worse than usual for such research. 
If the observed behaviors do not fit the model, in step 6 the whole process is 
refined and reiterated.  Presumably, goals are reexamined and, if necessary, more 
carefully specified.  The environmental model is refined, perhaps subdividing the 
model into different environments corresponding to a finer, more detailed 
specification of cognitive goals.  Computational limitations are reexamined and 
refined.  Normative models are fitted more sensitively to the refined goals and 
environments
60
, and appropriate goal directed behaviors are again predicted.  
Then new experiments are designed and conducted.  A major worry here is that 
one might be able to accommodate any behavior with enough tinkering with the 
models.  So care must be taken not to turn this process into a foregone conclusion. 
Finally, one may well wonder whether the supposition of rationality on the 
parts of human agents that underlies rational analyses is warranted.  There is 
ample evidence to show that human performance on reasoning tasks (e.g. the 
Wason tasks) is flawed.  If the rationality of human agents is assumed in this 
model, then the question to answer is why do we perform so badly on reasoning 
tasks?  The proponents of rational analysis start their answer by distinguishing 
between two senses of the term “rational” (though there are obviously more 
senses of the term as well).  Oaksford and Chater (2007), for example, note that 
there is an informal, everyday sense of ‘rationality’ that we take for granted.  
Everyday rationality is that which concerns beliefs and actions in specified 
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circumstances in daily life.
61
  For example, everyday rationality is involved when 
we make decisions and act and when we interpret each other’s sentences.  When 
we do make mistakes, it is against a backdrop of rational behavior that we take for 
granted.  This rational behavior is exhibited in our regular, everyday patterns of 
thought and action and is difficult to model in artificial form.
62
  They maintain 
that a quite different sense of the term “rational” refers to the kind of rationality 
involved in formal reasoning (i.e. mathematical and logical).
63
   
I want to defend briefly the notion of everyday rationality as distinct from 
formal rationality because I am cautiously sympathetic to this optimistic outlook 
on human rationality.  On the one hand, humans are very good at both basic and 
non-basic cognitive tasks.  For example, one basic cognitive task that we learn 
and develop as children is communication.  Early on we learn how to 
communicate our desires in order achieve implicit and explicit goals.  One (what I 
take to be) non-basic cognitive task that we learn (which refines our 
communication skills) is language.  We learn both semantics and syntax from our 
caregivers at amazing rates.  As we age these kinds of tasks become more difficult 
to learn, and our cognitive abilities to learn may diminish.  However once we 
have the cognitive ability, it is possible for us to retain it until death, even in a 
diminished capacity.   
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On the other hand, there is ample scientific and anecdotal evidence that 
humans really do fall short of our normative ideals, especially regarding non-basic 
cognitive tasks (e.g. reasoning skills).  This is why I am cautiously sympathetic to 
the notion of everyday rationality.  Just because a behavior is common (e.g. bias 
toward confirmation instances), we cannot assume that it is rational.  Furthermore, 
because we do fall short of our normative ideals so often, the ability to achieve 
implicit goals does not necessarily indicate rationality in a robust sense of the 
term. 
Section 3—Oaksford and Chater’s Extension of the Rational Analysis 
Program 
Oaksford and Chater (2007) have recently extended and improved on 
Anderson’s ideas for RA.  The main idea underlying RA is that everyday 
rationality tends to approach norms of ideal rationality as articulated by various 
kinds of formal models of rationality.  Oaksford and Chater specifically focus on 
particular aspects of human reasoning (e.g. inductive reasoning), whereas 
Anderson’s methodology was aimed at overall cognition.  The Oaksford and 
Chater version of RA seeks to explain how it is that humans are so successful in 
most kinds of every day reasoning, but unsuccessful in certain kinds of cases that 
have been studied.  Another aspect of this research aims to find links between 
legitimate informal reasoning and fallacious informal reasoning.  I think this 
second aspect of the project is important, but here I will focus on the work on 
explaining reasoning behavior in terms of formal models of rationality.  
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The starting point for this discussion is the relationship between the 
everyday rationality described above and formal rationality.  First, formal 
rationality is the rationality of logical and mathematical reasoning.  It is defined in 
terms of formal approaches to deductive and probabilistic reasoning that are 
paradigms for normative rationality.  In cases where human reasoning falls short 
of the normative standards set forth in these formal models, our epistemic 
evaluations of these cases are negative.  One important version of this kind of 
reasoning employed by RA is the logic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
described in Chapter 2, where it was introduced as an idealized model of 
reasoning, a model that applies descriptively only to ideal agents.  As 
idealizations both BCT and formal deductive logic are used as standards by which 
to judge informal and common sense varieties of reasoning and rationality.  In 
particular cognitive scientists (such as Wason) base their evaluations of human 




In Chater and Oaksford’s version of RA, the usual, straight-forward 
applications of formal models of rationality to human reasoning do not always 
suffice to determine whether that reasoning is any good.  One reason for this is the 
evidence from research programs like Wason’s, which seem to show that by the 
standards of the usual formal models, intelligent human beings tend to perform 
very poorly on simple reasoning tasks.
65
  Chater and Oaksford argue that we have 
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good evidence that people are rational—intelligent enough to flourish in a very 
complex world.  So, if the data from some kinds of rather contrived tests seem to 
show that almost all human agents tend to be very badly mistaken about decisions 
and judgments in the test situation, perhaps we should look more closely at 
auxiliary hypotheses about what counts as a correct judgment in such situations.  
Perhaps the standard models of formal rationality on which we are drawing are 
not really appropriate to the kind of situation that the test apparently presents to 
most people.  Perhaps in such test situations as the Wason task we are not actually 
testing for what we think we’re testing for, and perhaps the judgments most 
people make really are quite reasonable when we look at decision making more 
broadly, in terms of the real goals of the agent.  Human agents do seem to be 
doing something right. So a central task of cognitive psychology should be to 
figure out how and why natural reasoning succeeds so well. 
The RA approach does not consider everyday rationality to be superior to 
well established principles of formal rationality.  Rather the approach is to use the 
formal models more subtly—to represent features of human reasoning that are 
ignored by less sophisticated, blunter applications of formal reasoning models.  
Here are two examples that are well-known examples of how common reasoning 
falls short of well-established principles of formal rationality.  The purpose of 
mentioning these examples is to give two cases where common reasoning does 
not agree with principles of formal rationality if applied too bluntly.  The RA 
approach is to take into consideration the fact that the mistakes are common and 
to give an account of this fact using formal reasoning models.   
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The first example is decision theory.  Decision theory is a formal model of 
rationality that treats agents as utility maximizers.  However, a well-known 
“paradox” first suggested by Allais apparently shows that real human agents fail 
to maximize utility.
66
  Typically, this failure is understood as a defect in 
reasoning.  This is to say that because agents fail to act so as to maximize utility, 
the defect is in agent reasoning, not a defect in decision theory and its 
recommendations.  Some have suggested, though, that the frequency of failure to 
maximize utility shows that decision theory as normally conceived needs to be 
modified.
67
   
The second example is from propositional logic.  Propositional logic 
requires that the following inference from (1) to (2) is valid: 
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(1) If Mary lives in an apartment, Mary is poor, and if Mary lives 
in a house, Mary is rich. 
(2) Either, if Mary lives in an apartment, Mary is rich, or if Mary 
lives in a house, Mary is poor. 
However, most people regard (1) as highly plausible and (2) as not plausible.  So, 
common intuition is to reject the inference from (1) to (2) (because (2) has to be at 
least as plausible as (1)).
68
   
Because it is so common for people to make incorrect  assessments 
regarding these kinds of reasoning problems, one response is to reject the 
normative status of formal reasoning.  However, anyone who has taught an 
introductory logic class knows that this leads to the unacceptable result of (what I 
like to call) logic by consensus.  Chater and Oaksford use the following metaphor 
to describe this view, “…being rational is like a musician being in tune: all that 
matters is that we reason harmoniously with our fellows.”
69
  This conclusion, that 
everyday reasoning should trump formal reasoning is unacceptable because it can 
actually lead to incoherence.  The normativity of formal reasoning is based on 
showing that violations lead to various sorts of incoherence (e.g. assertions of 
claims that are jointly contradictory, being subject to Dutch bookable betting 
behavior, etc.).  Indeed, with more careful consideration, most people can be 
brought to see that commonly identified violations of formal logic are indeed bad 
reasoning. 
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What RA does is look for cases where apparently bad reasoning that is 
very common in practice may be rational with respect to a more sophisticated 
application of a (possibly different) model of formal rationality.  The traditional 
approach in cognitive science and philosophy is to treat rationality as uniform and 
absolute—as ‘all or nothing’.  Theories of rationality are compared with human 
performance, and when human performance does not meet the normative standard 
required by the theory, human performance is evaluated negatively (e.g. judge as 
irrational, illogical, unjustified, etc.).  RA rejects this approach as heavy-handed.  
It sees a proper role for cognitive science in explaining the success of agent’s 
cognitive processes in achieving goals given the constraints of the environment.
70
  
In doing this, RA draws on formal, normative principles of rationality to give 
structure to its descriptive explanations.  However, which formal principles are to 
be employed in the explanation of successful reasoning behavior should be 
determined by which principles are the most useful in explaining the success of 
those cognitive processes under examination.
71
  That is, successful thought and 
action in everyday contexts are used as working hypotheses.
72
  Furthermore, what 
counts as successful behavior is behavior that best approximates an optimal 
solution to a specified problem.  The empirical problem is that of explaining why 
people’s cognitive processes are so successful in achieving their goals (broadly 
construed).  In other words, what behavior counts as rational is not determined a 
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 While successful thought and action in everyday contexts are assumed, it is also understood that 
there are cases where people just make mistakes.  What counts as ‘successful’ will depend on a lot 
of factors, not the least of which is the goal that is to be attained.  
71 
 
priori, but determined by taking into consideration goals, environment, and 
computational limitations of the cognitive system.
73
  Let us look briefly at each of 
these three components. 
First, Chater and Oaksford assume that everyday thought and action is 
centered on achieving goals.  I take this to be uncontroversial, provided we 
construe the notion of a goal appropriately.  Decision theory is the paradigmatic 
formal theory concerned with goals.  In economics, which is grounded in decision 
theory, goals are represented in terms of good outcomes (which need not be 
material and may even be understood as path dependent), and utilities are 
associated with achieving them.
74
  Because goals can vary for a consumer (e.g. 
save money, or ensure reliability), utilities can vary with the object or event.  
Moreover as a theory of rational choice, decision theory treats agents as acting so 
as to maximize utility.  To see how this applies to a real human agent we need to 
carefully examine and evaluate her goals.  But there is a multitude of goals 
involved in everyday thought and action.  We can only evaluate the rationality of 
a real agent’s actions if we can accurately determine her goals.
75
  Notice that if the 
notion of a goal is construed broadly enough, then even unconscious, disinterested 
inquiry can count as an action aimed at a goal.  For example, the passive act of 
perception aims at gaining information from an environment.
76
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Central to a rational analysis of an agent’s behavior is the role and structure of 
the environment.  The environment acts as a constraint on finding a successful 
solution.  Everyday rationality is successful relative to an environment and what 
is achievable there.  RA employs formal models to determine what actions would 
count as successful relative to goals and the environment.
77
  In other words, what 
counts as successful action and thought is only meaningful relative to 
environmental opportunities and restrictions.  RA accommodates this by using a 
formal model of the structure and role of the environment to help delineate the 
actions and goals available to the agent. 
RA makes minimal assumptions about the cognitive computations of the 
cognitive system.  Rather, it hypothesizes that whatever behavior is optimal, or 
nearly so, for solving the problem at hand will be implemented by the cognitive 
system.  The reason a suboptimal behavior may be implemented is obvious—real 
agents in everyday thought and action are computationally limited in their 
abilities.
78
  Thus, the approach is fairly standard for Bayesians and cognitive 
scientists alike.  Minimal assumptions are made about the cognitive limitations of 
the system because the optimal behavior function derived in the formal model is 
used as an explanatory tool.  However, the full explanation will often involve an 
account of how the formal model would recommend action X as optimal, but that 
figuring that out would exceed the computational resources (and time) available 
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to the agent; however, action Y runs a close second to X and so a system that 
settles on Y provides a reasonable course of action.
79
 
Section 4—Applying RA to a Specific Case:  The Wason Experiments 
The Wason experiments are widely known.  Here are the details of one 
version of the Wason selection task setup.  The subject is shown four cards on a 
table, each exhibiting just one of the symbols D, K, 3, 7.  The subject is told that 
each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other side.  The subject is 
then asked to say precisely which cards should be turned over to adequately 
determine whether the following sentence is true or false:  Every card which has a 
D on one side has a 3 on the other side.
80
  This conditional sentence is known as 
“the rule,” and is classically understood in the experimental setup expressing the 
material conditional, if p then q where p corresponds to the response that fulfills 
the antecedent condition, and q corresponds to the response that fulfills the 
consequent condition.  The correct answer to the task, according to the classical 
interpretation of the problem as a deductive reasoning problem, is to select the 
cards labeled D and 7, since turning over these cards could prove the rule true or 
false.  The vast majority of subjects fail to choose this combination of cards.
81
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One RA approach is to interpret this situation not as a deductive reasoning 
problem, but rather as an inductive reasoning problem.  There are two reasons for 
reinterpreting the problem in this way.  First, Chater and Oaksford note that there 
has been a tacit acceptance on the part of psychologists of the hypothetico-
deductive approach to the confirmation of scientific hypotheses.
82
  On the 
hypothetico-deductive approach the Wason task becomes a problem of attempting 
to falsify hypotheses—where hypotheses are conjectures to be tested by attempted 
refutation.  This view of philosophy of science has historically been subject to 
criticism.
83
  This criticism makes the interpretation of the selection task subject to 
doubt.  If science does not proceed deductively, why should ordinary reasoning in 
the selection task proceed deductively?  Second, if the Wason task is not 
interpreted as a deductive inference problem employing falsification, then another 
model of scientific inference may be better able to account for the results in a way 
that is consistent with the view that the human subjects are acting rationally.
84
  To 
fill out the details of this account of the Wason task as an inductive inference 
                                                                                                                                     
Frequency of the selection of cards in four experiments (n = 128) 
   p and q   59 
   p   42 
   p, q and not-q  09 
   p and not-q  05 
   other   13 
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 The hypothetico-deductive method works like this:  observation statements are to be deduced 
from hypotheses and are subject to verification.   If the observation statement is found to be false, 
this falsified the hypothesis; if the observation statement turns out to be true, this supports the 
hypothesis. One criticism of the H-D approach is that it cannot account for statistical inference.  
Another is  that the very nature of scientific inference is not deductive, cf. Kuhn (1962). 
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Chater and Oaksford treat the task as one of expected information gain.  
The problem is to determine which cards to turn over to gain the most information 
regarding the truth of the rule.  Information gain is defined as the difference 
between uncertainty before receiving the data from the other side of a card and the 
uncertainty after receiving that data.  Uncertainty is measured using Shannon-
Wiener information which employs both prior and posterior probabilities for 
information calculations.  Bayes’ theorem is employed to calculate the posterior 
probabilities from prior probabilities and likelihoods of the data on the rule and on 
its negation.  The calculations also include a ‘rarity assumption’ as a default.  The 
rarity assumption is that only a small number of things in the world satisfy the 
antecedent or the consequent.
86
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 Ibid, p. 157.  Chater and Oaksford define information gain in the following way in Oaksford and 
Chater Bayesian Rationality, pp. 170-171.  First, Oaksford and Chater describe the participant’s 
job in the selection task as a task that requires a choice between two hypotheses, MD and MI (1994, 
“A Rational Analysis of the selection task as Optimal Data Selection” in Psychological Review, 
101, 608-631).  In MD, the hypothesis is that there is a dependency relation between the antecedent 
p and the consequent q in the conditional rule, ‘if p then q’.  In MI, the hypothesis is that the 
occurrence of ps and qs are independent.  On their characterization, participants want to know 
which hypothesis accurately describes the relationship between the numbers and letters on the 
cards, and their task is to choose the data that will give them the most information in order to 
make this choice.  Oaksford and Chater argued that people want to choose the data that will reduce 
their uncertainty about which of these two hypotheses to select, and the most informative data will 
be such that it reduces uncertainty the most.  Uncertainty is measured in the following way, where 
P(Mi) is the prior probability that either MD or MI accurately describes the relationship between 
letters and numbers on the cards in the task.   
 
I(Mi) = ∑ i P(Mi)log2[1/P(Mi)] 
 
The uncertainty is at a maximum when P(MD) = P(MI) = .5, or in other words when MD and MI are 
equally likely.  This is the prior uncertainty before turning over a card (data selection). 
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The net result of this approach is this: by measuring uncertainty in this way, the 
order of expected information gain matches the empirical results of the Wason 
task, and this approach explains the data as a rational inductive strategy.  The 
order of expected information (E) and information gain (Ig) for the cards D, 3, 7, 
and K is E(Ig(D))> E(Ig(3))> E(Ig(7))> E(Ig(K)).  This corresponds to the 
observations from the Wason task.
87
  In other words, the goal is to gain 
                                                                                                                                     
To determine information gain from turning over a card requires figuring out uncertainty after data 
selection D.  Uncertainty after data selection is calculated in the following way. 
 
I(Mi D) = ∑ i P(Mi D)log2[1/P(Mi D)]  
 
To determine posterior uncertainty after data selection, Bayes’ theorem is employed. 
 
 P(Mi D) = P(Mi)P(D Mi)/∑j P(Mj)P(D  Mi) 
 
To determine the likelihoods, P(D MD) or P(D MI) requires a little explanation.  Consider a case 
where someone is thinking about turning over the p card because they think there is a q on the 
back.  The probability of finding a q given MD is just P(q p).  This is because there is a (at the very 
least) a perceived relation of dependence between p and q.  The probability of finding a q given 
MI, however, is P(q p & MI) = P(q MI).  The probability that the dependence model is true given 
that someone does find a q on the other side of a p card is P(MD p & q).  It follows that P(MI  p & 
q) = 1 - P(MD  p & q). 
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 Ibid, p. 158.  Expected information gain is calculated in the following way (ibid, pp. 171-174).  
In general, information (Ig) is the difference between the initial uncertainty regarding which 
hypothesis is true and the uncertainty after data is received 
 
Ig  = I(Mi) – I(Mi D). 
To determine uncertainty associated with finding a q on the back of a p card (pq) 
 
Ig (pq) = I(Mi) – I(Mi pq). 
 
Ig (p~q) is calculated in the same way.  In the selection task, participants do not actually turn a card 
over, so the response (choice of card) is based on the expected information gain from turning a 
card.  To determine this, calculating the probabilities of data outcomes and how much one would 
learn from the outcomes is required.  First, the probabilities need to be calculated over both 
models 
 
 P(q p) = P(MD)P(q p & MD) + P(MI)P(q p & MI) and P(~q p) = 1 - P(q p). 
 
The posterior information gain values are weighted by both P(q p) and P(~q p) to give the 
expected uncertainty associated with turning over the p card (EI(p)) 
 




information from the environment (i.e. from the D, K, 3, and 7 cards).  Because 
these kinds of objects are rare (i.e. cards with ‘D,’ ‘K,’ ‘3,’ and ‘7’ printed on 
them are rare), the expected amount of information gain from looking for a 
falsifying instance is calculated as being low, because the probability of finding 
the falsifier (i.e. ‘D’ printed on the other side of the 7 card) is considered low.
88
  
The rational inductive strategy in this case is to look for confirming instances 
before looking for falsifying instances because that approach is expected to 
extract more information from the environment. 
To say that looking for confirming instances gives more information than 
falsifying ones may sound counterintuitive.  Falsifying instances are, after all, 
maximally informative.  However, because such cards as these are rare and 
information gain is the goal, the explanation is that confirming instances provide 
more information within this sort of environment.  The intuitive example that 
Chater and Oaksford appeal to is this: 
                                                                                                                                     
The expected information gain (EIg) associated with turning over the p card is then 
 
 EIg(p) = I(Mi) - EI(p). 
 
88
 Ibid.  Oaksford and Chater (2007) assume that card choice is competitive, meaning that the 
information gain associated with turning over each individual card varies, and the choice of 
whether or not to turn over a particular card x contends with the choices to turn over other 
individual cards y, z, etc.  This assumption allows for Oaksford and Chater to scale information 
gain associated with each card by total information available.  Scaled expected information gain 
associated with card x can then be defined as 
 
SEIg (x) = EIg(x)/∑xi [p, not p, q, not q] EIg(xi). 
 
Using Hattori’s (1999, 2002) ‘selection tendency function’ (STF) the probability that any 
particular card should be turned over is 
 




The STF maps scaled expected information gain on to the predicted probability that a particular 
card will be selected.  This particular STF (Hatori, ibid) has also been used to map outputs of 
neural networks on to probabilities of responses.  The parameters, 2.37 and 9.06 are Hatori’s 
estimates based on past data from the selection task.  
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Suppose that the hypothesis under test is ‘if a saucepan falls from the 
kitchen shelf (p) it makes a clanging noise (q).’  This rule, like the vast 
majority of everyday rules, conforms to the rarity assumption—saucepans 
fall quite rarely…and clangs are heard quite rarely….The four cards in the 
selection task can be seen as analogous to the following four scenarios.  
Suppose I am in the kitchen, and see the saucepan beginning to fall (p 
card); should I bother to take off my headphones and listen for a clang (i.e. 
should I turn the p card?)?  Intuitively, it seems that I should, because, 
whether there is a clang or not, I will learn something useful concerning 
the rule (if there is no clang, the rule is falsified; if there is a clang, then 
my estimate of the probability that the rule is true increases).  Suppose on 
the other hand that I am next door and I hear a clang (q card); should I 
bother to come into the kitchen to see whether the saucepan has fallen 
(should I turn the q card?)?  Intuitively, this is also worth doing—if the 
saucepan has not fallen then I have learned nothing (something else 
caused the clang); but if the saucepan has fallen, then this has strongly 
confirms the rule….Now consider the analogue of the turning of the not-q 
card:  I am next door and I hear no clang.  This time should I bother to 




The answer to this question is obviously no.  This RA approach to explaining the 
results of the Wason task seems successful to the extent that it can provide a 
rational explanation for the observed behavior of subjects.  More generally, RA 
attempts to construct such models based on formal decision theory to explain a 
host of human reasoning behaviors.  However, I have two reservations about this 
approach. 
First, though the intuitive example seems right, I am not sure that the 
intuitive example is analogous to the elements in the Wason task.  Though both 
examples are of rare events, falling sauce pans and clangs are closely associated 
in everyday situations with which people are familiar.  Cards marked ‘D’, ‘3’, 
‘K’, and ‘7’ are not familiar associations.  We expect that when a saucepan falls, 
it will make a noise.  We expect this because we have had experience with these 
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kinds of events.  When something falls, we expect it to make a sound.  I think that 
this sort of expectation is part of our background information, and is taken for 
granted, because our broad experience supports the supposition that usually 
medium sized bodies that fall to the floor make a noise.  But whereas Chater and 
Oaksford’s analysis fits the everyday case of falling sauce pans, it does not seem 
to fit the highly contrived experimental conditions of the Wason task.  We do not 
closely associate, Ds, 3s, Ks and 7s, and have no preconceived idea as to whether 
a rule for such associations may or may not hold.
90
 
Second, and more importantly I think, this approach runs the risk of 
licensing bad reasoning behavior wholesale in less mundane cases.  In the above 
cases not much is at stake when the card marked ‘3’ is chosen, or when the 
clanging sound occurs and one checks for a falling saucepan.  Not a lot seems to 
hang on whether we agree to treat these examples as falling under some kind of 
inductive reasoning strategy.  When more is at stake, though, it seems that this 
model is highly suspect.  Suppose that the stakes are raised in a different kind of 
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 In note 60, notice that when P(p) and P(q) are small, the information gain model predicts that 
P(Tq) > P(T~q).  This is because when P(p) and P(q) are small EIg(p) and EIg(q) become large.  
This is because these two cards, p and q, are more informative as to which hypothesis, MD or MI is 
true relative to the other cards.  Oaksford and Chater argue (2007, p. 174) that the fact that these 
probabilities should be low is consistent with the way natural language works to carve up 
categories in the world.  For example, ‘thing’ refers to objects and non-objects alike, so the scope 
of its reference is much broader than the scope of the reference of terms like ‘desk’.  The larger the 
scope of reference, the higher the probability that the term will refer to an object or non-object in 
the world and the smaller the scope of reference, the lower the probability of the term referring.  
This is the rarity assumption.  Perhaps specifying that “D cards have 3s on the back” as part of the 
artificial set-up of the experiment would make the artificial set-up more like a non-contrived 
example (like falling sauce pans and sounds).  This would make the rule part of our background 
information.  However, I do not think this ameliorates the situation for Oaksford and Chater.  
Recall that their characterization of the selection task is that participants want to know which 
hypothesis, MD or MI,  accurately describes the relationship between the numbers and letters on the 
cards, and their task is to choose the data that will give them the most information in order to 
make this choice.  While manipulating the artificial set-up of the selection task would serve to 





setup, but where a lot hangs on whether the analogous rule is true: agents who still 
“picked the wrong cards” with regard to fully testing the rule would suffer for it 
greatly in these circumstances.  Rational analysis allows for this kind of change in 
situation because it requires that the environment be specified for each kind of 
case; only the results expected in a specific sort of environment are checked 
against experimental results for that type of environment.   
Specifying the environment in an appropriate way may prove difficult in 
some cases.  Furthermore, this raises the issue of how closely goals must be 
connected to an environment.  Are specified goals so environment-specific that 
when the environment changes the goals must always change as well, or may 
goals remain the same across different environments?  Here are two examples 
where intuitively it seems that the goals must remain the same across different 
environments. 
In case 1 suppose the environment is a medical setting in which a medical 
professional in a developed country makes a diagnosis of HIV for a patient who 
tests positive after taking an HIV test.  Suppose that the false positive rate for this 
test is well known and is around 5%.  The judgment that the patient has HIV is 
too hasty when solely based on the results of a single test with this kind of false 
positive rate.  By calling this judgment ‘hasty’ we are making a negative 
evaluation about the judgment itself.  This negative evaluation about the judgment 
on the part of the medical professional seems right.  This is because in an ordinary 
medical setting like this one we expect medical professionals to pay attention to 
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the influence of false positive rates; that is just part of normal rationality.
91
  A 
positive result on such a test calls for the patient to be retested with a more 
rigorous (more expensive) test that has a much lower false positive rate. 
In case 2 suppose that the situation is similar to case 1, but is one in which 
the more rigorous test with the much lower false positive rate is not available.  
But suppose that anti-HIV drugs are relatively cheap and highly effective, and 
have few side effects.  Then it might be rational to diagnose the patient as having 
HIV, even though the probability of HIV is still low after the positive test result.  
Better to misdiagnose and treat patients who do not have the disease than take the 
chance of not treating someone who has HIV. 
In the two examples above, clearly which behavior counts as optimal 
differs.  But both cases are within the context of scientific practice, where the aim 
is to be objective.  Objectivity in this case is considered to be a normative good.  
The two cases show that rationalizing behavior in terms of a formal model is not 
completely satisfactory on its own.  In the next chapter I propose to incorporate an 
additional normative component into the context of rational decision, that of 
intellectual virtue.  I will try to show that it has an important role to play in 
assessments of whether an action or a decision is rational.   
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WHY VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY? 
Introduction  
 Virtue epistemology (VE) consists of a broad family of theories with a 
common feature:  what is central to knowledge and justification is the intellectual 
(and perhaps moral) character of the agent.  One faction within this family 
emphasizes the truth-conducive reliability of intellectual character.  Another 
faction emphasizes the responsibility that an agent has when assenting to belief, 
another aspect of intellectual character.  What is common to both of these 
conceptions of VE is that the intellectual character of the agent is the focal point 
of analysis.  Knowledge and justification derive from properties of persons as 
belief-acquiring agents.  VE’s shift in focus stands in contrast to the traditional 
conception of knowledge.  The traditional conception holds that knowledge is 
merely a species of belief that is distinguishable from other, non-knowledge 
instances of belief.  The mark of distinction between a knowledge belief and a 
non-knowledge belief is solely the properties that accrue to the belief.  On this 
view knowledge is distinguished from other kinds of beliefs by identifying 
properties of particular beliefs, collections of beliefs or processes by which beliefs 
are acquired.   
The aim of this chapter is to motivate VE by discussing three major issues 
that plagued 20
th
 century epistemology—elucidating the structure of justification, 
elucidating the nature of justification, and the general insufficiency of accounts of 
knowledge as justified true belief.  In shifting the focus of analysis from 
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properties of the beliefs to the belief-acquiring properties of agents that make up 
epistemic (or, intellectual) character, VE appears to offer an alternative account of 
the nature of knowledge that fares better than alternatives.  
This chapter proceeds as follows:  Section 1 presents the 
foundationalism/coherentism debate in epistemology regarding the structure of 
justification, Section 2 presents the internalist/externalist debate regarding the 
nature of justification, Section 3 presents the central problem of defining 
knowledge in terms of justified true belief – i.e. the so-called Gettier problems, 
and in Section 4 I introduce and discuss some preliminary considerations 
regarding VE, and I argue that employing the strategy (adapted from virtue ethics) 
of drawing on the stable dispositions of the agent in belief-acquisition, rather than 
focusing on the properties of beliefs and their connections to other beliefs, 
provides an important turn in the conception of knowledge.  In the next chapter I 
will develop my own conception of VE. 
Section 1—The Structure of Justification 
 In this section I will elucidate the central issues raised in recent 
philosophical debates over the structure of epistemic justification.  The issue of 
the structure of justification goes back at least to the Pyrrhonian problematic.  The 
Pyrrhonian problematic can be stated this way:  if there is no foundation upon 
which our justified beliefs rest, then an infinite regress of justification looms.   
One way to think about the Pyrrhonian problematic is in terms of Alston’s 
(1992) distinction between mediately and immediately justified beliefs.  A 
mediately justified belief is a belief that relies on another belief for its 
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justification.  An immediately justified belief is a belief that does not.
92
  The 
Pyrrhonist problem can be stated this way:  if what justifies a belief B1 is itself a 
belief B2, then B2 must also be justified in order to justify B1.  Another belief, 
B3, must justify B2, so B3 must itself be justified by some belief B4, and the 
regress continues unless there is a stopping point, a foundational belief that is 
immediately justified. Alternatively, the chain of justification may loop back into 
itself, circularly. The reason this is problematic is that it seems to lead to 
skepticism.  Jonathan Kvanvig (2007) characterizes the skeptical argument arising 
from the Pyrrhonian problematic this way: 
1.  No belief is justified unless its chain of reasons is infinitely long, 
stops, or goes in a circle. 
2. An infinitely long chain of reasons involves a vicious regress of 
reasons that cannot justify any belief. 
3. Any stopping point to terminate the chain of reasons is arbitrary, 
leaving every subsequent link in the chain depending on a beginning 
point that cannot justify its successor link, ultimately leaving one with 
no justification at all. 
4. Circular arguments cannot justify anything, leaving a chain of reasons 
that goes in a circle incapable of justifying any belief.
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As Kvanvig notes, two main views regarding the structure of justification have 
emerged to address this problem, coherentism and foundationalism. Both agree 
that skepticism is false, but differ on how to solve the problem. 
Foundationalism is the view that the structure of justification is ultimately 
anchored to non-inferential beliefs; so what ends the regress is a belief that is 
immediately justified.  An immediately justified belief is a belief whose source of 
justification is non-inferential in nature.  An immediately justified belief may be 
based on experience, or it may perhaps be self-justified.
94
  For example, my belief 
that 2 + 2 = 4 is obvious in a self-evident way to me.  So if self-evidence is a 
legitimate source of justification, then this belief is justified.  Furthermore, 
suppose it appears to me now as though a tree is before me.  If immediate 
experience is a source of justification, then the belief that a tree is before me is 
justified by how things appear to me now.   
One thing to note:  on Kvanvig’s characterization of the skeptical 
argument, the foundationalist accepts premise 1 above—that the chain of reasons 
is infinitely long, stops, or loops back into a circle.  The foundationalist goes for 
the thesis that the chain of reasons stops at base beliefs that are ether self-justified 
or justified some other way, independent of other reasons (e.g. justified from 
experience). 
 Coherentism regarding the structure of justification is most simply 
described as the denial of foundationalism.  Since I am only concerned with 
giving an overview of coherentism, I will only discuss the most popular version of 
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this view.  On what Kvanvig calls the standard account of coherentism,
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justification is holistic, rather than atomistic.  That is, justification is not linear in 
the way that the statement of the Pyrrhonian problem assumes, but is the property 
a belief set as a whole.  So, the coherentist would reject 1 from above—the chain 
of reasons neither stops (in the straightforward way that foundationalism claims), 
nor continues infinitely, nor loops back into a circle.  This is because justification 
is a property of a system of beliefs, where, if a belief system is coherent, a belief 
within that system is justified by its membership within the coherent system.  This 
holistic view stands in contrast with the atomistic view of justification that 
individual beliefs are justified by other individual beliefs. 
 Coherentists maintain that justification is a relation among propositions.  
Citing Neurath, Sosa comments on the metaphor that is commonly used to 
describe (in broad outline) the basic coherentist idea. 
“…our body of knowledge is a raft that floats free of any anchor or tie.  
Repairs must be made afloat, and though no part is untouchable, we must 
stand on some in order to replace or repair others….what justifies a belief 
is not that it be an infallible belief with an indubitable object, nor that it 
have been proved deductively on such a basis, but that it cohere with a 




The biggest challenge for the coherentist view is explaining the coherence relation 
itself.  I will return to this issue below, after first discussing some of the main 
problems faced by foundationalism. 
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 One of the major problems with foundationalism involves establishing just 
what the foundational beliefs are supposed to be.  The foundational belief must 
either be a cognitive state or a non-cognitive state of an agent.  If it is a cognitive 
state, then the challenge for the foundationalist is to show how the immediate 
belief is tied to truth—to a way the world actually is.  If it is a non-cognitive state, 
then the challenge for the foundationalist is to show how a non-cognitive state can 
serve as justifier for a belief set consisting of what are presumably cognitive states 
of an agent.  The difficulty lies in the fact that cognitive mental states have 
propositional content, and non-cognitive mental states do not.   
One useful way to understand the problem for foundationalists who hold 
that the foundational belief is a cognitive state starts with incorporating a 
distinction that Sosa uses.  He points out that a propositional attitude is a special 
kind of mental state that incorporates a proposition.  While we have other mental 
states, like headaches, the headache itself does not incorporate a propositional 
attitude, nor is it constitutive of a propositional attitude.
97
  This distinction is 
useful because it points to the fact that propositions are truth bearers, which when 
incorporated by a mental state or constitutive of a mental state involve judgment.  
Fumerton (2010) characterizes the problem this way:   
It is crucial that the foundationalist discover a kind of truth that can be 
known without inference.  But there can be no bearers of truth value 
without judgment and judgment involves the application of concepts.  But 
to apply a concept is to make a judgment about class membership, and to a 
make a judgment about class membership always involves relating the 










If the foundational belief, the mental state, is a propositional attitude, then the 
proposition is a bearer of a truth value, but this involves applying a concept, and 
applying a concept involves a judgment.  Judgment is inferential because it will at 
the very least involve concepts or beliefs about the past.  But, since the 
foundational belief is supposed to stop the regress of inferential justification, then 
it must be arrived at non-inferentially.  So, this objection goes, the foundational 
belief cannot be a cognitive state. 
 The objection to the version of foundationalism that holds that the basic 
belief is non-cognitive also draws on Sosa’s distinction.  To see the objection, 
first suppose a non-propositional mental state can serve as a foundation for 
justifying other beliefs.  So, for example, consider the mental state of having a 
headache.  This is a mental state that does not have propositional content, and so 
it is non-cognitive.  Suppose that you form the belief that you have a headache.  
There seems to be no obvious way for a state such as having a headache, one 
without propositional content, to justify a state with propositional content, such as 
the belief that you have a headache.  This is because, as Bonjour points out, the 
non-cognitive state involves no cognitive grasp of the state of affairs.  Since your 
non-cognitive state does not involve your cognitive grasp of your particular state 
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of affairs, it is difficult to see how your non-cognitive state can give you a reason 
to think that your belief that you have a headache is true.
99
 
 While these arguments against the cognitive-basis and non-cognitive-basis 
versions of foundationalism are insufficient to destroy the position entirely, I 
think that it is sufficient to cast doubt on foundationalism as an adequate theory of 
knowledge or justification.  On the one hand, it is true that some of our beliefs are 
justified inferentially, and it might be useful to characterize the chain of inference 
for some beliefs in terms of a structure that rests upon some kind of foundational 
belief.  For example, my belief that Lucy is a mammal is justified inferentially by 
other beliefs in my stock of beliefs.  Two beliefs that support it directly and 
inferentially are:  all cats are mammals and Lucy is a cat, and I might stop there if 
offering reasons for my belief, though neither of those beliefs is a foundational 
belief that could stop a regress of reasons for holding the belief that Lucy is a 
mammal.  On the other hand, since neither of these beliefs (that all cats are 
mammals and Lucy is a cat) could stop a regress, I could go on offering reasons 
for those beliefs, and even though I might be able to eventually stop the regress of 
reasons by positing a state that is either self-evident or self-justifying, I would still 
have to establish whether or not this foundational state is cognitive or non-
cognitive.  So, while foundationalism regarding the structure of justification might 
be useful for some purposes (e.g. characterizing the structure of justification for 
some kinds of beliefs), it is doubtful to me that it captures the whole story about 
justification, and so it is doubtful to me that it is an adequate theory of knowledge.   
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Since foundationalism seems inadequate, let us now return to coherentism 
as an alternative to foundationalism.  There are three major problems with 
coherentism.  The first problem for the view is determining exactly what 
coherence among beliefs is.  The straightforward answer, logical consistency, is 
too weak.  This description of coherence is too weak because mere logical 
consistency of belief does not imply that any of the beliefs are in fact true.  It is 
entirely possible to have a consistent system of beliefs that are almost wholly 
false.  As Kvanvig notes, “a good piece of fiction will display the virtue of 
coherence, but it is obviously unlikely to be true.”
100
  One reason this is such an 
important objection to coherentism is that a central value in epistemology, though, 
perhaps not the only value, is the goal of having a large body of non-trivial true 
beliefs, and very few non-trivial false beliefs.
101
  A piece of fiction may exhibit all 
of the features lauded by Bonjour and still be false with regard to almost all non-
trivial claims.  Although truth may not be the only epistemic value, it is surely 
among the most important, and an adequate epistemology should surely tie 
justified or “correctly held” belief to truth in a way in which justification or 
“correct holding” of the belief tends towards truth.
102
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A second problem, closely related to the first problem, is that there is no 
guarantee of cognitive contact with reality for an agent with a coherent belief 
set.
103
  This means that a collection of beliefs could be logically consistent, all of 
them in fact true, but lack a property that is central to knowledge—the appropriate 
connection between the believer and the facts of reality.  This connection with 
reality, which I can only call ‘cognitive contact’ , is what distinguishes knowledge 
from ordinary opinion or lucky guess.  Ordinary opinion and lucky guesses may 
be consistent with other beliefs in a belief set, and each may be true, but fall short 
of knowledge because each lacks that cognitive with reality.   
The third problem that coherentism faces is explaining how the coherence 
relation among beliefs confers justification on individual beliefs.  One answer is 
from Bonjour (1985) who characterizes coherence as being “a matter of how well 
a body of beliefs “hangs together”:  how well its component beliefs fit together, 
agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured 
system of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or set of conflicting 
subsystems.”
104
  Bonjour spells out this idea more fully in terms of the logical and 
probabilistic consistency of beliefs in the belief set, the inferability of the beliefs 
in the set from others in the set, the explanatory relations among the beliefs in the 
set, the relatedness and connectedness of the beliefs in the set, the lack of 
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anomalous beliefs in the set, and the degree to which conceptual changes can be 
accommodated within the set.
105 
   
Bonjour’s account makes a kind of intuitive sense.  However, as I see it, 
the problem for coherentism in general (and not merely this version of it) is to 
articulate how these factors are supposed to come together, each playing an 
appropriate contributing role to the justification of individual beliefs.  For 
example, consider the lottery paradox.
106
  This paradox centers around the issue of 
rational acceptance.  If a belief is justified, then, presumably, it is rational to 
accept it.  Suppose we have a fair lottery with 1000 tickets.  The belief that 
exactly one ticket will win is justified because it is justifiably believed to be a fair 
lottery.  However, one might also justifiably believe of each individual ticket that 
it will not win—that ticket 1 will not win, that ticket 2 will not win,…, that ticket 
1000 will not win—because the chance of each individual ticket winning is so 
low (1/1000).  The conjunction of each of these beliefs about each individual 
ticket is logically equivalent to the belief that no ticket will win the lottery, which 
contradicts the justified belief that exactly one ticket will win.  One of the features 
of Bonjour’s coherentist view is that coherence is a function of the degree to 
which beliefs are logically consistent.  Obviously, believing that exactly one 
ticket will win and also that no ticket will win is inconsistent, and believing this 
inconsistency is incoherent (some would say “irrational”), though there seems to 
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be sufficient justification for believing that exactly one ticket will win and for 
believing of each ticket that it will not win.  There is an apparent anomaly here, 
and it is not clear how this anomaly is to be resolved.  If it is incoherent (or 
irrational) to believe a contradiction and you are justified in believing each 
component of the contradiction, how is the coherence-as-knowledge view to 
avoid incoherent belief?  Some have argued that an agent need not believe the 
conjunction of her individual beliefs, and indeed in cases of this sort should not 
do so.  But this seems a very counter-intuitive move to most epistemologists.   
In this section I have merely given a brief sketch of the historical debate 
between coherentists and foundationalists and described some of the main 
problems with each.  I do not claim that either view has been refuted.  But I hope 
to have shown that at the very least both views are problematic – both have 
problems that remain unresolved.  Both seem to appeal to common intuitions, but 
these intuitions often clash.  In the next section I will describe the 
internalist/externalist debate over the conditions for justification.  The debate 
between these two positions also remains unresolved. 
Section 2—The Conditions for Justification 
 Another dimension of the nature of justification is the 
internalism/externalism debate.  Internalism about justification is a broad thesis 
about the basis for justification.  There are several distinct versions of internalism, 
and several distinct internalist theses.
107
  For each version of internalism there are 
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corresponding externalist responses that deny a corresponding central internalist 
claim.  For the sake of tractability I will be concerned only with the nature of 
justification.  By this I mean what Sosa, et al. refer to as the ontological aspect of 
internalism.
108
  The ontological version of internalism only requires that justifiers 
for a belief be part of the mental contents of the agent.
109
  Externalism, on this 
view, denies this claim.  An externalist view is one where the justifier need not be 
part of the mental contents of the agent.  In this section I will provide a broad 
characterization of ontological internalism (from here on out that’s what I will 
mean by ‘justification internalism’ or simply ‘internalism’) and externalism about 
justification and their associated problems. 
 Perhaps the best known version of justification internalism is Feldman and 
Conee’s view, which they call mentalism.  According to Feldman and Conee, “A 
mentalist theory may assert that justification is determined entirely by occurrent 
mental factors or by dispositional ones as well.  As long as the things that are said 
to contribute to justification are in the person’s mind, the view qualifies as a 
version of mentalism.”
110
  On this view, the only things that serve as justifiers are 
occurrent mental contents or dispositional factors (such as the disposition to form 
true perceptual beliefs).  The defense that Feldman and Conee provide is 
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straightforward.  In any case of justification, a mental state is responsible for the 
justification, and in any case where a belief is not justified, a mental state or lack 
thereof is responsible.  Feldman and Conee make their point by means of 
examples.  Here are two.   
Example 1:  Bob and Ray are sitting in an air-conditioned hotel lobby 
reading yesterday’s newspaper.  Each has read that it will be very 
warm today and, on that basis, each believes that it is very warm 
today.  Then Bob goes outside and feels the heat.  Both continue to 





Example 2:  Hilary is a brain in a vat who has been abducted recently from 
a fully embodied life in an ordinary environment.  He is being 
stimulated so that it seems to him as though his normal life has 
continued.  Hilary believes that he ate oatmeal for breakfast 
yesterday.  His memorial basis for his breakfast belief is artificial.  
It has been induced by his “envatters.”
112
   
 
There are two versions of details relevant to this second example. 
 
2a)  Hilary’s recollection is very faint and lacking in detail.  The meal 
seems incongruous to him in that it strikes him as a distasteful 
breakfast and he has no idea why he would have eaten it. 
 
2b)  Hilary’s recollection seems to him to be an ordinary vivid memory of 




In Example 1 the relevant epistemic difference between Bob and Ray lies 
in something internal to each agent.  In this case Bob is better justified than Ray 
in the belief that it is very warm today.  Assuming that both Bob and Ray 
obtained the weather report from a reliable source, they are both initially justified 
in their belief that it is very warm today; and given the description of the 
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circumstances, I think it is safe to say that they are equally justified up to the point 
before Bob goes outside.  However, after going outside, Bob is better justified in 
his belief that it is very warm today because he went outside and experienced the 
temperature – he “‘internalized’ the actual temperature”
114
 with his experience of 
the warmth of the day.  When he went outside he gathered additional evidence for 
his belief that it was warm outside. 
In Example 2, the relevant epistemic difference between versions 2a and 
2b is just an internal difference in introspective mental state for Hillary.  In (2a) 
Hillary’s belief is not what Feldman and Conee call “well justified.”
115
  The 
means by which the belief is formed, recollection, is weak.  The memory itself is 
one that Hilary might well come to question or doubt.  It is incongruous with the 
rest of his beliefs.  In (2b), however, the belief is well justified.  The means by 
which the belief comes about is of the ordinary strength possessed by many other 
beliefs (including those that might well also count as knowledge), and the belief is 
congruent with other beliefs that Hilary would have. 
Feldman and Conee put the point like this.  “It is reasonable to generalize 
from these examples to the conclusion that every variety of change that brings 
about or enhances justification either internalizes an external fact or makes a 
purely internal difference.  It appears that there is no need to appeal to anything 
extramental to explain any justificatory difference.”
116
  On this view the only 
factors that serve as justifiers are factors that are internal to an epistemic agent, 
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and specifically they are only the mental contents of the agent.  I will address 
problems with this view below.  But before doing so I first want to characterize 
the contrasting view called externalism. 
Externalism denies the internalist claim that there is no need to appeal to 
anything extramental to explain justificatory differences.  In the first example, an 
externalist might well claim that the difference in justification between Bob and 
Ray is in fact extramental.  Bob’s evidence is in part constituted by conditions 
external to his mental state.  If his sensory apparatus for detecting temperature 
were not functioning properly (e.g. he was suddenly hit by a high fever that he 
wasn’t aware of) when he went outside to the check the weather conditions, then 
his sensation of the heat would fail to be justificatory (despite his internal mental 
contents), or so an externalist might argue.   
To illustrate externalism’s denial of the internalist thesis, consider one 
early version of the externalist view called reliabilism.  Alvin Goldman’s process 
reliabilism is a version of externalism that asserts that factors external to the 
agent’s mental content are crucial to justification.  It is the view that the 
justificational status of a belief is dependent on the reliability of the causal 
process or processes involved in forming the belief.  Reliability is based on the 
tendency of a process to produce true beliefs rather than false beliefs.
117
  Goldman 
admits that he has to remain vague on the probabilistic threshold associated with 
reliability, on what counts as a “tendency”, and on the precise nature of what 
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counts as a process.  However, he does not find this to be problematic because our 
ordinary notion of justifiedness is equally vague.
118
   
Goldman’s process reliabilism takes Bob’s belief-forming processes to be 
the key.  The belief forming process involved in his belief that it is very warm 
outside when he steps outside is reliable provided that most of the time, under 
similar circumstances, Bob tends to form true beliefs about environmental 
conditions in which he finds himself.  Reliability of the process confers 
justification, not the mental contents of the agent.  Because the process itself is 
extramental (i.e. not part of the mental contents of the agent), this is an externalist 
position.  So, Bob may have a highly reliable belief-forming process involving 
environmental conditions, but not be occurrently or dispositionally aware of the 
process.   
Does the fact that Bob checks the temperature by going outside make Bob 
more justified than Ray, who relied entirely on the weather report?  Maybe.  
Although the newspaper report about the weather that day may be reliable 
(assume that this is a highly reputable publication), Bob’s belief-forming process 
involving his experience of the weather, combined with his belief forming-
process involving his reading the reputable newspaper, may add to the 
justificatory status of the belief.  Assuming that Bob’s belief-forming process 
about environmental conditions is more reliable than his belief-forming process 
involved in reading the weather report, Bob has better justification for his belief 
about weather conditions than he would if he had only read the weather report.  
This is because Bob’s environmental condition belief-forming process tends to get 
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Bob more true beliefs than Bob’s belief-forming processes involving reading 
reputable newspapers..  If Bob’s belief-forming process about environmental 
conditions is not more reliable than, but only equally reliable to, his newspaper-
trusting process, then perhaps the combination of the two processes adds to the 
justificatory status of the belief.  If Bob’s belief-forming process about 
environmental conditions were the less reliable of the two, then it would not add 
to the justificatory status of the belief.   
Hilary’s case, though, is a bit more tricky because the thought experiment 
starts with an archetypal skeptical situation.  In this situation, Hilary could never 
have the kind of justification that leads to knowledge, according to process 
reliabilism.  Perhaps he has something “justification-like” that would count as real 
justification were he not a brain in a vat.  But envatted as he is, his belief-forming 
process is unreliable.  Goldman takes memory to be a reliable belief-forming 
process.  So, if we change the example to avoid the skeptic (i.e. Hilary is not a 
brain in a vat, but has the breakfast belief as a result of his memory of his 
breakfast), and if memory is a belief-forming process that is sufficiently reliable 
to confer justification, then Hilary would be justified in his breakfast belief, and 
he would be justified in the same kind of way that anyone is justified when they 
have knowledge.  Notice that the internalist would have to say that envatted 
Hilary is justified in his belief (although, unfortunate in his situation), whereas the 
externalist can bring the external situation in which Hilary is embedded into the 
justificatory account, and thus deny that Hilary is justified.  Envatted brains fed 
false sensory information do not obtain their beliefs via a reliable process.  
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 Since the dominant forms of externalism about justification and 
knowledge are forms of reliabilism, I want to address a common objection to 
reliabilism—the so-called generality problem.  The generality problem is a 
longstanding problem raised against process reliabilism.  The problem is how to 
specify the appropriate type of process involved in a token instance of reliability 
(qua justification).  Each individual case of belief formation (i.e. each token of 
belief formation) falls under a wide variety of formation-process-types, some of 
them reliable (to various degrees) and some of them unreliable.  For example, 
consider the belief that I have as I write this, I see my laptop.  On the process 
reliabilist view, if it is a justified belief (and I think it is), I form this belief as a 
result of a token causal process that is reliable.  Suppose that the token causal 
process is the following.
119
  Light reflects off of my laptop into my eyes, which 
causes optic neural events which further cause other neural events that ultimately 
lead to the formation of the belief that I see my laptop.  The conjunction of these 
events (e.g. light reflecting off my eyes, the resulting optic neural events, the 
resulting neural event involved with applying concepts, etc.) is a token instance of 
the causal process involved in the formation of my belief.  Just because this 
particular token instance resulted in my true belief, I cannot rightly say that this 
instance is reliable.  Reliability, originally conceived by Goodman and I think 
understood generally, is a tendency.  In terms of belief formation, the tendency is 
to produce true beliefs rather than false beliefs.  So, a process type has to be 
reliable, has to have the tendency to produce true beliefs, rather than a process 
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token.  This token instance of the causal process can by typed in various ways.  
For example, this token can by typed as a process of involving the visual faculty, 
as a process the prompts my particular beliefs about my computer, or as a process 
that occurs when I am sitting on my couch.  The number of types this token 
process can fall under is limitless, and the reliability of each token instance 
depends on the type under which it falls.  Different types of causal process have 
different degrees of reliability.  The issue is to decide first which type is supposed 
to apply in a token instance and second to what degree must the type be reliable 
for the process to confer justification on the belief.
120
  Indeed, I think the 
generality problem is a problem for any version of externalism.
121
  This is because 
all versions of externalism trade on reliability in some way, and the specification 
of reliability is always relative to a type of situation.  In other words, for each 
token instance of reliability, whether it is in the form of belief formation processes 
or some other form, the conditions for the situation or process to count as reliable 
need to be specified.  The appropriate types will often hang on things like the 
level of detail that is relevant to the epistemic situation involved.  However, the 
most significant issue that the generality problem raises is this:  there is no reason 
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to suppose that there is a fact of the matter about which specific process-type is 
the one that determines justification in any given case.   
Furthermore, the generality problem reaches beyond externalist reliabilist 
epistemologies.  For example, any virtue theory of epistemology that emphasizes 
the reliability of the agent will have to address it.  (I will address virtue theories a 
bit later.)  However, I do not think that the generality problem is unsolvable in 
general.  But how it may be solved or resolved will depend on the details of the 
individual epistemic theories where it arises. 
The main problem for internalism, as I see it, is how an internalist 
accounts for the “internalization” of external facts.  One prominent way to do this 
is to commit to a foundationalist structure for knowledge where at the foundation 
is a base belief formed from sense experience.  However, if this move is made, 
then the internalist foundationalist has to resolve the foundationalist problems 
discussed earlier.  Is a base belief a cognitive state or a non-cognitive state?  If it 
is a non-cognitive state, then he has to account for how a non-cognitive state can 
serve as a justifier for cognitive states.  Alternatively, if the internalist takes a base 
belief to be a cognitive state, then he needs to give an account of justification that 
works independently of the external environment in which cognition takes place.  
If the justificatory conditions are purely mental contents, independent of the 
external world, then a brain in a vat could be justified in his beliefs, even though 
none of them are true.  We typically think that truth and justification are 
intimately linked, so much so that when we have adequate justification (e.g. in the 
form of evidence) we think that the belief is likely to be true.  We take the link 
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between truth and justification so seriously that when the link is broken we do not 
count the belief as knowledge.  The issue is, when the link is so broken that the 
justification of a belief no longer even makes the truth of the belief at all probable, 
should that still count as epistemic justification. 
Section 3—The Problem of Defining Knowledge 
 Before moving on to a general discussion of virtue epistemology, I want to 
discuss briefly the problem of defining knowledge.  While this problem did not 
originate the 20
th
 century, it came to the center of discussion with the famous 
Gettier paper.
122
  The crux of the Gettier problem is this.  Justified true belief is 
not sufficient for knowledge.  It is uncontroversial that one can have justified false 
beliefs.  Because of this, standard definitions that rely on justification as the 
component that turns true belief into knowledge fail.  For example, if we take the 
definition of knowledge to be: 
 S knows that P iff:  (a) P is true 
     (b) S believes P 
    and (c) S is justified in believing that P 




One important way to understand Gettier cases is Zagzebski’s 1994 
analysis.  In that paper, she points out that the historical response to this problem 
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in the time since Gettier’s publication is to either redefine justification so that it is 
sufficient for knowledge or to add an extra component to the standard definition 
so that the resulting definition (usually justified true belief plus something else) is 
sufficient for knowledge.
124
  Though she is not the first person to acknowledge 
that these are two common responses, I think that hers is an important way to 
acknowledge the problem.  Since the publication of the problem, the standard 
response has been to change the definition of knowledge by focusing on 
properties of beliefs (e.g. redefine justification such that as a property of a belief it 
turns true belief into knowledge or add another property to justified true belief 
such that this property turns justified true belief into knowledge) rather than 
properties of the agent who holds the belief.  However, none of these responses 
are immune to Gettier-type cases.  As Zagzebski argues, as long as truth is 
independent of justification (or some other property attributable to a belief such 
that this property is strong enough to turn true belief into knowledge) a Gettier 
case can be derived to undermine the theory of knowledge.
125
 
Another important point that she makes is that Gettier problems are 
virtually unavoidable in any definition of knowledge as “true belief plus 
something else”
126
 because of accidental features of that are inherent in Gettier 
cases.  The accidental features are instances of luck where one instance of luck 
cancels out another instance of luck such that, though the agent has a justified true 
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belief, she does not have knowledge.
127
  For example, consider the following case.  
Jones thinks that Smith is a cyclist who does not wear a helmet.  Jones believes 
this on the basis of good evidence, such as having seen someone who she believes 
is Smith on a bicycle, riding in the rain, without a helmet.  She forms the belief 
that Smith is a cyclist who does not wear a helmet, and as a result, resolves to tell 
Smith that he should wear his helmet, especially in the rain.  Later in the day, she 
meets Smith and learns that Smith was in fact riding to class in the rain without 
his helmet, and that he regularly rides without his helmet.  However, 
unbeknownst to her the cyclist that she saw earlier in the day was not Smith, but 
his twin brother, Brown, who happened to be riding on the path that intersected 
Smith’s walk earlier in the day.  Now her belief that Smith is a cyclist who does 
not wear a helmet is true and justified, but it is not knowledge.  She is unlucky in 
the first instance because the evidence that she has to support the belief does not 
in fact support the particular belief that Jones is a cyclist, but lucky in the second 
instance because the belief just happens to be true.  The bad luck involved in the 
first instance (her bad luck to have mistaken Jones for Brown) is cancelled out by 
her good luck in the second instance (her good luck to have formed a true belief, 
albeit accidentally). 
I think that Zagzebski’s analysis of Gettier problems is an important way 
to understand them.  Her analysis points to the problem of focusing on properties 
of beliefs alone for accounts of knowledge rather than properties of agents.  
Properties like truth, justification or warrant, when attributed to beliefs, are not 
enough to account for what we take to be a robust sense of the term “knowledge.”  
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True, justified, or warranted beliefs are not always knowledge even if a particular 
belief has all of these properties.  For example, consider the Gettier case above, 
but suppose it is not a rainy day.  Suppose that the visual conditions are perfect 
and that Smith and Brown are identical twins so alike that only their mother can 
tell them apart.  Suppose further that Jones has even heard from reliable 
colleagues that Smith is a cyclist.  In this modified version, Jones' belief is true, 
apt, justified, and warranted, but Smith still fails to know.   
However, in a more robust way that pertains to knowledge attributions, I 
think, we mean to evaluate the agent who holds the belief.  For example, when we 
evaluate a belief as unwarranted, we make an evaluation of not only the belief, but 
also the agent who holds the belief.  We might even say of the agent that he is 
unwarranted, and in saying this we mean that he does not have the right to hold 
this belief for various reasons.  We might hold him responsible in some sense for 
the lack of warrant because he is intellectually lazy (as with a lucky guess) or 
intellectually indiscriminate (as with beliefs that are held without appropriate 
scrutiny of the truth).  We are obligated in some sense to have warrant for at least 
some of our beliefs, if not all.   
Consider a case where someone forms a belief as a result of wishful 
thinking, the belief I will win the next Powerball payout.  Suppose that this person 
knows the chances of winning on a single play and buys ten tickets with their last 
ten dollars.  They form the belief, I will win the next Powerball payout, solely on 
the basis of their wishful thinking.  Clearly, this belief, I will win the next 
Powerball payout is unwarranted, and anyone would consider the belief a bad 
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kind of belief for someone to have.  What makes it a bad kind of belief is how it 
was formed.  It was formed in a way (wishful thinking) that usually does not lead 
to true beliefs.  Moreover, and more importantly, when we evaluate the belief, we 
also evaluate the person who holds the belief.  We would think that this person 
who holds this unwarranted belief is not entitled to hold the belief because of the 
way that she formed the belief.   
This kind of evaluation applies to persons holding warranted beliefs as 
well—Gettier cases seem to show this.  In a Gettier case understood in the way 
that Zagzebksi describes as, first, a case in which the truth of the belief and its 
justification are independent, and second, a case of good luck canceling out bad 
luck, though the belief has the properties of being true and being justified, the 
agent fails to know.  Though this failure to know is not the fault of agent, the 
accidental features of the case take away any credit that we may give to the agent 
for holding the belief in the first place.  Indeed, the accidental features of the case 
cause the agent to lose the credit that is associated with knowledge attributions.  
Credit is a kind of evaluation, and in cases of knowledge, it is a kind of positive 
evaluation.  Though more will be said below about the notion of credit as it relates 
to knowledge, here I merely want to establish it as a term of evaluation in order to 
show that there is a link between evaluative property and knower. 
This link between certain evaluative properties and knowers is similar to 
the link between certain evaluative properties and agents in moral action.  A 
moral action is good at least in the sense that it brings about a good state of 
affairs, for example, but we also think that what constitutes part of the goodness 
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of an act is the intention of the agent who performs the act.  For example, suppose 
I am redeeming cash back points from a credit card, and I have the option of 
having the cash deposited to my checking account or donated to relief efforts in 
Japan.  Suppose further that I fully intend to take the cash deposit to my checking 
account, but because the button for donating my rewards to the relief effort in 
Japan is so similar in visual presentation to the button for depositing the money 
into my checking account and they are spaced very closely together that I 
accidentally click on the button to donate to relief efforts.  My accidental 
contribution is a good in the sense that it brings about a good state of affairs, but I 
cannot be evaluated as good because I accidentally donated the money.   
A similar thing occurs in Gettier cases.  A true belief can be justified by 
evidence, for example, but for a true belief to be justified sufficiently for 
knowledge, it cannot have the accidental features of Gettier cases.  Recognizing 
the accidental features involved in Gettier cases points to the significance of the 
agent’s role in knowledge attribution.  For knowledge attributions, justifiedness, 
for example, is not merely a property of a belief.  It must also be a property of an 
agent or at the very least causally related to the agent in some way because agents 
certainly play a role in accounts of knowledge.  Virtually every theory of 
knowledge acknowledges this. 
Furthermore, for some instances of knowledge attribution, the intention of 
an agent to know does not seem to matter.  By ‘intention to know’ I mean the 
deliberative, internal, intellectual action that an agent may take in order to get to 
the truth.  This deliberative action could be as simple as adjusting one’s focus in 
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order to verify what is seen or as complex as critical reflection.  For example, in 
cases of simple perceptual knowledge (e.g. I know that I see my laptop in front of 
me and I am not entertaining any skeptical hypothesis), intentions do seem not 
enter in.  (I say ‘do not seem to’ because in this instance I do not require 
verification of any kind to just know that my laptop is in front of me, and critical 
reflection is certainly not required.)  Human beings have evolved to be able to 
acquire this kind of knowledge easily enough in most cases with minimal effort, 
deliberative or otherwise.  However, for other instances of knowledge attribution, 
the deliberative action of an agent does seem to matter, as in cases where 
knowledge is acquired through intellectual effort in a non-accidental way.  For 
example, I know that the capitol of Brazil is Brasilia because when I searched for 
the answer to the question, What is the capitol of Brazil? years ago I intended to 
get the answer, and being the kind of intellectual agent that I am, I consulted a 
reliable, trustworthy source for the answer. 
Section 4—Virtue Epistemology 
 One response to the problems of the structure of justification, the nature of 
justification, and defining knowledge is to shift the focus of analysis from 
properties of beliefs to properties of agents.
128
  Rather than analyze the notions of 
justification and knowledge solely in terms of properties of beliefs in isolation as 
if they stand independent from an agent, the approach from virtue epistemology is 
to look to properties of agents which somehow confer justification (or some other 
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epistemically important attribute) onto beliefs such that these beliefs are 
knowledge-worthy.  Indeed, Sosa’s 1980 paper, “The Raft and the Pyramid” is 
widely acknowledged to be the inspiration for the resurgence of an interest in 
virtue epistemology.  Here Sosa remarks on the ethical analogue to epistemology.  
What Sosa calls “reliabilism” in ethics is the view that “action [for an agent] is the 
result of certain stable virtues, and there are no equally virtuous alternate 
dispositions that, given his cognitive limitations, he might have embodied with 
equal or better total consequences, and that would have led him to [another, more 
dire action] in the circumstances.”
129
  The analogue to epistemology begins with 
justification and the different types of justification.  “The important move for our 
purpose is the stratification of justification.  Primary justification attaches to 
virtues and other dispositions to act, through their greater contribution of value 
when compared with alternatives.  Secondary justification attaches to particular 
acts in virtue of their source in virtues or other such justified dispositions.”
130
  For 
epistemology, “…primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to 
stable dispositions for belief acquisition, through their greater contribution to 
getting us to the truth.”
131
  Secondary justification works the same way as in the 
ethical analogue.  A belief is virtuous in virtue of its source in virtues or stable 
dispositions.
132
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So, what is an intellectual virtue?  There are multiple and varied 
understandings, but all virtue accounts hold that intellectual virtues are 
excellences of the intellect (though, these excellences are not necessarily truth 
conducive).  Here is a brief list of the epistemic virtues that are typically cited in 
VE accounts: 
attentiveness, courage (of the intellectual variety – willingness to buck the 
consensus when appropriate), creativity, curiosity, discernment, discretion, 
foresight, honesty, humility (e.g. willingness to admit that one might be 
wrong), imaginativeness, objectivity (e.g. attentiveness to justification 
and/or warrant for belief), parsimony (good judgment in the application of 
Occam’s razor), perceptiveness, prudence, practical wisdom, studiousness, 
tenacity, truthfulness, understanding. 
As with all virtues, these intellectual attributes turn to vices when taken to 
extremes.  For example, intellectual courage turns to a kind of rashness or plain 
contrariness if not moderated by discernment and humility; and tenacity turns to 
stubbornness (pigheadedness) when not properly kept in check by humility. 
Typically, accounts of intellectual virtues include a success component, 
and, somewhat less commonly, a motivational component.  The degree to which 
the success component or the motivational component is emphasized varies with 
the account, and indeed, the varying degree of emphasis is one way to divide up 
kinds of VE.  On the issue of excellences of the intellect, accounts which 
emphasize the success component of a virtue take the excellence to be attributed 
more to the reliability of the agent.  In other words, agent reliability in terms of 
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getting to the truth in a way that is attributable to the agent is what makes the 
virtue an excellence.  Accounts which emphasize the motivational component of 
the virtue over the reliability of the agent take virtues to be more of an excellence 
of the agent’s cognitive character.  In other words, the motivational component of 
the intellectual virtue is what makes it an intellectual excellence, more so than the 
reliability of the agent.
133
  While reliability is a necessary condition for 
knowledge, so is motivation on this kind of view. 
 So, there are at least two kinds of accounts in VE.  One is an account of 
virtue emphasizing the reliability of cognitive faculties.  These accounts are 
standardly called virtue reliabilist theories because they are descendent from 
earlier externalist, reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification.  On these 
views, the emphasis is on the reliability of the agent’s character to get to the truth.  
For example, Greco’s agent reliabilism, an early form of his virtue reliabilism, 
defines a belief with positive epistemic status (where positive epistemic status is 
that which turns true belief into knowledge) as one that results from stable and 
reliable dispositions that make up an agent’s cognitive character.
134
  So, the 
emphasis on this account is the reliability of the agent’s cognitive disposition to 
form true beliefs in the “right way” where the “right way” is the way that one 
would form a true belief that is sufficient for knowledge.  For example, one aspect 
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of a belief being formed in the “right way” is that it is not formed accidentally, as 
in a lucky guess. 
The other general account of a virtue epistemology emphasizes more 
refined character traits.  These are standardly called virtue responsibilist theories 
because they emphasize the responsibility that we think agents have toward their 
beliefs and, perhaps, a motivational component of virtue that may be necessary 
for some of the virtues.  Some examples of the more refined character traits are 
conscientiousness, intellectual humility, or creativity, though this is not an 
exhaustive list.  One consequence of the emphasis on agent responsibility or 
motivation for these kinds of character trait intellectual virtues is that some 
intellectual virtues are not necessarily truth conducive, and in fact, may produce a 
large number of false beliefs. 
Neither the responsibilist nor the reliabilist deny the importance and 
existence of what the other emphasizes (i.e. responsibilists do not deny the 
importance or existence of the reliability of faculties like vision and memory, and 
reliabilists do not deny the importance or existence of more refined cognitive 
character traits); each emphasizes different aspects of their theories, though some 
virtue theories deny that some things like skills or faculties are virtues.  Perhaps 
one’s preference for one view over another depends upon one’s intuitions 
regarding the nature of knowledge.   
My own intuitions are divided on this issue.  In some cases, knowledge is 
the kind of thing that involves the element of responsibility (and perhaps an 
associated motivation) as with epistemic conscientiousness.  One example of this 
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kind of case is scientific knowledge and the virtues associated with belief 
formation on the part of the scientist as epistemic agent.  The scientist endeavors 
to find true, relevant propositions, and avoid false propositions, regarding her 
subject.  An epistemically conscientious scientist does her best to do this because 
this is the epistemically right thing to do.  In this sense, the scientist has a 
responsibility to believe in a certain way (e.g. accept certain propositions as true 
and reject others in light of the evidence).  Furthermore, perhaps she is motivated 
to be epistemically responsible in this way because of her love of the truths of her 
subject.  The knowledge that results from her inquiry, therefore, is virtuous.   
Alternatively, perhaps there are some cases of knowledge where an 
account of virtue with reliability as the key element in knowledge is preferable.  
‘Reliability’ means reliably, consistently getting to the truth.  For example, in 
cases of sense perception reliability is the key feature for perceptual knowledge.  
One does not have to necessarily be motivated or aware of one’s motivations or 
responsibilities in forming the belief in order for it to count as knowledge.  One 
just has to reliably form true perceptual beliefs (and avoid false beliefs).  The 
advantage that reliabilist views have is that they emphasize the ‘success at getting 
to the truth’ component of simple cases of knowledge.  This advantage is parallel 
to simple ethical cases where the primary component of evaluation is the state of 
affairs that results from the moral action (e.g. reduce the suffering of others). 
Moreover, the two examples of virtues that I mentioned above (epistemic 
conscientiousness and reliable perceptual faculties) are examples of truth-
conducive virtues.  There are epistemic virtues that are not necessarily truth 
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conducive.  For example, the epistemic excellence involved with intellectual 
creativity is generally not thought to be truth-conducive.  Consider the intellectual 
creativity involved with creating poetry.  Though a poem may conform to strict 
structural rules, the elements of a poem (e.g. imagery or metaphor) which convey 
the meaning of the work do not convey literal truths, and in fact may lose their 
artistic meaning if taken literally.   
In the next chapter, I am going to sketch and endorse a more narrow, 
reliabilist view of virtue epistemology, but I want to reiterate that my own 
intuitions regarding what counts as an intellectual virtue are that there is more 
than one kind of intellectual virtue.  This is to say that I think that in some sense 
all of the above examples are robust examples of intellectual excellences, and 
therefore are intellectual virtues.  Furthermore, for my purposes, I am dividing up 
the virtues into two kinds—truth conducive and non-truth conducive—though, 
there are other ways to divide up the virtues.  Of the truth-conducive virtues, some 
of those are more like intellectual abilities or skills, while some of these virtues 
are more like character traits.  Each of these kinds of virtues deserves recognition 
as virtues, and ideally, perhaps there will someday be a unifying account of all of 
these kinds of virtues, but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
Of the virtues that are specifically truth-conducive, the ones that are more 
like intellectual abilities or skills are often associated with simple cases of 
knowledge (as in perception) or reasoning.  These virtues are best understood, I 
think, in terms of their reliable manifestations because when they are reliably 
manifested, they have the most value.  My argument for this claim just is this.  If 
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getting to the truth is an epistemic good, then the reliable ability to do so counts 
towards what is good about arriving at and maintaining true beliefs.  Getting to 
the truth is good, so the reliable ability to do so counts towards the goods 
associated with true beliefs.   
For some of the truth-conducive epistemic virtues, reliability is not 
enough.  These are the virtues that are less like abilities and more like intellectual 
character traits where reliability is not the most important feature of the virtue 
(though, it still may be a significant feature).  My argument for the claim that for 
some of these intellectual virtues reliability is not enough is this.  For example, 
reliable epistemic conscientiousness is a good epistemic character trait, but the 
reliability is not what makes being epistemically conscientiousness such a good 
thing (though, being reliable about being epistemically conscientious is a good).  
Epistemic conscientiousness is a good thing independent of whether or not one 
reliably gains a large number of true beliefs as a result of being conscientious (or, 
whether or not one is reliable about it).  It is a good thing epistemically because it 
is the responsible way to form beliefs, and responsible belief formation is 
valuable.  It is valuable because true beliefs are responsible beliefs. 
Moreover, some of the character trait virtues are not truth-conducive.  
Creativity, if it is considered to be a character trait kind of intellectual virtue 
(rather than an ability), is one that does not necessarily aim at producing true 
beliefs.  The goal of creative thought or action is to arrive at something new, and 
presumably the new creation is something of value.  Because humans are 
cognitive beings, this virtue is rightly considered to be part of our intellectual 
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makeup.  The value in the creation is not merely the value associated with 
attaining the truth.  Creative thought is valuable because of the new ideas that are 




These virtues have at least two things in common.  They all have 
intellectual value of some kind.  For example, reliable perceptual faculties allow 
one to form more true beliefs than false beliefs.  Conscientious belief has 
intellectual value because the beliefs that are formed as a result of this particular 
character trait arise from the desire to seek the truth.  Creativity has intellectual 
value because though the beliefs formed as a result of exercising this virtue are 
novel.  Furthermore, all of these virtues are the kinds of things that are attributable 
to agents.  Reliability, for anything, is attributable to that thing.  For example, we 
attribute reliability to a thermostat that accurately displays the temperature on a 
reliable basis.  The same is true for reliable perceptual faculties.  We attribute 
reliability to an agent who reliably forms true perceptual beliefs, and this 
reliability gives more support to the belief that is formed.  Conscientiousness 
involves desire—the desire to seek out true beliefs and avoid false ones.  Desires 
are the kinds of things that are attributable to agents.  Creativity is something that 
to my knowledge is only attributable agents. 
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The reason why the two features above are important is that these features 
are central to credit theories of knowledge.  While all theories of knowledge 
acknowledge that knowledge is something that is attributable to an agent, in 
general terms, a credit theory of knowledge emphasizes this aspect more strongly.  
There are two credit theories that I know of.  First there is Greco’s (2004) version 
that holds that reliable cognitive character is an important necessary condition for 
knowledge.
136
  Second, there is Riggs’ (2009) version that holds that the 
important necessary condition for knowledge is that the true belief is attributable 
to an agent as a cognitive agent.
137
  I will go into more detail regarding these two 
theories of credit in the next chapter as I develop a particular version of VE, but 
for now I want to point out that the main difference between these two views is a 
matter of emphasis.  Greco emphasizes reliability of cognitive character (probably 
because of his overall reliabilist stance), while Riggs emphasizes attribution to 
agents (due to his anti-luck considerations.  Both agree that whatever knowledge 
is, it is a kind of intellectual achievement for an agent.
138
   
Knowledge as achievement of something that is intellectually credit 
worthy is exactly what VE theories of knowledge have contributed to the overall 
discussion in epistemology.  The notion of intellectual or cognitive credit 
sidesteps the abovementioned issues in epistemology, while at the same time is 
sometimes compatible with a particular view.  Credit theories of knowledge do 
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not necessarily resolve these debates, but shift the discussion to something more 
central. 
First, regarding the foundationalism/coherentism debate, VE to my 
knowledge has not been able to resolve the debate between these two camps, but 
in shifting the direction of analysis from properties of beliefs to properties of 
agents as worthy/unworthy of intellectual credit for holding a belief, it changes 
the discussion in a fruitful way.  The foundationalism/coherentism debate is a 
debate over the structure of justification.  It treats beliefs as if they stand 
independent from a believer.  The fruitful change that VE offers is to recognize 
that beliefs are intimately connected to a believer.  Because beliefs do not stand 
independent from believers, properties of the believer and epistemic and external 
conditions under which beliefs are formed are important in contributing to 
whether or not a belief is attributed as justified.  Whether the belief is produced 
through ability or motivation or responsibly the way in which it is produced 
determines the degree to which the belief is justified.  Because this shift does not 
resolve the debate, VE is consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. 
Second, regarding the internalism/externalism debate, VE has not resolved 
this debate either, but this is an instance in which VE has advanced the discussion.  
The internalism/externalism debate is one of conflicting intuitions over the nature 
of justification.  The debate is unresolved to be sure, however, the advance in 
discussion from VE here is to reinforce and reaffirm at least some of those 
intuitions.  VE accounts of knowledge offer something for both internalists and 
externalists.  VE accounts acknowledge that reliability, to some extent, is a 
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necessary condition for knowledge, be it reliability at getting to the truth as an 
epistemic norm
139
 or reliability as the successful manifestation of the virtue.
140
  
VE accounts offer internalists their necessary condition as well.  Some kinds of 
knowledge (specifically, the non-simple kind as with perceptual knowledge) 
require internal constraints (in the form of the epistemic virtues) for justification. 
Third, regarding the definition of knowledge, VE has contributed the 
most.  The traditional definition of knowledge—justified true belief—is 
inadequate, as Gettier cases show.  Since beliefs do not stand independent from a 
believer, it is a reasonable step to consider properties of a believer as part of the 
definition of knowledge.  Various conceptions of VE have attempted different 
definitions, and indeed, at least one eschews necessary and sufficient conditions 
for knowledge.
141
  The important advance in discussion from these accounts is 
that they make the intellectual character of the believer central to their accounts. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have done the following.  I have reviewed three of the 
major problems for epistemology in the 20
th
 century.  My aim was to show that 
VE is an alternative account of knowledge and justification that shifts the focus of 
analysis of these concepts.  This shift is important because it changes the crux of 
the debate over issues like the structure and nature of justification and the 
definition of knowledge.  In the following chapter I will endorse a specific view 
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of virtue epistemology.  In the chapter after that I will conclude this dissertation 




RELIABILITY, CREDIT, VIRTUE 
Introduction  
The central importance of the virtue approach to epistemology is its 
emphasis on the agent.  Whether the emphasis is on the cognitive character of the 
agent or the cognitive ability of the agent, the approach is unique compared to 
previous theories.  In those previous theories the agent as a knower is treated 
more like a placeholder for conditions on some abstract feature of the world, 
rather than the participant in the act of knowing.  Of course, the agent plays a role 
in other theories of knowledge as well (e.g. S knows that p, always), however, 
VE’s emphasis on the role of the agent as knower in a state of knowing (or, 
believer in a state of believing) showcases the role of the agent in the definitions 
of knowledge or justified belief.  The aim of this chapter is to sketch a particular 
view of VE.   
This chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 1 I briefly discuss my own 
dual conception of what an intellectual virtue is.  For the rest of the chapter I will 
focus on one of these conceptions, intellectual virtue as ability or skill
142
, in order 
to sketch the view more fully.  In Section 2, I will discuss the role of reliability for 
this particular view and argue that reliability is a normative notion.  In Section 3 I 
discuss the general notions of credit by exploring the familiar notions of athletic 
and moral credit.  I do this in order to draw an analogy with the notion of 
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intellectual credit.  In Section 4 I conclude with a discussion of a particular virtue 
theoretic account in which the notion of credit is central to the account. 
Section 1—The Nature of Intellectual Virtue 
In this section I want to briefly discuss what I understand an intellectual 
virtue to be.  I assume that a virtue, in general, is an excellence or a state of a 
thing that makes that thing good. An intellectual or cognitive virtue is an 
excellence of the intellect or cognitive state that makes the intellect good.  In the 
last chapter I divided up the virtues into two categories—virtues that are more like 
skills or abilities to the extent that the manifestations of them tend to produce true 
beliefs, and virtues that are more like character traits that may or may not be truth-
conducive.  Undoubtedly, there are other ways to divide up and classify the 
intellectual virtues, and indeed, some
143
 would not count certain abilities or skills 
(such as reasoning skills) as virtues.  However, I think that dividing up the 
intellectual virtues this way is intuitive and for the most part uncontroversial. 
To a first approximation, an intellectual virtue is similar to a moral virtue 
as defined by Aristotle.  Roughly put, Aristotle defines a moral virtue as a state of 
character of an individual, under her control, that lies at the mean between two 
extremes.  Some intellectual virtues are like this conception of moral virtues in 
that they are 1) states of an agent’s intellectual character and 2) under an agent’s 
control at least to some extent.  When I say that intellectual virtues are states of 
intellectual character, I mean generally that they are excellences of an agent’s 
intellectual makeup.  By ‘intellectual makeup’ I mean the stable cognitive habits 
and dispositions that are part of an agent’s intellectual life.  I mentioned two 
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examples of this kind of intellectual virtue in Chapter 4—intellectual 
conscientiousness and creativity.  As I noted in Chapter 4, some of these character 
trait virtues are not necessarily conducive to true believing, as with creativity, 
while others are conducive to true believing, as with intellectual 
conscientiousness.   
Furthermore, on this understanding, intellectual virtue is to some degree 
under an agent’s control.  This is to say that the virtue tends to be an acquired trait 
and may require agent motivation in order for the agent to develop this trait in 
specific cases.  I say, “tends to be” an acquired trait because though virtues like 
creativity or conscientiousness may come naturally to the exceptionally gifted, 
most of us have to develop these kinds of virtues to some extent over time.  
Motivation is not a requirement for all cases of trait acquisition, though it seems 
like it is for some.  For example, one could develop an intellectual character trait 
like creativity without a specific motivation in mind, especially if one is naturally 
gifted in the creative sense.  In this case, creativity is a natural aspect of 
intellectual character, and though it may still need to be developed, because it is a 
natural aspect of intellectual character, motivation may not be required for 
development.  However, it seems like for most people, motivation is required in 
order to develop a character trait (such as creativity).  The development of the 
trait usually requires some work and practice, and this work and practice requires 
motivation.  For example, an agent may have to be motivated to develop his 
intellectual creativity in order to complete a manuscript.  The work and practice 
involved in the development of intellectual creativity also requires motivation. 
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Intellectual virtues are also much like other abilities or skills.  Abilities in 
general are stable habits to achieve some end, and an intellectual ability is no 
different.  While there may be more than one end to be achieved through 
intellectual ability, the most obvious one is to acquire true beliefs.  This 
understanding fits easily with the virtues associated with perception.  The abilities 
associated with perceptual cognition (e.g. sight, sound, touch, taste, smell) are 
intellectual virtues that require minimal training (if any at all) and do not always 
seem to be under the direct control of an agent.  For example, when I look ahead 
and see a tree, I instantly recognize that it is a tree and form the belief that I see a 
tree.  The belief that I form seems to require minimal effort and to be formed 
involuntarily. 
These two ways of understanding intellectual virtue—as a state of 
character under the control of an agent and as an ability—are compatible and 
often overlap to some extent.  For example, the character trait type virtues like 
creativity or conscientiousness are also abilities to some extent.  The ‘end’ to be 
achieved is the creative result or the acquisition of more true beliefs than false 
beliefs, respectively.  And some of the more ‘ability’ associated virtues can also 
be like character states in that their development and applications are under the 
control of an agent and may require motivation in order to develop.  For example, 
while the ability to make good arguments, the ability to recognize reliable 
authorities, and the ability to evaluate evidence may come naturally to some, most 
of us have to develop these abilities over time.  These abilities are under the direct 
control of the agent and may require motivation in order to develop.  Furthermore, 
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some intellectual virtues may only states of character (and not abilities at all), 
while others may be purely ability-like (i.e. and not character states of any sort).  
For example, open-mindedness may just be a character state, rather than an 
ability; and the virtues associated with perception do not seem like character 
states at all.  This poses no special problem for the virtue approach. For, there is 
no need for there to be a single conception of the nature of an intellectual virtue.  
The important thing that both these conceptions of intellectual virtue have in 
common is that they are excellences of the intellect.  All that’s really essential is 
that we are able to recognize an intellectual virtue as such, and then can provide a 
fitting account of what makes it a virtue of the intellect.  
From here on out in this chapter I will focus on intellectual virtues that fit 
the conception of an ability.  A version of this conception of intellectual virtue 
lends itself especially well to Bayesian epistemology, and the purpose of this 
dissertation is to secure an important link between Bayesian epistemology and 
virtue epistemology.  Moreover, because I take the emphasis on the reliability of 
the agent to be of particular importance in VE, I am going to focus on a version of 
reliabilism that emphasizes abilities in its account.  If knowledge is of the kind 
Greco (2010) describes as a “success from ability,”
144
 and I think it is, then 
reliability is central to developing and possessing an intellectual ability.  The 
more reliable an agent is in exercising his ability, the more we attribute the ability 
to the agent.  While I am sympathetic to the responsibilists, as described in 
Chapter 4, when specific kinds of knowledge or specific virtues are differentiated, 
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reliability is uncontroversially important.  One must be reliable in order for the 
character trait or ability to be of the kind that counts as excellent.  For example, 
reliability is a necessary part of the virtue of open-mindedness, and of a virtuous 
perceptual ability as well.   
Section 2—Reliability 
In this section I will discuss a version of reliabilism that I think accurately 
captures the nature of knowledge.  Previously, in Chapter 4, I discussed 
Goldman’s process reliabilism, which is for the most part unsuccessful as a theory 
of knowledge.  It is unsuccessful not only because of the generality problem, but 
also, and relatedly, because it is incapable of handling general, practical cases of 
knowledge.  I said in Chapter 4 that the generality problem is a problem for all 
versions of reliabilism, so I will address the problem and a possible response later.  
For now I want to introduce a version of reliabilism that is more promising.  This 
version is Greco’s account of knowledge as success from ability (KSA).  Greco’s 
KSA account is as follows:   
S knows p if and only if S believes the truth (with respect to p) because 
S’s belief that p is produced by intellectual ability.
145
   
 
The use of the term ‘because’ here is intended to indicate a causal relationship.  
The idea is that S’s belief regarding the truth with respect to p is caused in some 
way by S’s intellectual abilities, skills, and powers.
146
  Intellectual abilities and 
powers are understood here as the possession of intellectual virtues.
147
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Intellectual credit is deserved, and may be attributed to an agent when the agent 
believes p through the application of their intellectual ability.
148
   
The KSA account is a reliabilist position.  Reliabilism, broadly construed, 
is the view that emphasizes the truth-conduciveness of belief-formation via a 
process, method, or other epistemological factor.  It is a view that applies to both 
theories of knowledge and justification.  It is an externalist view regarding the 
issues of justification and knowledge because, for whatever species of 
externalism, the conditions for justification or knowledge are not limited to the 
mental contents of the believer.  Because KSA is an externalist position, it faces 




The emphasis on reliability supplemented with properly applied 
intellectual ability makes this view attractive as a theory of knowledge.  
‘Reliability’, as used generally in epistemological contexts, refers to the idea that 
a process or an agent regularly gets to the truth, and this is a useful way to 
understand the notion.  However, I want to draw attention to another, more 
common usage that is epistemologists tend to ignore.  Reliability is a feature of a 
thing that makes it stable, and when applied to a process or procedure, it is a 
feature that makes the process or procedure repeatable.  Stability and repeatability 
are valuable in general.  The stable disposition of an agent, for example, is one on 
the basis of which we can predict future behavior.  A repeatable method in 
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science, for example, is valuable because results from the method can be 
rechecked, and thus verified or refuted.   
Reliabilism, by itself, is an attractive feature of a theory of knowledge or 
justification because it emphasizes an important truth-conducive property of 
belief formation—reliability.  Reliability is important in the formation of true 
beliefs because it adds the value from stability and repeatability to the belief that 
is formed.  It is uncontroversial that true beliefs, justified true beliefs, and 
knowledge are all valuable, and we generally think of these as valuable in 
ascending order.  One source of this value is the reliable means by which the 
belief is formed. 
My claim that one source of value is reliability, though, is not uncontested.  
Zagzebski (2003) argues that reliability per se has no value or disvalue.  She uses 
several examples to make her point.  The goodness of the espresso does not come 
from the source that produces it, the espresso maker.  The espresso would be just 
as good whether it was produced by a reliable or unreliable espresso maker.  A 
reliable dripping faucet is not good, not because it reliably drips, but because 
dripping water is not good.
150
  These examples are supposed to be analogous to 
true belief and the source of true belief (as in a belief forming process in an 
agent).  I agree with her that reliability alone does not account for the goodness 
that true beliefs have.  True beliefs, whatever value they have, are valuable 
regardless of whether or not they are produced from a reliable process.  For 
example, the belief that I form when I look ahead and correctly identify the tree 
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that I see before me is valuable (has value) regardless of whether or not my belief 
forming process is reliable.   
However, I disagree that reliability can have no value per se.  If reliability 
is understood as stability and repeatability, then as applied to some kinds of cases, 
reliability certainly does add value.  For example, while it is true that a reliable 
espresso maker does not add value to the espresso (the espresso is just as good or 
bad whether or not it is produced from a reliable maker), reliability in the ability 
to produce good espresso makes the espresso maker valuable.  In other words, the 
espresso maker itself has value because of its reliability to produce good espresso.  
Though dripping water from a faucet is not good, the fact that the faucet drips 
reliably makes the faucet not good.  Reliability itself confers value on the thing 
that is reliable.  So, a reliable belief forming process is valuable because of its 
reliability in getting to the truth (at least).
151
  Reliability may not explain the value 
simpliciter of a true belief, but if the belief is formed from some reliable faculty, 
method, or process, then the belief has some added value in virtue of the fact that 
it was formed by a reliable (thus, valuable) process.  The same holds for true 
beliefs that are unreliably formed.  Of course they have some positive value 
because they are true, but they also seem to have some negative value as well.  
For example, suppose I form the belief that the winning Powerball numbers are 4, 
21, 20, 12, 26, 22 as a result of seeing these numbers on the back of a fortune 
from a fortune cookie.  Suppose further that this belief turns out to be true.  Now, 
this true belief was formed from an unreliable process, but is valuable because it 
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is true; thus it does not have the substantive value that reliably formed beliefs 
have.  For example, a belief formed from my ability to reason well, whether it is 
true or not, has more value than the fortune-cookie belief. 
Reliably formed justified true beliefs are good things to have, and I have 
argued that they are good at least in part because of the truth-producing reliability 
of the process by which they are formed.  But reliability is not enough for a robust 
theory of justification or knowledge.  Reliability is not enough for a robust theory 
of justification because although a reliable method, process, or ability may confer 
some amount of justification (e.g. the belief is justified in virtue of the fact that it 
was produced by a reliable process), and therefore value, it does not confer the 
full degree of justification that seems to be required for knowledge.  Take for 
example a justified true belief that p formed by my reliable faculty of sight.  The 
reliability of my faculty alone cannot be the sole source of my justification for 
believing that p, though reliability does confer some justification.   
The reason why reliability alone does not confer the kind of justification 
required for knowledge is that there are many instances where one can reliably 
form a true belief with some justification, but nevertheless cannot legitimately 
claim to know.  For example, suppose I go to only a partially reliable source like 
Wikipedia to find out whether or not Brasilia is the capitol of Brazil.  Wikipedia is 
the kind of source that is only partially reliable.  The belief that I form, that 
Brasilia is the capitol of Brazil, is justified, but not to the degree that is required 
for knowledge.  To have sufficient justification for the belief to count as 
knowledge, I would need something more.  Thus, reliability alone is also cannot 
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sufficient for a theory of knowledge.  Gettier cases show that a belief can be 
produced by a reliable belief forming process (e.g. inference), yet fall short of 
knowledge because the justification conferred falls short of what’s needed for 
knowledge.  
Reliability is a feature of justification and knowledge that is the same for 
both those who come by it naturally and those who can only acquire it via hard 
work.  So although acquiring something through hard work may deserve some 
special kind of credit (and virtue theories tend to draw on credit-worthy 
attributes), reliability is itself credit-worthy regardless of how it is acquired.  To 
see the point, consider that some people are naturally better at solving 
mathematical problems than others.  They seem to get truths of mathematics 
without nearly as much study or work as others require.  However, the fact that 
the ability to solve mathematical problems comes naturally for them does not 
detract from the value of their ability to get correct results.  In other words, those 
who are naturally equipped with mathematical ability deserve no less credit for 
their mathematical beliefs than those who have to work incredibly hard to acquire 
similar abilities.  The feature of the ability common to both the agent who comes 
by it naturally and the agent who has to acquire it via hard work is reliable. 
Section 3—Credit 
The notion of the credit-worthiness of attributes and abilities must play an 
important role in a virtue epistemology.  Credit is the kind of thing that can be 
deserved, and most importantly, the kind of thing that can be attributed.  When we 
attribute credit to an agent for an action or an outcome, we do so because we think 
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an agent deserves it.  For example, when a professional basketball player makes a 
shot from the three point line, we give him credit for making the shot.  When a 
student answers correctly on an exam, we give her credit for giving the correct 
answer.  The means by which someone achieves (or deserves) credit is through 
their ability, whether it is a motivated effort or not. This suggests that the notion 
of credit may play a significant role in a virtue epistemology, since credit attends 
virtuous ability. 
When I say that the means by which someone achieves (or deserves) credit 
is through their ability, I mean the following.  Since abilities are the stable habits 
to achieve some end, they are the kinds of things that are more resistant to 
accidental features of a situation that may either accidently bring success or 
prohibit achievement.  From here on out I’ll call such accidental features “luck”.  
For example, when one has the ability to make a shot from the three point line on 
a basketball court, this means that one has the stable habit, entrenched in some 
way, to make that shot, whether or not one is motivated to make the shot, and 
whether or not one has ever made that kind of shot before.  So, in some sense, 
even a non-expert, non-professional has the ability, though this sense is very 
weak.  In this case, the case in which the non-basketball playing novice makes the 
shot, the novice has achieved the end, and therefore, is worthy of some credit, but 
not a lot of credit.  The novice certainly deserves less credit than that professional.  
The reason why the novice deserves less credit is because she lacks in ability, and 
her success is due more to the lucky features of the situation than to stable habits. 
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It may seem controversial to say that a novice deserves any credit for an 
act that produces an outcome that is more due to the accidental features of a 
situation than her ability.  The reason why the novice deserves credit (though it is 
minimal) is because the result that occurred came about as a result of her action.  
This kind of credit, though, is negligible.  Consider Greco’s example of athletic 
credit, Bucky Dent’s homerun that eliminated the Red Sox from the play-offs in 
1978.
152
  Bucky Dent was not a homerun hitter; indeed, he hit very few homeruns 
over the course of his career.  However, on this particular occasion, he managed 
to hit a homerun.  Given his past hitting record and the conditions on the field at 
the time, it was a remarkable occurrence.
153
  Dent received credit for hitting that 
homerun, as did the Yankees as a team.  But, as Greco points out, Red Sox fans 
do not give very much credit to either Dent for the three run homer or to the 
Yankees for their subsequent win.  Red Sox fans attribute the homerun to mere 
bad luck because accidental features of the situation, such as conditions on the 
field, had more influence on the outcome than did Dent’s hitting ability. 
In moral action, the same notion of credit can be applied.  Riggs puts it 
this way: 
Someone who produces some morally good end by pure luck deserves less 
moral credit than does someone who produces the end by application of 
her skills and abilities.  These kinds of considerations are what lie behind 
our intuitions about cases of “moral luck.”  The drunk driver who fails to 
                                                 
152
 Greco(2003), op. cit., p. 122. 
 
153
 So much so, that even Dent could not believe that he had made the homerun.  Dent is quoted as 
saying, “I knew I had hit it high enough to hit the wall…but there were shadows, and I didn't see 
the ball land. I didn't know I had hit a homer until I saw the umpire signaling. I couldn't believe 






run over someone only because she encountered no pedestrians on the way 
home deserves little or no credit for that positive outcome (or lack of a 
negative outcome) because this outcome was not (sufficiently) brought 
about by the application of her abilities, powers, and skills, but rather due 




The drunk driver is “morally lucky” to the extent that because of external 
circumstances in her situation, she does not injure pedestrians during her drive 
(the good consequence).  The common intuition is that she does not deserve much 
credit for this.  It is merely an accidental feature of the situation that there were no 
pedestrians on the road at the time of her driving. 
In the moral realm, actions are more morally praiseworthy (i.e. morally 
credit-worthy in Riggs’ sense) when they can be attributed to the powers, abilities, 
actions, and decisions of the agent who brings about the consequence.  A drunk 
driver and a sober driver may achieve the same end of not injuring pedestrians.  In 
some sense, both can be attributed some positive credit, while the sober driver, 
obviously, deserves more positive credit.  The drunk driver is less capable in her 
driving abilities than the sober driver, so it is merely due to luck that the good end 
(not injuring pedestrians) comes about for the drunk driver. 
Here is an example of negative credit-worthiness, adapted from a famous 
example due to James Rachels.
155
  Both Smith and Jones stand to inherit a large 
amount of money upon the death of their young cousin.  In Smith’s case, he 
sneaks into his cousin’s bathroom while his cousin is taking a bath, drowns him, 
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and makes the surroundings appear as if the child died accidently.  In Jones’ case, 
he, with the same intention as Smith, sneaks into his cousin’s bathroom while his 
cousin is taking a bath.  Just as Jones enters the bathroom, his cousin slips and 
begins to drown.  Jones does nothing to save his cousin while he watches his 
cousin die.  We consider both Smith and Jones to be both morally blameworthy.  
Smith takes the direct action to kill, while Jones takes no action.  Rachels’ point is 
that while there is a bare difference in the facts of each situation, there is no moral 
difference.  The prevailing intuition about Jones is that he is as morally 
blameworthy for the death of his nephew as Smith is.   
I contend that the reason why there is no moral difference between 
Smith’s case and Jones’ case is because while luck plays a role (i.e. the nephew 
slips), from the moral perspective, the outcome is in fact due to the agent’s 
powers, abilities, actions, and decisions.  Though Smith takes direct action to kill 
his cousin and Jones takes no action, we find both Smith and Jones equally 
morally blameworthy because both intended to act in such a way as to bring about 
the death of their respective cousins.  The “lucky” features of Jones’ situation, 
though, allowed for Jones to kill his cousin with inaction.  In fact, his decision to 
do nothing to keep his cousin from drowning together with his resulting inaction, 
are morally significant facts of his situation.  His inaction is what makes him 
“credit worthy” in a negative sense—i.e. blameworthy.   
For both kinds of credit discussed so far, athletic and moral, notice that 
credit need not be an absolute, all or nothing attribution.  Credit is deserved and 
attributed in degrees.  When an expert homerun hitter hits a homerun, more credit 
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is attributed to her for the homerun than attributed to a novice who hits a 
homerun.  While an expert homerun hitter deserves credit for hitting a homerun, 
the circumstances under which the homerun is hit do still play a role, and even 
then credit is attributed in degrees.  For example, when an expert hitter hits under 
the “right” conditions (i.e. no wind or favorable winds, lower air pressure, lower 
humidity), the circumstances for achieving the homerun are favorable for success 
because the ball travels through atmospheric conditions with less resistance.  
Perhaps less credit is deserved for the homerun in this instance, even for the 
expert.  When an expert hitter hits under less than optimal conditions (e.g. strong 
headwind, high air pressure, high humidity), atmospheric conditions offer more 
resistance against the ball, making the home run less likely.  Perhaps more credit 
is deserved for success in this instance.   
The same is true for moral credit.  Suppose Smith is a sober driver who 
must drive through an area dense with pedestrians and Jones is a drunk driver who 
must do the same.  When Smith is successful at navigating pedestrian traffic, she 
deserves more positive moral credit (moral praise) than would Jones who also 
successfully navigates through pedestrian traffic.  Furthermore, Smith also 
deserves more credit in this case than she would in the case where there the 
pedestrian traffic is sparse.   
The examples of athletic credit and moral credit suggest analogous credit-
worthiness assessments for cases of epistemic or intellectual performance.  An 
agent deserves more or less epistemic credit, depending on the degree to which 
her powers, abilities, skills, and (where appropriate) motivations are involved in 
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bringing about her true belief.  For example, a student who makes a correct guess 
at the answer deserves less credit for her belief than a student who arrives at the 
answer through her abilities, skills, etc.  When an agent believes the truth with 
respect to p as a result of her abilities, skills, etc, she has, to borrow Greco’s term, 
achieved true belief. 
Furthermore, if I am right about reliability being crucial to accounts of 
justification and knowledge, then the notion of credit for believing truly is crucial 
as well.  There is an interplay between the reliability of an agent and the extent to 
which credit is due to the agent for holding the belief.  For, if an agent happens to 
believe truly, but via an unreliable process, then little credit is due. Thus, on a 
virtue account in which knowledge is taken to be “true belief achieved in a credit-
worthy way”, the belief may fail to count as knowledge.  However, on this kind of 
account of knowledge, when an agent believes truly through the application of 
reliable truth seeking processes, then the kind of credit due to the agent may raise 
the belief to the status of knowledge.  Thus, on this kind of view, ‘knowledge’ is 
an honorific for an agent’s beliefs when they are true and acquired via the right 
kind of process involving the right kind of intellectual abilities (which may be 
either natural or acquired abilities). 
Section 4—Virtue  
What is the connection between epistemic credit as described above and 
intellectual virtue?  In this section I will attempt to answer this question. My 
preferred account of knowledge and justification, Greco’s account of knowledge 
as success from ability (KSA), incorporates the idea that whatever knowledge and 
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justification are, they are attributable to an agent.  So the KSA view is a virtue-
theoretic account that takes credit for a belief into its account.  This is in contrast 
to the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief, which permits a 
rather weak connection to agency. On the usual account a belief need merely be 
creditable to the agent as having been justified for him (or by him).  This weak 
connection to agency in the traditional account of knowledge as justified true 
belief is one reason that the traditional accounts are so easily susceptible to Gettier 
problems, in part because the justificatory process may fail to be one that reliably 
produces true beliefs for that agent under the present circumstances. 
Briefly, Greco’s KSA account is as follows:   
S knows p if and only if  
S believes the truth (with respect to p) because S’s belief 
that p is (reliability) produced by (virtuous) intellectual 
ability.
156
   
 
The use of the term ‘because’ here is intended to indicate a causal relationship.  
The idea is that S’s belief regarding the truth with respect to p is caused in some 
way by S’s intellectual abilities, skills, and powers.
157
  Intellectual abilities and 
powers are understood here as the possession of intellectual virtues.
158
  
Intellectual credit is deserved, and may be attributed to an agent when the agent 
believes p through the application of their intellectual ability.
159
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The KSA account is a reliabilist position.  Regarding the issues of 
justification and knowledge it is an externalist position.
160
  I take the emphasis on 
the reliability of the knowledge acquisition process, together with the point that 
reliability is insufficient for knowledge, but must be supplemented with properly 
applied intellectual ability, to be an especially important feature of the KSA 
account.  The point is that although some agent may reliably form true beliefs, 
that agent would fail to be creditable for having knowledge if that process failed to 
draw on his intellectual ability (e.g. if he were a very reliable guesser).  
Reliability is central to an agent-centered account of justification and 
knowledge, so it is a requirement of any adequate epistemology.  This is because 
an important feature of knowledge should be a kind of stability that attends 
reliability.  In other words, although our justifications of particular propositions 
may change (thus changing their status as knowledge), conceptually for a 
proposition to count as knowledge it should be the kind of thing (have the kind of 
epistemic properties) that permit it to be reliably available from a knowledgeable 
agent.  If an agent reliably believes the truth, then that agent should be is a stable 
source of knowledge.  
Furthermore, an agent’s intellectual abilities and powers should properly 
be part of that person’s cognitive character or make-up.  Thus, it should be 
dispositional.  In other words, an agent has a cognitive ability or power as part of 
her (at least somewhat) stable cognitive makeup, which disposes her to believe a 
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proposition only when that belief is formed via certain reliable processes that 
draw on the right sorts of intellectual abilities.  Epistemic ability is the kind of 
thing that is stable, and that lends stability to the knowledge possessed by an 
agent.  Furthermore, when an agent has an ability that is a stable disposition 
towards achieving some particular kind of end, then that agent may justly be 
credited for achievements that result from that ability. 
The value of the stable disposition is the same, at least in some sense, 
whether the ability is natural or acquired.  Of course, we may value an ability that 
we have acquired through hard work (rather than via nature) because we had to 
work hard for it, but this is a different sense of the term ‘value’.  The sense of 
‘value’ to which I refer, though, is the value that the ability has due to the stable 
disposition or dispositions towards achieving valuable ends that make up the 
ability.  For example, the value of the ability to reliably form true mathematical 
beliefs is the same whether or not it is easily acquired.  Moreover, whether or not 
the ability is easily acquired is irrelevant to attributing credit. 
Again, the notions of reliability and credit are import to VE.  What makes 
someone worthy of credit is their reliability.  The more reliable an ability is, the 
more credit to be attributed for the successful achievement through ability.  To get 
the idea, consider the Dent example again.  Dent was not a reliable homerun 
hitter.  His homerun was due more to the ‘lucky’ conditions for him on the field.  
Though, Dent gets some credit for hitting the homerun (contra Red Sox fans), 
because he is an unreliable hitter, he does not get much credit.  A reliable hitter, 
deserves more credit, even if conditions for him are ‘lucky’ at the time of success. 
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This kind of account of knowledge as credit recognizes, as Greco notes, 
the kind of normativity that comes via reliable success from ability, and as such is 
a kind of externalist account of knowledge.
161
  In any area of action (e.g. moral, 
athletic, intellectual), reliable success from ability is positively evaluated.  
Similarly for reliable failure or inconsistency of action—we both are evaluated 
negatively.  In Chapter 2 I argued that reliability is a normative constraint on 
acquiring rational belief.  I agree with Greco that when an agent is reliable in 
believing truly, that reliability satisfies a central kind of epistemic standard.  
Reliability may not be the only epistemic standard, but on the present account of 
credit it is the most salient standard.
162
 
Greco proposes the following theory of intellectual credit attribution.  S 
deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if: 
a. believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value,  
b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and  
c. believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s reliable cognitive 
character.  
 
Alternatively:   
S’s reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of 




I think that this theory of intellectual credit attribution gets things right 
regarding the notion of epistemic credit.  Believing the truth regarding a 
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proposition usually has at least some epistemic value.  When the belief is 
creditable to an agent, the minimal condition on knowledge or justification is met.  
But, most importantly regarding epistemic credit (for concepts like knowledge or 
justification), an agent’s cognitive character has to play a relevant role in the 
reason why an agent believes the truth.  For instance, believing that it is not 
raining (when it is in fact not raining) is epistemically valuable.  It is a good thing 
to believe the truth about the external world.  When that belief is held by an agent, 
the belief is creditable to that agent.  But more importantly, when an agent 
believes as a result of her cognitive abilities, the agent deserves credit for holding 
that belief because her positive intellectual abilities are part of the causal reasons 
for her belief. 
 Epistemic credit seems to me to be central to the concepts of knowledge or 
justification in general.  Evidence, reasons, arguments, etc. offer justification for 
propositions.  However, none of these are relevant without there being an agent 
who holds the corresponding beliefs about evidence, reasons, or arguments.  
Furthermore, the mere fact that an agent might justifiably hold the belief is not 
enough, as Gettier cases show.  The belief has to be attributable to an agent due to 
her intellectual abilities entering into a causal process in the right way for her true 
belief to count as knowledge. 
 Finally, I take epistemic credit to be something that admits of degree, like 
other forms of credit.  Dent may be due some credit for the homerun he hit.  
However, the amount of credit he was given depended on who was evaluating 
him.  Red Sox fans gave him little to no credit—they took the accomplishment to 
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be almost entirely attributable to luck rather than ability.  Yankees fans, though 
astonished, give Dent more credit.  What the Sox fans and the Yankees fans 
disagreed about was the extent to which Dent’s abilities contributed to his 
success.  For, Dent was in fact trying to get a hit; and most homeruns happen that 
way (usually a player who hits a homerun is not specifically trying for a 
homerun).  And Dent did have fairly good hitting ability.  So, arguably, he should 
get as much credit as most homerun hitters.  In any case, I think that epistemic 
credit works in much the same way.  When someone comes to justifiably hold a 
belief, then he should get some credit.  The amount of credit depends on the 
degree to which the agent’s abilities or powers properly contribute to the agent’s 




EPISTEMIC VIRTUES, PRIOR PROBABILITES, and NORMS for 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
Very little work has been done to try to connect Bayesian epistemology 
with any version of traditional epistemology, let alone virtue epistemology.
164
  
The purpose of this dissertation is to try to do just that.  In Chapter 2, I discussed 
Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) as a way of providing the logic and 
epistemology of scientific inference.  For the most part, BCT is usually conceived 
of as providing an idealization of warranted belief strengths for real agents.  In 
Chapter 3 I discussed one recent application of the principles of BCT to cognitive 
science, rational analysis, which is less idealized in that it is an empirical project 
that shows the extent to which real human agents may reason in a way that 
conforms to Bayesian principles.  In Chapter 4, I discussed the historical 
motivations for VE.  In Chapter 5 I presented a brief sketch of a reliabilist version 
of VE.  In this chapter I will propose and discuss some natural connections 
between the Bayesian epistemology and VE.   
I think of VE as being less idealized than BCT, but still somewhat 
idealized, as normative models tend to be.  VE is, in a sense, an empirical project 
in that it looks to the instances of epistemological success for normative 
standards.  By epistemological success I mean an agent’s success associated with 
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epistemic acts of thought, for example, justified belief, acquiring true beliefs, 
acquiring knowledge, thinking creatively, etc.  In this sense VE is agent based, 
and both VE and BCT are agent based conceptions.  By agent based I mean that 
the conceptual priority is given to particulars about agents and the conditions 
under which epistemic concepts like knowledge, justification, or confirmation 
apply with respect to individual agents.   
Section 1—Why Bayesian Epistemology Needs Something Else 
The main goal of BCT is to provide a logic and epistemology for how we 
arrive at strongly confirmed theories that are true.  As a logic, and to some extent 
as an epistemology, it is an idealization.  Additional normative constraints are 
surely relevant, not only to belief in general, but also to beliefs that arise in 
scientific contexts.  Traditional epistemology mainly endorses these additional 
normative constraints via analyses of the concepts of justification and knowledge.  
Though the approach from traditional epistemology is compatible with Bayesian 
epistemology, the primary focus of Bayesian epistemology has been on other 
concepts, such as belief strengths and degrees of confirmation, which are 
ultimately represented by probabilities.   
The majority of Bayesians are subjectivists who take Bayesian probability 
functions to represent the belief strengths of ideal agents, where belief strengths 
are measured on a probabilistic scale.  The belief strengths of ideal agents are 
probabilistically consistent—that is, they satisfy the laws of probability theory.  
The belief strengths of real agents should satisfy the same laws of probability as 
well (i.e. must be probabilistically consistent), on pain of a kind of pragmatic flaw 
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in how they rank possible actions to perform when outcomes are uncertain. An 
agent whose belief strengths violate the probabilistic laws is subject to select “best 
actions” that guarantee a loss, regardless of how the world may turn out—her 
decision are subject to a so-called Dutch-book.  Furthermore, decisions to act 
based on probabilistically consistent belief-strengths can always avoid this kind of 
sure-loss.  Thus, subjectivist Bayesians use probabilistic consistency as a standard 
of rationality.  They often call probabilistically inconsistent agents irrational.  
Any broader epistemology should accommodate this point about decision 
and action.  This is to say that any robust theory of knowledge should include a 
comprehensive theory of decision that links belief and knowledge to decisions 
regarding best actions.  The only comprehensive theory of this kind that we have 
at present is Bayesian decision theory.  So any epistemology that pretends to be 
comprehensive should either incorporate Bayesian decision theory or be ready to 
replace it with another theory that fulfills the same role of linking belief and 
knowledge to decisions regarding best actions.  To my knowledge there are no 
candidate replacement theories of decision available. 
The subjectivist Bayesian account, though, does not supply an adequate 
epistemology on its own.  Its account of rationality is merely that of probabilistic 
consistency. As we saw in Chapter 4 in the discussion of coherentism as a theory 
of the structure of justification, mere consistency, even if it is probabilistic 
consistency, is not enough for an adequate epistemology.  Recall, for instance, the 
objections to coherentism that points out that a piece of fiction can be completely 
consistent, although each of the propositions in the story is false.  In the same 
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way, belief strengths may be probabilistically consistent (i.e. not violate 
probabilistic laws), but not at all closely aligned to the truth (e.g. it is 
probabilistically coherent for an agent to have degree-of-belief .95 that Elvis is 
alive on Mars, provided the agent also has, for instance, degree-of-belief .05 that 
Elvis is not alive on Mars).  The subjectivist Bayesian’s account of probabilistic 
consistency has nothing to offer in the way of getting to the truth via evidence.  
 Objectivist Bayesians differ from subjectivist Bayesians with regard to 
how they interpret the kinds of probabilities involved in Bayesian confirmation 
functions.  Some take confirmational probabilities to be relative frequencies, some 
take them to be objective chances.
165
 Other objectivists take Bayesian 
confirmational probabilities to be strictly logical in some sense. Historically many 
Bayesian logicists have taken the logically specified prior probabilities required 
by the Bayesian formalism to be determined by some form of a principle of 
indifference.
166
  This is in contrast to the subjectivist Bayesians, who allow the 
prior probabilities to represent an agent’s degree of belief in a hypothesis prior to 
taking the evidence into account.
167
  Sometimes there is agreement among various 
kinds of Bayesians with regard to how evidential support (i.e. confirmation of 
hypotheses) is supposed to work, sometimes not.  Their differences are especially 
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strong when it comes to the assessment of prior probabilities for hypotheses.
168
  
However, arguably, any version of Bayesianism that pretends to be a basis for an 
epistemology of evidential support for scientific hypotheses and theories should 
depend only on objective or rational factors to figure into an agent’s assessment 
of prior probabilities. 
 This kind of divide between subjective and objectivist Bayesians also 
applies to the logic of confirmation.  The subjectivist takes confirmation functions 
to be probability functions that represent belief strengths of ideal agents.  A 
conditional probability for a real agent represents a belief strength an ideal agent 
would have in a hypothesis on a body of evidence if that evidence represents all 
she knows (with certainty) that is relevant to a hypothesis.  The objectivist (or 
logicist) takes confirmation functions to be conditional probability functions.  
Although traditionally many objectivists have used the principle of indifference, 
to assign prior probabilities, that is not really essential to the logicist line. What is 
essential is that logicists take the numerical values of the conditional probability 
functions to represent a measure of argument strength—the measure of how 
strongly evidence supports a hypothesis.  Indeed, the logicist may completely part 
company with the subjectivist Bayesians.  The logicist is only interested in a logic 
of confirmation, not in and account of decision.  To the extent that the logicist 
wants to tie the confirmation function into the logic of decision, the logicist takes 
confirmational probability functions to be completely distinct from the degree-of-
belief functions used in decision theory. Rather, the logicist holds that degrees of 
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belief should be informed by degrees of confirmation – that the confirmation 
function is distinct, but should inform what the agent believes, and how strongly 
she believes it.  Thus, the logicist Bayesian approach to confirmation does not 
pretend to provide anything other than a logic of evidential support.  So, if the 
logic of Bayesian confirmation theory is to do any real epistemological work, it 
must be embedded within a broader theory of knowledge.  Furthermore, even 
subjectivist Bayesian confirmation theory fails to provide anything like an 
adequate epistemology, since arguably it does not, on its own, provide an account 
of evidential support, but only an account of probabilistic coherence (consistency) 
appropriate to decision theory. 
 Perhaps the most telling argument that subjectivist Bayesian belief 
functions cannot be Bayesian confirmation functions come via the so-called 
problem of old evidence.  To see how this argument works, first notice that the 
primary role of a Bayesian belief function is to represent an idealized agent’s 
belief strengths in various propositions (or sentences) given everything she 
knows.  This is because the belief strength measure is supposed to combine with 
the agent’s desires for outcomes in the world (represented by her utilities) to 
provide decisions on actions to be taken.  A belief function that falls short of 
representing her full belief strengths for possible states of the world cannot 
properly play this decision theoretic role.  However, a confirmation function is 
supposed to measure the support of evidence for a hypothesis based on how likely 
the hypothesis says that evidence is, regardless of whether the agent knows that 
the evidence claim has turned out to be true.   
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 For example, when a coin has turned up “heads” and the agent knows that, 
her belief function should say that her belief strength in “heads” is 1.  It is a 
theorem of probability theory that when Pr(E) = 1, Pr(E | H) = 1.  So, this agent 
cannot use her belief function P to represent that the hypothesis, H, says that the 
coin is fair—i.e. her belief function, P, cannot have it that P(E|H) = ½.  So, her 
belief function cannot represent what a hypothesis says about evidence.  So, her 
belief function cannot properly measure the confirmation of hypotheses on the 
evidence.   This is one aspect of the so-called problem of old evidence.  It shows 
that a Bayesian belief function cannot be the same thing as a Bayesian 
confirmation function. 
 The fact that belief functions cannot be confirmation functions leaves a 
gap in the subjectivist Bayesian account of the logic of confirmation.  Subjectivist 
Bayesians have an account of ideally consistent belief strengths, but no good 
account of a confirmation theory that gives rise to these belief strengths, much 
less an account of how evidence should inform belief in a way that makes true 
claims come to be strongly believed.  Subjectivist Bayesians must appeal to some 
separate account of confirmation for that.  If that separate account is also 
Bayesian, it must employ confirmation functions that are distinct from the 
Bayesian belief functions that are used in Bayesian decision theory to represent 
the belief strengths on which decisions are made.  So, even Bayesians in the 
subjectivist camp must draw on a separate logic of confirmation functions that 
represent a kind of logic of evidential support.  In addition, they need an account 
of how Bayesian support (Bayesian confirmation) is supposed to inform Bayesian 
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belief strengths.  One simple version of this account would be that an agent’s 
belief strength for a hypothesis, H, should be updated to have the value of her 
confirmation strengths based on all the evidence she knows (with certainty).  
However, this remains far from a full theory of knowledge.   
Section 2—More for Bayesians to Consider  
On the account given in Chapter 2 belief is not binary, not all or nothing.  
It comes in degrees.  This approach to belief has previously been a point of 
conceptual disagreement between traditional epistemologists and Bayesians.  
Traditional epistemologies focus on belief as a binary categorical concept.  So, 
this area of disconnect should be a starting point for discussion.  There is no doubt 
that real agents are more confident in some propositions than others, while at the 
same time they hold certain beliefs in the categorical sense.  Idealizations, to the 
extent that they are useful and accurate depictions of real agents, should share this 
same feature.  Rather than see this feature, degrees of belief, as a flaw for humans 
as epistemic agents (as the model of binary belief suggests) to be overcome or 
ignored in the idealization, this feature should be incorporated into the idealized 
model.  
Although it is convenient to characterize belief strengths for the ideal 
agent in terms of probabilities that have precise numerical values, a real agent will 
usually have a difficult time determining exactly to what degree she believes in 
the existence of a god, or that the universe is 13.7 billion years old.  However, the 
model of idealized agents and their levels of confidence does not really need to 
rely on numerical values.  An alternative approach is to employ a kind of 
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qualitative probabilism that takes comparative confidence relations to be basic 
(e.g. relations like the agent is more confident that B than that C). On this model 




I will not fully address the issue of how degrees of confidence and 
qualitative comparative confidence are related to binary belief.  A few remarks on 
the issue will serve my purposes.   
The qualitative approach to comparative belief seems a much more natural 
model of belief for real agents than does the numerical degree of belief idea.  
Indeed, the notion of numerical degrees of belief can be shown to derive from the 
qualitative comparative notion.  The numerical notion can be shown (via a 
representation theorem) to be an overly precise idealization of the qualitative 
comparative notion (the notion that the agent is at least as confident that B as that 
C).  Intuitively plausible rules for this comparative notion have been developed 
and explicated.
170
  These rules for comparative confidence (e.g. that comparative 
confidence is transitive) are normative constraints that real agents may in fact 
violate.  (This kind of logical norm is specified in terms or axioms or rules, 
whereas most epistemic norms with which I am concerned in this project are less 
formal.)  Thus, there are at least two important kinds of belief that are 
epistemically important: the categorical doxastic attitude that is binary, admitting 
of no degrees; and the comparative notion, which may be representable by 
                                                 
169
 Hawthorne, “The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief” in Franz Huber and Christoph 
Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, Synthese Library, 342, 2009, Springer, pp. 49-74. 
 
170
 Ibid.  These are adaptations of the axioms qualitative probability. 
154 
 
numerical degrees. Insofar as the binary notion is supposed to satisfy the norm of 
logical consistency—that the agent’s whole body of beliefs should be logically 
consistent—it is every bit as much of an idealization as the comparative notion 
(with its axioms or rules for coherent comparative confidence relations to follow). 
My main concern is not these idealizations as such, but the epistemic life 
of real agents, and how these norms are supposed to benefit real agents.  The 
point of introducing the idealized model is to provide easily recognizable norms 
of belief formation and assent for real agents to follow.  The normative model 
provides a kind of exemplar that shows us what the normative standards are.     
In Chapter 5 I endorsed a view of knowledge and credit in which 
intellectual character plays an important causal role in tending an agent’s belief 
towards truth.  On the view presented in Chapter 5, one of the necessary 
conditions for knowledge and justification is that it be credit worthy.  Just as 
confidence in propositions comes in degrees, there is no doubt that 
creditworthiness comes in degrees as well.  If intellectual credit is closely 
analogous to other kinds of credit (moral or athletic), then the degree to which 
someone deserves credit for true belief depends on the degree to which believing 
truly can be attributed to the agent’s skills or abilities.   
Section 3—Confidence, Belief, and Acceptance 
Mark Kaplan (2002) argues for a modest version of subjective 
Bayesianism in which he adds to the notion of degrees of confidence and binary 
belief a third binary doxastic attitude he calls ‘acceptance.’  He takes the term 
‘accept’ to function in a fairly ordinary sense, similar to the sense in which we 
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accept a proposition for the sake of argument.  Acceptance is what a person is 
willing to assert within the context of inquiry, or alternately “a person accepts P 
just when she is willing to assert P in the context of inquiry; that is, just if, faced 
with a decision problem wherein her sole aim was to assert the truth (as it pertains 
to P), where her only options were to assert that P, assert that not-P, or make 
neither assertion, she would prefer to assert P.”
171
  Acceptance is an alternative to 
categorical belief.  Whereas categorical belief may be understood as a grade of 
confidence above some threshold, or as a state of certainty (a grade of confidence 
at the maximum threshold), acceptance is supposed to be more like supposition 
within a context.  Acceptance itself is not defined in terms of confidence rankings 
(above a threshold, or as a state of certainty).  According to Kaplan, to define it as 
such would make it akin to categorical belief.  On Kaplan’s account, a person 
could rationally accept a theory (in a context. or for some purpose), but at the 
same time be confident that it is false.
172
 
Kaplan’s notion of acceptance is supposed to be a primitive cognitive 
state, like that of naïve belief, creditable to an agent. However, Kaplan is clear 
that he does not wish to replace the notion of naïve belief with acceptance.
173
  A 
naïve belief is one that is not subject to confidence rankings.  For example, an 
ordinary belief formed by the act of perception is a kind of pre-reflective naïve 
belief state.  If I perceive in the ordinary way, I am forming beliefs that I 
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uncritically take to be true.  For instance, I believe that I see a white piece of 
paper in front of me now.  Such beliefs are pre-reflective in that they come to us 
immediately from our perceptual states.  However, some naïve belief states are 
post-reflective, such as a belief formed by the act of “observation”.  If I am 
observing some event in the ordinary way, I form beliefs about them, but may or 
may not be fully confident in the truth of these beliefs.  The idea is that 
observation involves active attention to belief formation via a critical process, and 
as such is subject to confidence rankings, whereas belief about the immediately 
perceived is passive and uncritical. 
Kaplan locates the notion within the context of inquiry, but I think inquiry 
should be understood more broadly to include the context of experience.  For 
example, we might accept something for the sake of argument, but in the same 
way we also might accept the involuntary beliefs that we form from perception.  
Suppose I am walking along a sidewalk on a sunny day.  I am scanning the area in 
front of me unreflectively in order to move down the sidewalk.  As I take in the 
information from my perceptual processes, I accept what I perceive uncritically 
(at least until I encounter some anomaly that gives me reason to reflect critically 
on what I apparently perceive).  It often happens that if given the choice of 
asserting some P about my surroundings, asserting some not-P about my 
surroundings, or asserting neither, I would prefer to assert P.  This is the sense of 
‘accept’ that can be applied to ordinary processes that do not involve ‘higher-
order’ reasoning, but ‘lower-level’ cognitive perceptual processes.   
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Now suppose that the context of inquiry is more narrowly restricted to the 
framework of an argument.  When we accept a proposition for the sake of 
argument, we temporarily grant the truth of the proposition within the framework 
of the argument, though we could have some confidence that the proposition is 
strictly speaking false.  Borrowing Kaplan’s example of the lottery paradox as an 
illustration,
174
 we can at the same time assert that some ticket will win and have a 
high degree of confidence that each individual ticket will lose without running the 
risk of contradiction.   
We can apply this more narrow sense of the context of inquiry to the 
example I gave above of simple, casual acts of perception, but where the context 
is experience and action rather than argument.  When we uncritically perceive our 
surroundings, we grant for the sake (not of argument, but) of getting on in our 
lives that we are not brains in vats, that other minds exist, and so forth.  In other 
words, in simple casual perception we accept what it is that we perceive from 
experience; we accept it for the sake of action.  For example, if given the choice 
of asserting that the sun is out, asserting that the sun is not out, or neither, I prefer 
(for the sake of getting on with my life and the actions I need to take to do so) to 
assert that the sun is out, though I might have a confidence strength to some small 
degree that I may be dreaming.  I prefer to assert that the sun is out because it is 
what I experience and the basis on which I act. 
This narrow sense of the context of inquiry can be refined even further to a 
notion of the type that involves observation.  Observation is distinct from 
perception in that observation is more epistemically active, requiring attention to 
                                                 
174
 Kaplan (2002), op. cit., p. 454. 
158 
 
things, both those directly perceived by the senses and those that cannot be 
directly perceived.
175
  The added attention employed in observation involves a 
kind of epistemic activity requiring discernment and judgment.  When we assess 
evidence in a scientific setting, someone (the researcher or an assistant) engages 
in observation of the evidence (or at least observation of instrument reading that 
indicate the evidence).  When we observe evidence within this context of inquiry, 
we accept the evidence—accept it in a way that does not involve some degree of 
confidence we have in the evidence.   
Kaplan tries to distinguish several distinct binary notions of belief.  But, I 
think the notion Kaplan explicates is a quite ordinary notion, and that the 
introduction of a new term, ‘acceptance’, is of no particular help.  The belief state 
is categorical and naive in the sense that it is not subject to ranking in terms of 
degrees of confidence either pre-reflectively or post-reflectively.  Kaplan’s 
contribution is to point out that binary belief often functions relative to a context 
of inquiry.  Contexts of inquiry vary and differ in important ways.  They range 
from contexts like that of everyday perception to that of refined observation in an 
experimental setting.  In each of these contexts belief is a binary cognitive state; 
given the options of asserting the propositional content of the belief, asserting the 
negation of the propositional content of the belief, or not asserting anything, an 
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agent would prefer (among only these three options) to assert that content 
(sometimes even despite having only a small degree of confidence in the belief). 
It seems to me that there are epistemic norms that govern the formation 
and possession of this kind of belief state in a fundamental, regulative way, and 
there are cognitive virtues and vices that affect the agent’s ability to satisfy these 
norms.  For example, when the belief state is pre-reflective (and the context of 
inquiry is sufficiently broad), the cognitive virtue is more akin to a skill or ability 
to pay proper attention.  Perceptual excellence in this case just is the faculty 
functioning in the proper way,  a way that is conducive to making the belief states 
that result from the exercise of the virtue that governs the relevant faculty more 
likely to be true than false.  When the belief state is post-reflective (and the 
context of inquiry is narrowed), the cognitive virtue is more akin to a character 
trait virtue.  Observational excellence perhaps involves the perceptual excellence 
to some extent, but the character-trait that promotes excellence, as part of the 
agent’s cognitive makeup, is more involved.  For instance, the cognitive makeup 
of the agent will also involve motivation as a contributing factor to observational 
excellence. 
Where does the conception of epistemic virtue fit into the Bayesian 
approach to an epistemology for the sciences?  More specifically, how does it fit 
into the probabilistic apparatus?  I think that agent reliability and motivation are 
part of the background information we take as granted in the context.  Given that 
an agent is epistemically reliable (employs reliable epistemic processes), he will 
reliably form true beliefs—perhaps only believing those claims for which he has 
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the appropriate degree of confidence.  If formation of the belief (or the acquisition 
of an appropriate degree of confidence) involves motivation, to the extent that the 
agent is properly motivated to seek the truth and has the required capacities for 
finding it, the agent should be reliable in forming true beliefs (or reliably holding 
the appropriate degree of confidence). 
The idea that reliability can be fitted into the Bayesian apparatus has 
recently been explored by Bovens and Hartmann (2003).  They construct a model 
of witness reliability, using degree of reliability as an endogenous propositional 
variable.
176
  They argue that since true-positive rates and false-positive rates are 
well documented for medical tests, when we receive agreement on outcomes from 
various already well-confirmed medical tests, this does not usually influence our 
confidence in the reliability of the tests.  However things are very different when 
we are considering information from sources for which the reliability is open to 
question.  When we receive information from a set of sources, we may at first be 
skeptical.  However, if we receive the same information from each of various 
independent sources, our confidence in the reliability of these sources increases.  
Bovens and Hartmann supply precise Bayesian models of how this should 
work.
177
   
I think that this is an important idea for a proponent of BCT to consider.  
To the extent that BCT is an idealization, the difference between a partially 
reliable medical test and a partially reliable witness is usually not taken into 
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account.  Both involve evidentiary mechanisms.  However, when using a medical 
test with well-documented and sufficiently high true positive rates and sufficiently 
low false positive rates, our degree of confidence in the reliability of test does not 
change upon receiving a series of agreeing outcomes.  And that is as it should be.  
However, we do become more confident in the reliability of an individual witness 
when we receive a series of reports that can be corroborated with other reports 
from other witnesses.  And that is also as it should be.  Indeed, even in cases 
involving a single report this difference is apparent.  Upon receiving a positive 
outcome for a single test with well-documented high true-positive and true-
negative rates, our degree of confidence in the reliability of the test should not 
change.  But our degree of confidence in the reliability of a witness may well 
change significantly when the witness provides information that we later verify as 
true.  
Both BCT and VE are kinds of naturalism in a broad sense.  The broad 
sense of naturalism that I have in mind is that which takes into account the natural 
features of a human agent, and then tries to define the notions of justification, 
knowledge, etc. in terms of those features.  This kind of subjectivity that plays 
roles in BCT and in VE is only to be expected in naturalistic accounts of the 
attempts of human agents to justify belief and obtain knowledge. 
Section 4—Virtue Epistemology meets the Problem of the Priors 
So, how might we draw the notion of epistemic character from virtue 
epistemology into Bayesian epistemology to solve the problem of the priors?  The 
problem of the priors is a problem for establishing constraints other than the mere 
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rules of probability theory on what prior probabilities are assigned to hypotheses.  
I think that epistemic virtues may be brought to bear in reasoning constraining 
how prior probabilities are to be assigned.  Before I delve into how this could be 
accomplished, I want to point out an important aspect of the problem of the priors. 
In some cases the prior probabilities of hypotheses merely concern the 
relative frequencies of events of some sort – e.g. base rates for a disease in a 
population.  In such cases prior probabilities are really a kind of likelihood, and 
are also unproblematic.
178
  But the prior probabilities of most scientific 
hypotheses are not like this.  There is no base-rate to which to appeal in assessing 
the prior probability of a theory of the nature of matter and energy, or for a theory 
about the origin of life on earth.  Nevertheless, there would be no problem of 
assessing the values of prior probabilities if the kind of relevant background 
information that functions as premises for plausibility arguments for alternative 
hypotheses, and its strength in support of various hypotheses, were uniformly 
agreed to by all scientists in the relevant discipline.  The problem of the priors 
exists precisely because such background information as provides for plausibility 
arguments is not uniformly recognized and agreed to, and the weight of their 
support for the various alternative hypotheses is not objectively or inter-
subjectively agreed to by the relevant community.   
It is relatively uncontroversial that individual agents hold some beliefs 
more firmly than others, and I think it is clear enough that these belief strengths 
can be represented in terms of probabilistic weightings on a scale from zero to 
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one, where the belief strengths of incompatible claims sum to the strength of their 
disjunction.  Thus degrees of belief measured as personal probabilities make good 
sense, even if the numerical values are overly precise;  for, it’s really the ordering 
by strength among beliefs that matters.  Furthermore, it seems to me that this 
subjectivist idea about belief weightings need not appeal to relative frequencies.  
For example, one may well believe more strongly that Alzheimer’s disease is 
caused by reduced synthesis of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine than that it is 
caused by amyloid beta deposits, without basing these belief strengths on any 
kind of frequency information about rates at which diseases of various kinds are 
caused by various mechanisms.  Personal probabilities represent subjective 
uncertainties – subjective belief strengths.  Subjectivist Bayesians construe prior 
probabilities for hypotheses in just this way.  By contrast, Bayesian likelihoods 
for evidence according to hypotheses are relatively objective in scientific 
contexts.  They are taken to represent what the hypotheses say about the evidence.  
But prior probabilities are usually construed as the personal belief strengths of 
agents with regard to the truth of various hypotheses before the evidence is taken 
into account.  Bayes’ theorem computes the posterior probabilities of hypotheses, 
which represent the plausibility of hypotheses based on the evidence together with 
the prior plausibilities of hypotheses (as represented by prior probabilities). Thus, 
prior probabilities are the most subjective element of Bayes’ theorem.   
However, in scientific settings prior probabilities are not merely subjective 
personal probability assignments—at least they shouldn’t be.  In that setting all 
kinds of background information, especially plausibility arguments, are essential 
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to assessing hypotheses.  For example, in discussions of scientific methodology, 
Pierre Duhem (the physicist, philosopher of science, and anti-inductivist) often 
appealed to scientific “good sense”, the intuitive reasoning ability of scientists, to 
account for how a scientific discipline may be successful in evaluating 
hypotheses.  Among those attributes of reasonable scientists Duhem seems to 
have in mind are good judgment in assessing which possible hypotheses (or 
theories) are worthy of consideration (i.e., which ones pass the laugh test), and a 
fair and impartial assessment of the weight of evidence.
179
   
Recently attempts have been made at reconstructing Duhem’s notion of 
“good sense” as epistemic virtues within a version of a virtue epistemology.
180
  I 
am sympathetic to these attempts.  But as an avowed inductivist I take the notion 
of “good sense” to best be captured as the kinds of plausibility assessments 
scientist draw on in making judgments that are relevant to which hypothesis or 
theory is best confirmed overall.  In a Bayesian confirmation theory hypotheses 
and theories are evaluated relative to a body of evidence and relative to 
plausibility considerations that bear on hypotheses independently of that body of 
evidence.  The body of evidence influences the support for a hypothesis via how 
likely the evidence is according to that hypothesis as compared to how likely the 
evidence is according to competing hypotheses.  Thus, the evidence impacts 
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hypothesis via ratios of likelihoods.  That is the likelihoodist component of the 
Bayesian model of evidential support.   
But there is clearly more to hypothesis evaluation than that.  To see the 
point, consider the following kind of case.  A scientist submits a research paper to 
a reputable journal reporting extremely strong experimental evidence against a 
new hypothesis X that no one has ever tested before.  The journal refuses to 
publish, saying that no one would have believed X anyway – that X is an 
extremely implausible hypothesis – it doesn’t “pass the laugh test”.  But isn’t 
science supposed to be completely objective, looking only at what the evidence 
is?  If that were true, then refuting evidence for any hypothesis should be as 
important as refuting evidence for any other hypothesis.  The point is that 
scientists take plausibility considerations into account all the time.  The Bayesian 
approach just codifies the role of such considerations.  The fact that the 
plausibility considerations don’t come from experimental evidence doesn’t mean 
that these considerations are mere subjective whims.  Scientist may (and should) 
have good reasons for such assessments, and they should be willing to make those 
considerations public, open to discussion and assessment, and reassessment.  The 
open discussion among a community about what is reasonable and plausible is 
precisely the arena where the intellectual virtues should play an important role.  
The good epistemic character of the participants means that they are willing to 
engage in a fair and open-mined (epistemically virtuous) search for the truth.  
Real agents may only approximate this ideal.  But to the extent that they do 
approximate it, and provided that such epistemic virtues are indeed truth-
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promoting, this way of employing the Bayesian logic furthers the chances that the 
Bayesian mechanism will produce highly confirmed hypotheses that are indeed 
true.   
Chapter 2 explained how the Bayesian inferential mechanism can succeed 
here, provided the epistemic virtues employed in the service of plausibility 
analyses are reliable enough that they judge hypotheses that really are true to be 
not too extremely implausible prior to bring evidence to bear.    
Section 5—Virtue Epistemology meets Rational Analysis 
What does virtue epistemology have to offer the contemporary project in 
cognitive science known as rational analysis?  If the goal is just to model how 
human agents extract information from an environment, then does virtue 
epistemology have anything to offer cognitive science?  One response might be 
this: the way in which rational analysis models human behavior adds 
significantly to our understanding of that behavior, and the kind of Bayesian 
analysis employed by rational analysis does seem to show that some apparent 
cognitive mistakes are indeed ‘rational’ after all.  So, there is no need for any 
additional normative standard that a virtue theory might bring to bear. 
I agree that the models employed by rational analysis may do a good job 
at explaining some kinds of human behavior.  Furthermore, in most everyday 
cases those suboptimal solutions rationalized by rational analyses may well be 
“good enough” for our needs.  However, if some of the suboptimal inferential 
behaviors were transferred as “rational enough” to the domain of scientific 
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inferences in real scientific contexts, scientific knowledge would be the worse for 
it.   
Consider, for example, the kind of inferential behavior rationalized by 
rational analysis in the context of the Wason task.  Recall that in those 
experiments most people exhibit a verification bias.  They naturally tend to look 
only for confirming evidence, but fail to be disposed to look for refuting or 
falsifying evidence.  Rational analysis does model such behavior as an optimal 
use of resources under the right kinds of circumstances.  But that doesn’t mean 
that a verification bias is always to be preferred.  Indeed, were it widespread 
within a scientific domain it would be devastating to the attempt gain scientific 
knowledge.  Scientific hypotheses would less often be subjected to experiment 
that might falsification or refutation them.  As a result popular hypotheses and 
theories that are in fact false tend to hold on for a longer period of time.  Their 
continued positive successes would make the search for alternatives seem much 
less important. 
The rationalization of verification bias given by rational analysis may be 
the correct behavior (according to a decision theoretic cost-benefit analysis) in 
situations that only involve the “extraction of information” from an environment.  
And this may well help to explain the usual reliability of many of our judgments 
in our daily lives.  But when out judgments may have much more dire 
consequences, the cost-benefit factors change, and getting to the truth may be 
more crucial.   
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For example, when I wake up in the morning and first open my eyes, I 
reliably tend to form true beliefs about my environment.  The cognitive virtues 
that I exercise in that kind of setting are of the perceptual kind, where all I need to 
do is be successful is pay sufficient attention to my environment so as not to trip 
over the cat.  In this environment, under these circumstances, by not spending too 
much time trying to find evidence to falsify my hypothesis about where I am and 
the layout of my room, I’m not only acting rationally, I am also acting in accord 
with epistemic virtue. For my purposes—getting to the coffee—may failure to test 
my environmental hypotheses is not a failure of rationality.  Indeed, working too 
hard at finding falsifying evidence about my environment would be epistemically 
vicious. 
However, it is worth noting that in the Wason task itself a verification bias 
is far from praiseworthy.  In this experimental situation, given the task as 
described by the experimenter, failure to check for the falsifying evidence exhibits 
the epistemic vice of failing to look for easily accessible refuting evidence.  In 
fact, once the mistake is explained to subjects, they invariably get it.  
Furthermore, when the same sort of rule is cast in less abstract terms (e.g. “if a 
person is drinking a beer, in then she has an ID saying she is that says is at least 
21”), subjects are much more likely to look for falsifying instances (checking beer 
drinkers' IDs to see if the rule has not been followed).   
My point is that it seems to me that the notion of rationality employed by 
the rational analysis program goes too far in its efforts to provide a rational 
explanation of the real inferential failures of people.  Drawing on the notion of 
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epistemic virtues understood in terms of skills and abilities together with the 
appropriate motivation component, changes how we may judge such behaviors in 
important ways.  The intellectual virtues provide normative standards for good 
thinking.  The usual (abstractly stated) Wason task is a deductive reasoning 
problem.  People do in fact come up short in the rigorous pursuit of relevant 
evidence here—they fail to exhibit a virtue of good inferential practice.  However, 
as pointed out earlier, the rigorous pursuit of relevant falsifying evidence would 
be a vice in a different kind of situation (getting to my morning coffee).   
As with virtue ethics, the virtue, the excellence, comes with finding an 
action appropriate to the situation.  Indeed, this is often how moral virtue is 
identified.  For example, virtue ethics is neither rule-governed nor concerned 
strictly with promoting a particular optimal consequence (e.g. utility).  Epistemic 
virtue works the same way.  The virtue, the excellence, appropriate to the 
epistemic act is often better identified by looking to an exemplar of that 
excellence, and the exemplar is identified, usually, by her success at achieving the 
epistemic goal. Perhaps even models of ideal agents may be able to play this 
exemplary role in cases where it can be shown that the agent of the ideal model 
will tend to achieve the desired kinds of success (such as avoiding Dutch books, 
or converging on the truth as evidence increases).   
Section 6—A Closing Remark 
As I see it, the ideas discussed in this dissertation are only the beginning 
of a much larger project that should ultimately produce a more unified 
epistemology.  If this investigation is headed in the right direction, then that 
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unified view will be a virtue epistemology that is informed by Bayesian 
approaches to the confirmation of scientific hypotheses, by Bayesian decision 
theory, and by empirical research on real human cognition, as exemplified by 
rational analysis.  A truly comprehensive epistemology will have to draw on all 
of these resources, and explore connections among them much more fully.  I hope 
to have at least illustrated the fruitfulness of this kind of approach, and to have 
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